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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The deciphering of the human genetic code in 2003 has been widely acknowledged as a major 
achievement in genetic science but it has given rise to a number of legal and ethical concerns, 
most notably that of the protection of genetic information.  Universally, there are ongoing 
attempts to address this concern. This research proposes a suitable approach for South African 
law.  It proceeds from the premise that the privacy paradigm, rather than the anti-discrimination 
paradigm, is better suited to the protection of genetic information, hence the discourse on genetic 
privacy. The unique challenges posed by genetic information are identified, with a focus on 
forensic DNA databases, genetic research databases, life insurance, employment, and genetic 
research involving human participants.   
An in-depth analysis of the South African privacy protection framework is undertaken in 
order to determine its adequacy for the purpose of meeting the legal and ethical demands of 
genetic information. Aspects of the law of privacy, insurance, labour, evidence; medical law; 
philosophy and bioethics are accordingly traversed. A cross-jurisdictional review is undertaken 
with the aim of identifying lessons to be learnt from the experiences of the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States of America.  Legislation, common law, 
codes of practice, court decisions, international conventions, legal literature, ethical guidelines, 
and industry developments pertaining to the selected jurisdictions, are studied with the aim of 
identifying strengths and weaknesses in the various approaches. 
It is found that the current South African position is fragmented, complex, and in urgent 
need of reform.  Another finding is that existing national and international ethical guidelines are 
not entirely adequate for the protection of genetic privacy. These findings, together with the 
lessons gleaned from the cross-jurisdictional review, lead to the conclusion that South Africa 
needs a specific genetic information protection statute for the protection of genetic privacy.  This 
research culminates with recommendations regarding the content of the proposed statute. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
„The advent of modern genetic science has generally been heralded as one of the greatest 
advances in human history.  Unfortunately, it is also perceived as one of the biggest threats to 
individual interests in the contemporary private sphere.‟1 
 
„A great deal of the sociological and much of the legal literature on privacy is often both 
frustrating to read and futile to recount.  This need not particularly concern the law reformer.  
Provided an identifiable wrong is shown to lack an adequate legal remedy, the necessity for 
which can be clearly demonstrated, the onus placed upon those who seek to change the law, is 
discharged.‟2   
 
 
The science of genetics emerged in the mid-nineteenth century when Gregor Mendel‟s 
experiments with peas led to the discovery of the basic mechanisms of heredity.  It was then that 
the journey to deciphering the genetic code began.  In 1953 James Watson and Francis Crick 
discovered the double-helix structure of deoxyribonucleicacid (DNA), a feat which earned them 
the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine in 1962.  The Human Genome Project was launched 
in 1990 and the first draft of the human genetic code was completed in June 2000.  This code is 
considered to be the blueprint for human life, which in turn has led to theories of genetic 
determinism, genetic reductionism, and genetics exceptionalism.   
Genetic determinism refers to the belief that the future of an individual is decided solely by 
genetic makeup and nothing can be done to change that.  Genetic reductionism is the theory that 
everything about human beings is determined by genes, without any regard to external factors.  
This includes health and behavioural traits.  The influence of external factors is totally 
disregarded.  Genetics exceptionalism is the theory that genetic information is unique and 
deserving of special protection. Privacy is said to have emerged as an important issue within a 
largely genetics exceptionalism discourse.
3
  Fears of discrimination in areas of employment and 
                                                 
1
  Graeme Laurie  Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms  (2002) 20. 
2
  Raymond Wacks  The Protection of Privacy (1980) 176. 
3
  Jennifer Molina Genetic Privacy: Issues in Aotearoa/New Zealand  (2005) available at  
http://www.ssrc.canterbury.ac.nz/research/2004-5/Genetic%20Privacy.pdf  accessed on 14 July 2007. 
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insurance have come to the fore. A fear of eugenics
4
 has also emerged. Such anxiety may be 
attributed to the absence of regulation in this new but rapidly advancing field and a general fear 
of the unknown. 
   The realisation of the potential for diagnosis and prediction of genetic conditions began with 
the initiation of the Human Genome Project in 1990.  This Project was an organised international 
scientific endeavour to determine the complete structure of the human DNA and to understand its 
function. The aims of the Human Genome Project were to - 
(1) identify all the genes in human DNA; 
(2)  determine the sequences of the 3 billion chemical base pairs that make up human DNA; 
(3)   store this information in databases; 
(4)   improve tools for data analysis; 
(5)   transfer related technologies to the private sector; and  
(6)   address the ethical, legal, and social issues that may arise from the project.
5
 
  The completion of the human DNA sequence in 2003 coincided with the 50th anniversary of 
Watson and Crick's discovery of the fundamental structure of DNA.  Although this achievement 
of the Human Genome Project has been hailed as a giant step in science, it has major 
consequences for the law.  It has renewed the debates surrounding the issue of personal privacy 
and fears of discrimination as a consequential harm resulting from inadequate privacy protection.  
Since the completion of the human DNA sequence the issue of genetic privacy has gained 
attention in many countries. The potential uses
6
 of genetic information give rise to privacy 
concerns.  These concerns are wider than those that may be addressed by confidentiality.  The 
protection afforded by confidentiality is not sufficient in the context of genetic information 
because genetic information is not limited to situations involving medical professionals and 
patients. Genetic information is generated in other settings such as research and it is therefore 
                                                 
4
   The term was coined in 1883 by Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin.  Galton defined the term as „the 
science of improving inherited stock, not only by judicious matings, but by all the influences which give more 
suitable strains a better chance‟.  The forced sterilisation of mentally retarded individuals in the United States of 
America  in the 1930‟s and the attempt to create a master-race by the mass killing of Jews in Germany are examples 
of eugenics.  See David J. Galton & Clare J. Galton „Francis Galton: and eugenics today‟ (1998) 24:2 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 99. 
 
5
  Human Genome Project Information, available at  
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/about.shtml  accessed on 2 July 2007. 
6
  Genetic information is more commonly used for predicting and diagnosing medical conditions, assisting in 
reproductive decision-making, assessing suitability for employment, assessing insurance eligibility, identification in 
criminal cases, conducting medical research, and determining paternity.  See Eugene Oscapella Genetics, Privacy 
and Discrimination Document Prepared for the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (2000) 8. 
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necessary to protect genetic information privacy instead of simply relying on confidentiality.  
Confidentiality can clearly not fully address the privacy concerns relating to genetic information 
due to its limited scope of application. Concerns around the use of genetic information in the 
context of insurance, employment, and databases have been most prominent in other countries. 
This is evident from the major inquiries
7
 into the protection of genetic information as well as the 
results of empirical studies conducted in the United Kingdom
8
 and in Australia.
9
  
Genetic privacy protection is clearly an issue which will have to be addressed throughout the 
world in due course.  For this reason it has to be considered and responded to in South Africa.  
The thrust of this study is accordingly to provide insight into the issues that must be considered 
when developing a South African response to the challenges posed by genetic privacy.   In that 
sense it is proactive as it anticipates the challenges and makes recommendations.  It focuses 
specifically on genetic information which is information about a person‟s inherited genetic 
make-up.  Genetic information is obtained through genetic testing and disclosure of such 
information may lead to genetic discrimination.  The focus does not extend to genomic 
information which is information gained from studies of the interaction between various genes as 
well as between genes and the environment.  Such a study does not fall within the parameters of 
this research. 
Genetic information privacy is not yet the subject of debate in South Africa but it needs 
attention for the following reasons: 
(1) Genetic privacy is an issue that is inevitable in the wake of rapidly advancing 
technologies as is apparent from the ongoing debates in other countries. 
(2) South Africa currently has disease registries which are not covered by legislation 
regarding disease notification and which were initiated as a result of scientific interest.  Cancer 
registries and the birth defects registry are prime examples.
10
 This is of concern especially in the 
case of breast cancer which has been attributed to the BRCA-1 and BRCA-2 genes.  BRCA1 is a 
                                                 
7
  Australian Law Reform Commission (Project 26) Essentially Yours: The Protection of Human Genetic 
Information in Australia (2003);  Human Genetics Commission Inside Information: Balancing Interests in the Use 
of Personal Genetic Data (2002). 
8
  Lawrence Low, Suzanne King & Tom Wilkie „Genetic discrimination in life insurance: Empirical evidence 
from a cross-sectional survey of genetic support groups in the United Kingdom‟ (1998) 317 British Medical Journal 
1632. 
9
  Margaret F Otlowski, Sandra D Taylor & Kristine K  Barlow-Stewart „Australian empirical study into genetic 
discrimination‟ (2002) 12 Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 164. 
10
 Nokuzola Mqoqi , Freddy Sitas and Jane Halkett  South African Health Review (2002) ch 20, available at 
http://www.hst.org.za/uploads/files/chapter20.pdf, accessed  on12 June 2007. 
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breast cancer susceptibility gene that was first identified in 1994. People carrying a mutation in 
this gene are at an increased risk of breast or ovarian cancer.  BRCA-2 was identified in 1995 
and is also a cancer causing gene when mutated. The data in cancer registries are used by 
researchers and insurers, amongst others.
11
  Unregulated or insufficiently regulated access to this 
information is cause for concern because hereditary breast cancer is caused by a mutant gene 
passed from parents to children and also because breast cancer is more prevalent in certain ethnic 
groups such as Ashkenazi Jews. 
 (3) The third concern relates to the facilitation of international collaborative medical research 
which may involve the transborder flow of data.  This requires that South Africa develop privacy 
protection mechanisms which are found to be adequate by international roleplayers in research.   
A case in point is the European Data Protection Directive,
12
 in terms of which all countries 
trading with European Union member states are required to have data protection regimes which 
conform to the adequacy standards laid down in the Directive.
13
   The Directive provides that 
member states shall only transfer data to countries which provide an adequate level of protection 
to personal data.   
(4) The National Health Act 61 of 2003 provides for the prevention of unauthorised access to 
health records but does not define a health record.
14
  It is therefore uncertain whether genetic 
information will be afforded such protection from disclosure under this legislation. 
(5)  The Department of Health has published policy guidelines for the management and 
prevention of genetic disorders, birth defects and disabilities.
15
  One of the goals set down in 
these guidelines is to establish a national monitoring and evaluation system for genetic disorders 
and birth defects.
16
  Item 5.6 refers to data collection by the department under a National Genetic 
Information System.  The guidelines do provide that individual privacy should be protected from 
institutional third parties such as employers, insurers, schools, commercial entities, and 
government agencies.
17
 The department‟s goal is to integrate genetic services into the primary 
                                                 
11
   Ibid 398. 
12
  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of  
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data. 
13
   Ibid art. 25. 
14
  Section 17. 
15
  Policy Guidelines for the Management and Prevention of Genetic Disorders, Birth Defects and Disabilities 
(2001). 
 
16
  Ibid 11. 
17
  Ibid 49. 
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health care system and it recognises that protection of privacy is important when dealing with 
genetic information.  The question which arises is how privacy is to be protected.   
(6) Guidelines issued by the Medical Research Council draw attention to the long-term 
storage of information resulting from genetic screening and which may form the basis of a 
genetic register.
18
 The Council acknowledges that „confidentiality of all medical information is 
essential, and this is particularly the case with genetic registers, which may contain highly 
sensitive and potentially identifiable data on large numbers of individuals with, or at risk of, 
serious genetic disorders. Computer-based genetic registers are subject to the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act 2 of 2000, but there is a need for additional safeguards for all genetic 
registers, including secure storage of information, limitation of access to those specifically 
responsible for a register, and the removal of identifying information when data are used for 
research purposes. This is an important area of concern. The Department of Health, in 
consultation with health authorities and appropriate professional bodies, should devise effective 
arrangements for the preservation of confidentiality, particularly in relation to genetic registers, 
and should provide the necessary guidance.‟19  The nature of genetic registers clearly indicates a 
need for privacy protection. The Department of Health has issued regulations
20
 dealing with 
these issues this issue but the adequacy of these regulations is open to debate. It is important to 
note that the promotion of Access to Information Act applies only in the context of requests for 
access to information.  Information is only protected from disclosure in the case of a request for 
access.   
(7) There is no legislation in South Africa for the regulation of human genetic databases as is 
apparent from the regulations
21
 mentioned above. 
(8) Data protection measures are very limited in South Africa.  Neethling observes that 
„South African commentators are unanimous that the creation of such measures through 
legislation is a matter of great urgency.‟22  The call for urgent legislative intervention is due to 
the threat posed to the privacy of individuals by the collection of personal data.  As far as genetic 
information is concerned, the threat arises in the context of the creation of forensic DNA 
                                                 
18
  South African Medical Research Council Guidelines on Ethics in Reproductive Biology and Genetic Research 
(2000).  
19
   Ibid para 3.3.4.1.4. 
20
   Regulations  relating to the use of human biological material  GN R.177 GG 35099 of 2 March 2012. 
21
    Ibid. 
22
  J Neethling, J M Potgieter & P J Visser  Neethling’s Law of Personality  2ed (2005) 271. 
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databases.  The individual‟s right to privacy has to be balanced against the interest of the state in 
solving crime. 
(9) In South Africa the doctrine of privilege does not apply to the confidential relationship 
between doctor and patient.  Genetic information gained in the course of such a relationship is 
therefore protected by the rules of confidentiality but is not subject to any privilege.  A concept 
of „genetic privilege‟ as a statutory privilege is therefore worth investigating. This privilege may 
be based on the nature of the relationship within which the information has been imparted or 
come into existence or on the nature of the information sought to be protected from disclosure. 
Alternatively, a judicial discretion to excuse a witness from giving evidence in breach of a social 
or ethical value may be considered.  A statutory basis for such discretion would ensure that the 
discretion is exercised in a consistent and reasonably predictable manner.   
    All of the abovementioned issues support the argument that the issue of genetic privacy 
requires prompt attention from legal scholars, policymakers, and legislators in South Africa.  
Privacy is a constitutionally entrenched right and is therefore important enough to warrant this 
investigation, especially when other countries have already debated the issue and have developed 
appropriate strategies to deal with genetic privacy.  Even though this area is evolving rapidly, it 
has to be regulated to prevent harm which could jeopardise the realisation of the constitutionally- 
entrenched right to privacy in South Africa.  Failure to take action is likely to result in 
unnecessary uncertainty and otherwise avoidable litigation. 
  The main objective of this research is accordingly to demonstrate a need for genetic privacy 
legislation in South Africa, based on the identification of gaps, inconsistencies, and overlaps in 
the current regulatory framework as well as the advances that have been made in the selected 
overseas jurisdictions.  This entails striking a balance between the privacy rights of the 
individual and the rights of third parties who may seek access to the genetic information.  In 
order to strike the correct balance, it is essential to consider the debates that have informed such 
decisions in other countries.  This research is therefore very important for South Africa because 
it will position policymakers and legislators to respond to the challenges posed by genetic 
information privacy in an informed manner.   
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1.2 THE DEFINITION OF GENETIC INFORMATION 
Literature on the nature of genetic information is characterised by polarised views on genetics 
exceptionalism and the genetic inclusivist approach (sometimes referred to in the literature as 
genetic anti-exceptionalism).  Genetics exceptionalism has been defined as „the societal practice 
of treating genetic data as different from other types of health data for the purposes of assessing 
privacy and security protections.‟23  The leading proponents of genetics exceptionalism are 
Annas, Glantz and Roche who are of the view that genetic information is unique because it - 
(1) can predict an individual‟s likely medical future for a variety of conditions; 
(2) divulges personal information about parents, siblings, and children; and 
(3) has historically been used to stigmatise and victimise individuals.
24
 
They refer to the information contained in DNA as an individual‟s „coded probabilistic future 
diary‟.25  They take the view that genetic information is uniquely powerful, uniquely personal, 
and thus merits unique privacy protection.
26
   
The Human Genetics Commission in the United Kingdom identified the following as possible 
reasons for the special consideration of genetic information: 
(1) it is uniquely identifying information; 
(2) it can be obtained from a small sample and even without the knowledge of the individual 
from whom it is obtained; 
(3) it is predictive; 
(4) it may be of interest to third parties such as insurance companies and employers; 
(5) it has potential commercial value; 
(6) it has value for pharmacogenomics; and 
(7) it may be collected for one purpose and subsequently be used for another purpose.
27
 
Proponents of the genetic inclusivist approach contend that genetic information is just another 
form of medical information and it therefore does not warrant special protection.  Gostin, Hodge,  
and Murray are opposed to the idea of genetics exceptionalism.  Gostin and Hodge argue that 
genetics exceptionalism is flawed for the following two reasons:  
                                                 
23
  Gostin LO & Hodge JG „Genetic privacy and the law: An end to genetics exceptionalism‟ (1999) 40 Jurimetrics 
21 at 31. 
24
   George J Annas , Leonard H Glantz & Patricia A Roche „Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act: Science, policy and 
practical considerations‟ (1995) 23:4 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 360. 
25
  Ibid.  
26
  Ibid 365. 
27
   Human Genetics Commission Discussion Document Whose Hands on Your Genes (2000) at 6. 
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(1) Strict protections of autonomy, privacy and equal treatment of persons with genetic 
conditions threaten the accomplishment of public goods; and 
(2) there is no clear demarcation separating genetic data from other health data.‟28 
Murray argues that there is no good moral justification for treating genetic information 
differently from other medical information.
29
 He points out that many other types of medical 
information also provide „probabilistic peeks‟ into future health risks and may give rise to 
discrimination.
30
 He accordingly finds it difficult to justify the different treatment of genetic 
information. 
 Rothstein argues that the reasons for regarding genetic information as different from other 
medical health information are social rather than scientific.
31
  O‟Neill also rejects the genetics 
exceptionalism theory and draws a distinction between the use of genetic data and the data itself.  
She believes that there are good reasons for regarding certain uses of data as distinctive.
32
  
Genetic data becomes distinctive because of the way it may be used by third parties.  Tavani 
agrees with O‟Neill‟s argument only insofar as it relates to the use of genetic data being 
distinctive as opposed to the intrinsic nature of the data itself. He goes a step further and asks 
what exactly makes the use of genetic data distinctive and his answer lies in the advanced data 
processing technology that is now available.
33
  
      Tavani correctly argues that genetics exceptionalists focus too strongly on the differences 
between genetic and non-genetic personal information whilst anti-exceptionalists underestimate 
critical differences.
34
  A few commentators have suggested a middle ground in relation to the 
classification of genetic information.  Lemmens and Austin adopt a particularly robust approach 
to genetic information.
35
  They convincingly argue that genetic information shares many of the 
characteristics of traditional health information and that it does not raise new legal or ethical 
questions.  This argument is qualified by the acknowledgement that there is still a need for a 
                                                 
28
  Op cit note 23 at 21. 
29
  T Murray „Genetic Exceptionalism and Future Diaries: Is Genetic Information Different from Other Medical 
Information?‟ in Mark A Rothstein (ed) Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era 
(1997) 71. 
30
  Ibid 64.    
31
   Mark A Rothstein (ed) Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era (1997) 459. 
32
  Onora O‟Neill Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (2002) 105. 
33
  Herman T Tavani „Genomic research and data–mining technology: Implications for personal privacy and 
informed consent‟ (2004) 6 Ethics and Information Technology 15 at 21. 
34
  Ibid 20. 
35
  Trudo Lemmens  & Lisa Austin Of volume, death and speed: The challenges of genetic information Report for 
the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (2001). 
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reassessment of existing regimes and consideration of the development of new regulatory 
responses.   They argue that the following factors should be reasons for reassessing current 
regulatory approaches:  
(1)  exacerbation of existing ethical and social problems relating to general health 
information; 
(2)  elevation of existing social and ethical  issues beyond the level of the individual,  to 
family and community levels; 
(3) the volume of information that can be extracted from one sample which can be kept 
indefinitely; 
(4) speed of testing; and 
(5) the link between genetics and computer technology.
36
 
Lemmens and Austin conclude that „the concerns raised by the advent of genetic testing are 
related more to what one can call an amplification of existing concerns about the use of health 
information than to the specificity of genetics.  It is a matter of degree, or depth, more than a 
matter of newness.‟37  
 Kosseim et al
38
 have identified four general approaches to the protection of human genetic 
information: 
(1) The personal information approach in terms of which genetic information is encompassed 
by the broad definition of personal data. Canada, France and New Zealand adopt this 
approach. 
(2) The sensitive information approach which requires genetic information to be classified as 
sensitive data in order to be protected. This approached is followed by the European 
Parliament, Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
(3)  The medical information approach which recognises genetic information as medical 
information. The World Medical Association, Australia, Council of Europe, and the 
United States of America follow this approach. 
                                                 
36
  Ibid 23. 
37
  Ibid 2. 
38
   Patricia Kosseim, Martin Letendre & Bartha Maria  Knoppers „Protecting genetic information: A comparison of 
normative approaches‟ (2004) 2:1 GenEdit  1 at 3-4. 
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(4)  The genetic information approach which requires genetic-specific rules. UNESCO, the 
United Nations, and Israel follow this approach.
39
 
 Kosseim et al
40
 adopt a similar view to that taken by Lemmens and Austin.   They argue that 
the issues raised by genetic information are not new but a more acute form of those relating to 
other personal information. They do not support the idea of a separate legal regime to regulate 
genetic data. Instead, they recommend that existing frameworks governing personal information 
should be reassessed in light of the „new‟ issues raised by genetics.  These commentators favour 
the personal information regime because it focuses on the purpose for which personal 
information may be collected, used and disclosed rather than on the type of information sought to 
be protected. 
   It follows from the discussion above that it cannot be assumed that existing regulatory 
regimes will address the heightened challenges posed by genetic information. The first step in 
the assessment process would be to adopt an appropriate definition of genetic information and 
thereafter to determine the extent to which existing regulatory mechanisms protect such 
information. The definition or classification of genetic information will have a significant impact 
on the methods employed to protect it.  From a legal perspective the definition of genetic 
information is crucial to the determination of the appropriate privacy protection model.  It is 
important to determine whether genetic information should be treated as personal information, as 
sensitive information within the ambit of general data protection legislation, or whether it 
warrants separate attention.  It is necessary to develop a definition which is neither too narrow 
nor too broad.  A narrow definition might fail to provide adequate protection because too much 
information might be excluded from its ambit.  A very broad definition, on the other hand, might 
provide protection to an unreasonably wide range of information thereby resulting in 
unreasonable restrictions on access.
41
   The chosen classification and definition will influence the 
choice of protection mechanism. Suitable regulatory mechanisms include primary legislation, 
subordinate legislation, and industry codes.  
                                                 
39
  Ibid 6-8 and Annexed Tables of Information. 
40
  Op cit note 38. 
41
   Laurie op cit note 1 at 106. 
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 Everett observes that „the distinction between genetic and non-genetic medical information is 
central to the legal changes arising from the genetic privacy movement.‟42  I draw on Everett‟s 
observation in this research.  I adopt the approach that any legal response to the challenges posed 
by genetic information must begin with a classification of genetic information. For the purposes 
of this research, genetic information is seen as medical information which gives rise to new legal 
challenges.    The main reason for the close scrutiny of genetic information is its link with 
computer technology, the increasing number of genetic databases worldwide, and the unique 
third-party interest in genetic information.  A suitable response will entail either developing new 
legislation or amending existing legislation to meet the demands of genetic information. Once 
again the response will, to a large extent, be determined by the classification of genetic 
information. 
 
 
1.3  THE CONCEPT OF GENETIC PRIVACY 
Privacy is entrenched as a fundamental right in the Bill of Rights.
43
  Section 14 of the 
Constitution provides that – 
 „Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have – 
(a) their person or home searched; 
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possessions seized; or 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.‟ 
The wording of s 14 makes it clear that this list is not exhaustive.  The Constitution provides 
broad protection for the right to privacy but the right is not unlimited. De Waal et al identify 
three concerns which the right to privacy seeks to protect: 
(1) the right to be left alone; 
(2) the right to development of the individual personality; and 
(3) informational privacy.
44
 
This research advances the idea that genetic privacy falls within the realm of informational 
privacy and should therefore be protected by the right to privacy. 
                                                 
42
  Margaret Everett „Can you keep a (genetic) secret? The genetic privacy movement‟ (2004) 13:4 Journal of 
Genetic Counselling 273 at 278. 
43
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, ch 2, s 14. 
44
  Johan De Waal, Iain Currie & Gerhard Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 3ed (2000) 270. 
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  Privacy is an amorphous concept
45
 which has long been the subject of legal and philosophical 
debate.   The issue of privacy has been discussed, debated, and thoroughly analysed from many 
perspectives. Privacy is undoubtedly an amorphous concept surrounded by a plethora of 
academic literature and intellectually stimulating scholarly debate. After much discussion on the 
topic, this concept remains as elusive as ever.  This is borne out by the observation of the 
Constitutional Court in Bernstein v Bester that the „use of this term has not been 
unproblematic‟.46  In making this observation the court referred to the varying definitions that 
have been accorded to privacy both nationally and internationally.   
  The debate has intensified in the wake of new technologies which pose new challenges to the 
concept of privacy.  Computer technology and genetic technology are prime examples of areas 
that demand fresh scrutiny of existing privacy regimes.   A combination of both technologies 
poses a major challenge to privacy in the traditional sense. Laurie aptly points out that „there was 
no such concept as genetic privacy before scientific advances provided us with the means to 
gather and manipulate genetic information.‟47  The concept of genetic privacy is even more 
complex and thought-provoking than the traditional concept of privacy. This may be attributed to 
the new dimension added by genetic information to the traditional concept of health or medical 
information.  As observed by Lemmens and Austin, genetic information takes the traditional 
concept of health information to a new level for various reasons.
48
  It will be argued here that 
this, in turn, takes the privacy issue to a new level.   
  Laurie correctly observes that „the history of privacy has been beleaguered by obscanturism 
and imprecision‟49 but he argues that the amorphous nature of privacy does not mean that it 
cannot or should not be protected.
50
  He takes the view that the law has an important role to play 
in the protection of privacy and that the issue of genetic privacy must be addressed regardless of 
the challenges that lie ahead.  This research, to a large extent, takes up the challenge identified by 
Laurie. 
                                                 
45
  Bernstein & others v Bester & others 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at 787-8. 
46
  Ibid 791. 
47
  Op cit note 1at 25. 
48
  Op cit note 35. 
49
   Op cit note 1 at 26. 
50
  Ibid 51. 
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   Gostin suggests that one way of attaining reasonable privacy protection is by developing 
„rigorous legal safeguards.‟51  Writing in 1995, he found that existing legal „safeguards were 
inadequate, fragmented, inconsistent, and contained many gaps in coverage.‟52  It has been 
suggested in the literature that de-identifying genetic data renders it anonymous thereby reducing 
the need for privacy protection.  Gostin notes that advances in computer technology have made it 
possible to search multiple databases resulting in the ability to link genetic information to an 
individual.  He concludes that non-linked genetic data is not a guarantee of anonymity and that 
all genetic information must be accorded due privacy protection.  Gostin‟s concern lies with 
those privacy statutes which exempt anonymous genetic information from their ambit of 
application. He argues that privacy protections must be put in place to prevent so-called 
anonymous genetic data from being linked to individuals.
53
   
    Genetic privacy usually focuses on informational privacy. The protection of genetic 
information privacy is aimed at preventing the unauthorised disclosure of private information, 
thereby preventing consequential harm.  Kim proposes a privacy paradigm as opposed to an anti-
discrimination approach for the protection of genetic information.
54
 This is simply because the 
flow of information is easier to monitor and enforce as opposed to the use of information once it 
is in the hands of an insurer or employer.  
 Access to genetic information is largely unchartered territory in South Africa at this stage. 
There is a patchwork of protections against unfair discrimination, medical testing in the 
employment sphere, and privacy in general, but in essence the matter is entirely new.  The South 
African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) recently completed an investigation into data 
protection with a view to developing a data protection statute for South Africa.
55
  A Bill
56
 has 
been developed, which takes the form of a general data protection statute which still leaves the 
door open for sectoral laws and industry codes of practice.  The draft Bill makes provision for 
the protection of health information privacy.  It also considers the protection of information 
pertaining to „inherited characteristics‟.   
                                                 
51
   Lawrence O. Gostin  „Genetic privacy‟ (1995) 23 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 320 at 324. 
52
  Ibid. 
53
  Ibid 322. 
54
   Pauline T. Kim „Genetic discrimination, genetic privacy: Rethinking employee protections for a brave new 
workplace‟  (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review 1497 at 1551. 
 
55
  South African Law Reform Commission  (Project 124) Privacy and Data Protection. 
56
  B9-2009. 
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  Protecting genetic information privacy, like other forms of privacy, is a balancing act. It is 
necessary, when implementing regulatory mechanisms, to ensure that the rights of the individual 
do not unreasonably curtail research efforts which could benefit the public.   It is clear from the 
literature review that the concept of genetic privacy is a challenging one that has attracted 
attention from many quarters.  It has not been satisfactorily addressed to date and is by no means 
a problem that is easily solved.  It is therefore important to learn from the experiences of other 
jurisdictions and to reach a point where differing approaches can be critically analysed for the 
benefit of South Africa.  Hence, the cross-jurisdictional review. 
   A review of international regulatory responses to the protection of human genetic 
information reveals that most countries acknowledge a need to protect genetic information 
although the approaches vary in form and scope. I do not propose the wholesale adoption of any 
jurisdiction‟s approach on the protection of genetic information privacy.  What I attempt to do, 
through this research, is to inform policymakers and legislators of the debates surrounding 
genetic information privacy and to propose an eclectic approach for South Africa.  This entails 
proposing the development of genetic privacy legislation which will provide comprehensive 
privacy protection for genetic information.  This approach should obviate the need for further 
legislation, thereby preventing the development of overlapping or conflicting statutes and 
regulations.   It will also promote consistency in an area which is riddled with problems.  
Proposing the development of genetic privacy legislation while rejecting the core arguments 
supporting genetics exceptionalism might appear to be contradictory when viewed in the light of 
existing literature. The reviewed literature indicates a link between specific genetic privacy 
protection legislation and genetics exceptionalism. It will be argued here that it is not the nature 
of genetic information itself which justifies separate legislative treatment but the unique third-
party interest shown in it, coupled with its potential for misuse and advances in bioinformatics.  
Essentially, this amounts to a rejection of genetics exceptionalism and the genetic inclusivist 
approach.  It is an alternative approach which represents a compromise position for reasons 
which differ from those already advanced in the reviewed literature. 
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1.4 ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE STUDY 
There are many issues and concerns pertaining to access to and disclosure of genetic 
information. The deciphering of the human genome has ushered in a new era of genetics which 
poses its own challenges to traditional legal concepts and regulatory frameworks.  Most countries 
recognise the need for genetic privacy protection.  This research explores the different 
approaches adopted in selected jurisdictions as well as the underlying reasons for the variation in 
approaches.   
   Section 14 of the Constitution provides individuals with a  right to privacy which includes 
the right not to  be subject to searches of their person, home or property; seizure of their 
possessions; or violation of private communications. Even though the right to privacy enjoys 
constitutional protection, the challenges posed by a combination of genetic technology and 
information technology require legislative intervention.   Neethling et al note that the creation of 
databanks „pose an immense threat to the individual‟ due to the use of computer technology. 57    
It is clear that data protection legislation is required in South Africa but this raises further issues 
pertaining to the exact scope of such legislation. The second issue relates to the nature of genetic 
information as encapsulated in the ongoing academic debate about genetics exceptionalism.  The 
choice of regulatory intervention depends, to a large extent, on the definition of genetic 
information.  
    Many of the concerns around the use of genetic information may be attributable to genetics 
exceptionalism.  Some of these concerns do have merit and therefore warrant attention.  The first 
concern is the potential for violation of individual privacy rights due to an inadequate regulatory 
framework for the protection of genetic information.  The second concern is the impact of 
inadequate privacy protection on international collaborative research prospects for South African 
researchers.  Due to globalisation and the importance of medical research it is crucial that South 
Africa positions itself as an international role-player.  This means acknowledging the importance 
of comparative law in the development of regulatory measures for South Africa. Cross-border 
flow of data may be necessary in international collaborative research.  If South Africa fails to 
promulgate adequate data protection legislation, this flow of data may not be possible in certain 
cases, for example, in the case of data transfer between South Africa and member states of the 
European Union.     
                                                 
57
  Op cit note 22. 
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What is further sought is the means of dealing with genetic data in an information privacy 
regime.  General data protection legislation might not adequately address the challenges posed 
by genetic information.  Even though general data protection legislation is being developed in 
South Africa, the issue of how it may improve genetic information protection must still be 
assessed in the light of regulatory developments in other countries. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is considering extending membership to 
South Africa.  That decision will be affected by South Africa‟s ability to adopt OECD practices, 
policies, and standards.  It is therefore crucial for legislators to consider this aspect when 
developing legislation.  
    A significant aspect of this study is the identification of privacy concerns surrounding genetic 
information.  There have been inquiries in other countries but there is no empirical evidence in 
this regard in South Africa due to the fact that the area of genetic privacy is still in its infancy 
here.  In 2001 the Life Offices‟ Association (LOA)  developed a Code of Genetic Testing as part 
of its Code of Conduct.
58
  The introduction to the Code noted that various consumer groups had 
indicated concern about genetic testing and its impact on the availability of insurance. This 
concern extended to the potential misuse of genetic information by the insurance industry. In 
2009 the Association for Savings and Investment SA (ASISA)
59
 issued a similar Standard on 
Genetic Testing which replaced the LOA Code.
60
  The introduction to the document states that 
changes to the policy may become necessary in time depending on changes in technology and 
consumer attitudes.  It is apparent that the insurance industry is monitoring developments in the 
area of genetics and that their policies will be amended accordingly.  The law should be equally 
proactive and should not be allowed to lag behind industry in this regard. 
     The following issues are accordingly addressed in this study: 
(a) The challenges posed by genetic databases. 
(b) Access to genetic information by insurers, employers, and researchers. 
(c) The current state of privacy protection in South Africa.  This includes the identification 
of inadequacies and gaps in the legal framework. 
                                                 
58
  Life Offices‟ Association Code of Conduct (2001) ch 20.   
59
  The LOA was disbanded in 2008 and its functions were subsumed by the Association for Savings and 
Investment SA (ASISA), which is a representative body for many savings, investment, and insurance organisations, 
including the LOA.   
60
  Standard on Genetic Testing (2009) available at  
 http://www.asisa.org.za/index.php/members/codes.html, accessed on 17 April 2012. 
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(d) The introduction of a privilege for the protection of genetic information in order to 
protect genetic information from disclosure in court proceedings. 
(e) The state of genetic information protection in selected countries. 
(f) Scope for changes to the existing legal framework in order to achieve an adequate level 
of genetic privacy protection. 
 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODS AND SCOPE 
This is primarily a legal study which incorporates aspects of bioethics and philosophy.  The areas 
of law that are covered are insurance, labour, evidence, and medical law.  Two methods of 
analysis are used; namely, legal and ethical analysis.  Legal issues are addressed by analysing 
national laws, international laws, international conventions, and treaties.  Bioethical issues are 
addressed through the study of national and international ethical guidelines.  Both areas of 
research are supported by secondary sources; namely, academic literature in books and journals, 
institutional research reports, and internet sources. 
The research commences with a summary of the legal and ethical debates surrounding 
genetic information privacy. The purpose of such a discussion is to provide background 
information on the multifarious, controversial, and often polarised views on the protection of 
genetic information. Such sensitisation is necessary in order to foster an understanding of the 
legal and ethical challenges that are posed by genetic information.  An overview of the most 
common concerns associated with genetic information is also provided with the aim of justifying 
the call for legislative protection of genetic privacy.  Secondary sources of information are 
mainly used for this purpose.  
 A crucial aspect of this research is the cross-jurisdictional review of legal, ethical, and policy 
developments in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America. The positions in the constituent states, countries, territories,  and provinces are not 
discussed in detail but where significant differences are observed, these are noted.  National 
laws, international conventions, and treaties are analysed for this purpose.  The findings of this 
review are recommended for lawmaking efforts in South Africa.   
   The discussion of the South African position is based on the analysis of the constitution, case 
law, common law, ethical guidelines, institutional codes of practice, professional rules, and 
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academic literature.  The research concludes with recommendations for improvements to the 
South African information protection regime.   
   On a theoretical level this research favours neither the genetics exceptionalist approach nor the 
genetic inclusivist approach in their entirety.  It adopts a middle ground, with the aim of finding 
a legally sound solution to the challenges posed by genetic information.  It is based on the view 
that genetic information is distinctive enough to warrant renewed scrutiny of existing regulatory 
mechanisms in order to determine their adequacy for the protection of this type of information.  
The approach may be described as eclectic and pragmatic. 
    In South Africa privacy is protected by the common law and the constitution. I accept that 
informational privacy is the most suitable framework for dealing with genetic privacy. This 
research accordingly focuses on informational privacy. The right of informational privacy 
protects individual autonomy by preventing forced disclosure of information or unauthorised 
acquisition of information about an individual.  I adopt the view that controlling the flow of 
genetic information is key to protecting genetic information.    
    The legal, ethical, and policy issues are analysed in relation to the academic literature on 
genetic privacy and international regulatory responses in the selected jurisdictions. The different 
regulatory responses are reviewed with a view to finding a compass which will point South 
African legislators in the right direction.     The view is taken that there is no need to „reinvent 
the wheel‟.  As Partlett points out, „[l]ike the advantage of the second in line to manufacture or 
market products, lawmakers garner valuable information in observing the trials, tribulations, and 
triumphs of another‟s law reform efforts.‟61    The approaches in the selected jurisdictions are 
therefore critically analysed for characteristics which could prove beneficial to South Africa. The 
aim is to find a pragmatic approach which fits the South African situation whilst avoiding the 
pitfalls of genetics exceptionalism and the genetic inclusivist approach.  
The scope of this research is limited in three respects.  First, Asian countries are not included 
in the cross-jurisdictional review due to the noticeable absence of genetic privacy protection in 
these jurisdictions.  It was accordingly expected that this research would reap minimal benefit 
from a study of genetic privacy in Asian jurisdictions, hence the exclusion. The emphasis has 
been placed on those countries which have made noticeable progress in this area and which 
                                                 
61
  David F Partlett „Misuse of genetic information: The common law and professionals‟ liability‟ (2003) 42 
Washburn Law Journal 500 at 509. 
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therefore have much to offer in terms of solutions and lessons based on experience. Secondly, 
since the aim of this research is to promote genetic privacy protection in South Africa, a 
comprehensive analysis of genetic discrimination is not undertaken.  The brief discussions of 
genetic discrimination are merely a means to an end, which is that of justifying the need for 
genetic privacy protection.  Thirdly, this research focuses on the protection of privacy in the 
context of information derived from genetic samples and not on actual genetic material or 
samples from which such information may be derived.  The focus is accordingly on 
informational privacy.  Privacy concerns relating to tissue banks and biorepositories are  
therefore not addressed. 
 
 
1.6 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter one is an introduction to the research.  It provides background information, objectives of 
the study, an exposition of the concept of genetic privacy as well as the surrounding debates, 
discussion of the issues and concerns relevant to the protection of genetic privacy, a theoretical 
framework which indicates what perspective is adopted in relation to the academic debates 
inherent in a newly emerging field, and a statement of the research methodology. 
    Chapter two provides an overview of forensic and research DNA databases because of their 
inextricable link with the concerns which gave impetus to this research.  The concern over the 
creation of genetic databases and the potential for third party access to personal information have 
given rise to renewed calls for further protection of individual privacy.  The threat of violation of 
privacy is heightened because of the link between genetic technology, information technology, 
and the creation of databases of genetic information.  These aspects are addressed with a view to 
justifying the undertaking of this study.  
Chapter three provides an overview of the interests of employers, insurers, and researchers in 
genetic information and the need for privacy protection as a mechanism to prevent genetic 
discrimination which could arise from the violation of privacy.  Similar to the previous chapter, 
this chapter is intended to justify the need for an adequate genetic privacy regulatory framework 
in South Africa.      Chapter four provides a legal exposition of the right to privacy in South 
Africa and culminates in a discussion of the right to genetic information privacy.  Chapter five 
deals exclusively with evidentiary privilege insofar as it may be extended to genetic information.  
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Chapter six deals with legislative developments in selected jurisdictions; namely, Australia, 
Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.  The 
Netherlands has characteristics which make it suitable for this purpose: first, it is a member State 
of the European Union; secondly, it is a signatory to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine;
62
 and thirdly, it has data protection legislation which is also intended for genetic 
privacy protection.  The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine is important because it 
is a binding instrument in the area of genetic privacy protection.  The Netherlands differs from 
the other jurisdictions under review to the extent that it has legislation aimed at protecting 
genetic privacy together with a moratorium on the use of genetic information by insurance 
companies.    
The United Kingdom and Australia are considered for the insight that they can provide 
through the research they have already undertaken into genetic privacy and the reform 
recommendations they have proposed.  The Australian Law Reform Commission and the 
Australian Health Ethics Committee of the National Health and Medical Research Council 
undertook a joint inquiry into the protection of human genetic samples and information.
63
  The 
project has been described as „the most comprehensive consideration of the ethical, legal and 
social implications of the “New Genetics” ever undertaken.‟64  The Human Genetics 
Commission in the United Kingdom has conducted two relevant inquiries into genetic 
information.
65
  The work of the commission is ongoing and provides valuable insight into public 
attitudes and concerns relating to genetic information.  The recommendations made by the 
Commission are based on actual public concerns and not just on perceptions of policymakers and 
legislators.   
Canadian developments are of interest and are based on the work of the Canadian 
Biotechnology Advisory Committee. An analysis of the Canadian position is intended to indicate 
how general privacy legislation may be used to protect genetic privacy.  In the United States of 
America most of the relevant legislation has been developed within an anti-discrimination 
paradigm and most legislative measures exist at state level only.  The individual States have 
                                                 
62
  Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and dignity of the Human Being with Regard 
to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997). 
63
  Supra note 7. 
64
  Ibid 33. 
65
  HGC Discussion Document op cit note 75; Human Genetics Commission Inside Information: Balancing 
Interests in the Use of Personal Genetic Data Summary Report (2002). 
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adopted divergent approaches to the protection of genetic information with emphasis being 
placed on prevention of improper use.  The American position does help to demonstrate why a 
privacy approach has been favoured over an anti-discrimination approach in this research.  
Chapter seven focuses on legal and industry developments in South Africa relating to the 
protection of genetic privacy.  The following specific instruments are critically anlaysed:  the 
Personal Data Protection Bill;
66
  the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1988; and the Code of 
Conduct of ASISA.
67
  Chapter eight concludes this research. It also contains recommendations 
for legislative intervention to adequately address the protection of genetic privacy in South 
Africa. 
 
                                                 
66
  Supra note 56. 
67
  Supra note 60. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
GENETIC DATABASES 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
„Whether established for the purpose of finding genes, predicting, diagnosing, or treating 
genetic disease, or identifying criminal suspects, soldiers missing in action, or other 
missing persons, DNA banks and DNA data banks hold tremendous promise. But DNA 
banking and DNA data banking also raise novel legal, ethical, and public policy 
challenges.‟1 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight and discuss the issues and concerns pertaining 
to genetic databases with the aim of supporting the argument that there is a need for 
genetic privacy legislation in South Africa.  The right to privacy is considered in the 
context of genetic information contained in databases. The acquisition, use and retention 
of DNA samples and profiles affect the individual‟s right to privacy. Allen notes that 
genetic privacy denotes informational privacy since it requires the confidentiality of 
genetic information as well limits on third-party access to genetic information.
2
   
 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is an acid molecule found in the nucleus of cells.  It 
carries genetic information in the cell.  The structure of DNA was discovered in 1953 by 
Francis Crick and James Watson. It is accepted that no two individuals, except for 
identical twins, have the same DNA profile. This is why DNA is referred to as a 
„distinctive biometric identifier‟. This is the factor that makes DNA an invaluable tool in 
criminal investigation.  Biological samples such as hair, blood, semen, saliva, and skin 
are taken from the subject for DNA analysis. Non-coding sections of DNA (sometimes 
referred to as „junk DNA‟) are analysed to generate a DNA profile. The profile is 
expressed as a set of numbers and a sex chromosome. 
 A database is defined as „a collection of data which is organized, prioritised and 
available for consultation, the content of which can evolve by the addition of updated 
                                                 
1
  Jean E. McEwen „DNA Data Banks‟ in Mark A Rothstein (ed) Genetic Secrets: Protecting Privacy 
and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era  (1997) 232. 
2
  Anita L Allen „Genetic Privacy: Concepts and Values‟ in Mark A Rothstein (ed) Genetic Secrets: 
Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era (1997) 33. 
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information, and which, in this day and age, is always computerised, according to a 
variety of structures.‟3 A databank/biobank refers to a collection of biological samples 
such as saliva, hair, semen, and blood, from which DNA can be extracted.  A genetic 
database usually refers to the former or to a combination of the two. The terms „DNA 
database‟ and „genetic database‟ are used interchangeably here because genetic 
information is derived from biological samples through DNA analysis. 
 Issues and concerns relating to forensic and research databases are discussed here. 
DNA databases are useful tools in clinical medicine, genetic research, and forensic 
science. They prove particularly useful in the investigation of crimes where the 
recidivism rates are high, for example, sexual offences.  In addition to proving guilt, they 
are being used to exonerate the innocent.
4
  They are also useful for pharmacogenomics 
research. This chapter culminates in conclusions which will be useful for the future 
regulation of genetic databases in South Africa. 
 
 
2.2  FORENSIC DNA DATABASES 
 
(a) The emergence and development of forensic DNA databases 
Fingerprint analyis is the oldest biometric technique used for identification purposes.  
The first documented interest in fingerprints was a paper written in 1684 by Dr Nehemiah 
Grew. The first British court conviction using fingerprint evidence was obtained in 1902. 
Fingerprinting science was followed by blood-group antigen typing and then by DNA 
profiling. Sir Alec Jeffreys, a British geneticist, developed DNA profiling in 1984.  He 
found that DNA contains certain distinctive markers which differ in individuals. He 
called these markers mini-satellites and the process became known as DNA 
fingerprinting.
5
  
                                                 
3 
 Anne Cambon-Thomsen, Clémentine Sallée, Emmanuelle Rial-Sebbag & Bartha Maria Knoppers 
„Populational genetic databases: Is a specific ethical and legal framework necessary?‟ (2005) 3:1 GenEdit 
1. 
4
  The Innocence Project in the United States of America is an excellent example of this. See 
http://www.innocenceproject.org  accessed on 10 December 2008. 
5
  Melissa Lee Phillips „Crime scene genetics: Transforming forensic science through molecular 
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Polymerase chain reaction (PCR), a molecular biological method for amplifying 
DNA,
6
 was subsequently developed by Kary Mullis.  In 1993 Mullis was awarded the 
Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his development of the PCR technique.
7
  This technique 
makes it possible to artificially replicate an individual DNA segment of any genetic 
material several million times. In forensics, PCR has proved very useful as it makes it 
possible to analyse the DNA in very small biological samples such as a drop of blood.  
PCR forms the basis of all current forensic DNA analysis methods.  
 The PCR method facilitated the creation of DNA databases.  It has been noted that 
prior to the discovery of PCR, the use of DNA fingerprinting was reactive.
8
 A suspect 
had to be identified in order to obtain a DNA sample for comparison with a sample 
obtained from a crime scene. DNA databases have allowed police to be proactive in their 
investigation of cases. Now all that is required is a crime scene sample which can be 
compared against profiles contained in the database. The benefits of DNA databases have 
been found to include „the potential to make speedy and robust suspected offender 
identifications through automated profile comparisons in centralised criminal justice 
databases; the ability to confidently eliminate innocent suspects from investigation; the 
increased likelihood of generating reliable and persuasive evidence for use in court; a 
reduction in the cost of many investigations; the likely deterrent effect of DNA 
databasing on potential criminal offenders; and a possible increase in public confidence 
in policing and in the wider judicial process.‟9 
 The world‟s first forensic DNA database, the National DNA Database (NDNAD), 
was established in Britain in 1995. This is currently the world‟s largest forensic database 
per head of the population.
10
  It contains samples and profiles from individuals who are 
suspected of, charged with, reported for or convicted of a recordable offence.  It is seen 
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as a „model example of the installation and use of forensic DNA databasing.‟11   A 
number of countries have since established national forensic databases which contain 
DNA profiles from suspects and convicted offenders as well as crime scene samples.  
 The benefits of DNA databases are substantial and undeniable.  This technology 
makes it possible to solve criminal cases which previously would have remained 
unsolved. The use of DNA technology in the criminal justice system has been described 
as the most significant development in forensic science since fingerprinting.
12
 
13
 It has 
also been referred to as „the gold standard for identification in contemporary society.‟14   
As noted by leading commentators, „although DNA banking and data banking take place 
in a variety of contexts, nowhere have these activities proliferated more rapidly than in 
the area of law enforcement.‟15 The combination of genetics and information technology 
has resulted in a powerful crime-fighting tool.  
 
 
(b)  Issues and concerns relating to forensic DNA databases 
The creation of forensic DNA databases has been acknowledged as one of the areas of 
greatest controversy.
16
  Notwithstanding the benefits of DNA databases, they do pose 
enormous challenges.  Basic issues such as definitions of genomic terms have been 
fraught with difficulty. It has been noted that the „potential uses and abuses of forensic 
databases are considerable.‟17 Legal parameters need to be set as in the case of the 
NDNAD in the United Kingdom.
18
 However, the legislative framework must not have an 
inhibitory effect on crime detection and prosecution.  It is imperative that a balance be 
struck between the individual‟s right to privacy and society‟s need for crime reduction.  
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The legal challenges arise in the context of the secondary use of data without the consent 
of the individuals from whom such data originate; cross-border sharing of data; the 
inclusion of data from minors; the inclusion of data from arrestees; and the indefinite 
storage of data.  All of these issues pose threats to individual privacy. Forensic DNA 
databases have been the subject of much controversy and have initiated debate on the 
need for legal regulation.  
 There is no uniformity in the approaches to databases. Numerous differences exist 
with regard to the categories of persons included in databases, retention periods, and 
criteria for destruction of samples. This lack of harmonisation poses its own challenges 
for the cross-border sharing of data and international policing efforts.  There is no 
generally accepted minimum standard of protection applicable to information contained 
in forensic DNA databases.  Data sharing is becoming increasingly important for law 
enforcement purposes.  The challenge lies in developing legislation that will prescribe 
adequate protection for all DNA information leaving any jurisdiction as well as affording 
adequate protection to DNA information brought from outside the jurisdiction.  
Uniformity in the level of protection is pivotal to the success of cross-border law 
enforcement initiatives.   
 The issue of human rights is important when dealing with forensic DNA databases. A 
delicate balancing act is required in order to protect the privacy of the individual whilst 
respecting the interest of the State in addressing crime. It is possible to achieve this 
balance through legislation. Of major concern is the retention of DNA samples and 
profiles of persons who have not been convicted of offences. From a human rights 
perspective it is easier to justify retaining DNA information of persons who are convicted 
of crimes as opposed to retaining the information of those who are not convicted.  If the 
constitutionality of the retention of DNA samples and profiles of an unconvicted person 
is challenged as an invasion of the right to privacy, it will be difficult to prove a 
justifiable limitation of the right. The weighing up of competing interests by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Marper v The United Kingdom
19
 is proof 
of this.  Legislation which seeks only to further the interests of the State in detecting and 
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preventing crime is, however, not advisable as it serves only to erode public confidence 
in the use of invaluable technology.   
 The decision of the ECtHR in Marper
20
  is of great value to this research as it 
objectively analyses the impact of the United Kingdom‟s NDNAD on the right to 
privacy.   It is also a judgment dealing with the world‟s first and largest DNA database 
which has had great influence in the rest of the world. It must be given serious 
consideration even by countries outside the European Union because it has the potential 
to influence national judiciaries when considering international law for the purpose of 
delivering judgment.  The United Kingdom has played a pioneering role in this field but 
this judgment proves that the rules regulating the NDNAD are not necessarily the most 
progressive in terms of respect for human rights.  
 
(i) Secondary use of data 
„While issues such as who should be included in a database, how long profiles should be 
retained, and what searches can be conducted, are often clearly established in specific 
legislative language, the uses to which samples can be put subsequent to a usable 
database profile being developed is rarely so specifically regulated. Except for the small 
minority of countries that require the relatively expeditious destruction of samples once 
profiling has been performed and checked, countries generally fail to identify what uses 
may or may not be made of biological material. Given the potential uses, both appropriate 
or not, legal and illegal, it is surprising how little attention has been paid, globally, to the 
issue of the non-forensic uses of forensic samples.‟21 
 One of the challenges posed in the case of genetic databases arises from the 
unauthorised use of samples or the secondary use of samples. This entails the use of data 
for purposes other than those for which they were originally collected. For example, 
DNA obtained from an accused during criminal investigations should not be used for 
research and vice versa. Also, where a donor consents to the use of a sample for research 
in one specific instance, that sample should not be used for any other research because 
the donor has not consented thereto. In relation to forensic databases the main concerns 
are the use of database information to study the genetics of criminal behaviour and to 
infer ethnicity.   
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There is a need for legislative safeguards to prevent the inappropriate use of 
information contained in forensic databases.  It has consistently been argued that the loci 
used for forensic purposes contain non-coding sequences and can therefore not be used 
for other purposes such as determining genetic predisposition to illness.  This argument is 
correct only insofar as it relates to DNA profiles. It cannot succeed where DNA samples 
are in issue.  DNA samples can always be reanalyzed and put to inappropriate uses in the 
future. 
Sample destruction is the only way of preventing further use of samples.  In Europe 
the EU Directive 95/46/EC deals with the protection of individuals insofar as the 
processing of personal data and the free movement of such data are concerned.  Article 3 
of the Directive provides that it „does not apply to the processing of personal data when 
such processing operations involve the activities of a State in criminal law.‟  This results 
in the exclusion of forensic information from the ambit of the Directive. The Directive 
will, however, become applicable as soon as forensic information is used for purposes 
outside the scope of criminal law.  This must be borne in mind by agencies seeking to 
access forensic information for non-forensic purposes. The Directive therefore does 
provide a certain level of protection in the event of the secondary use of genetic 
information. 
 
(ii) Cross-border transfer of data 
The concern lies in the sharing of data between countries that do not necessarily offer 
similar levels of legal protection. This jeopardises the right to privacy. The Prüm Treaty
22
 
(also referred to as Schengen III)
23
 is a multilateral agreement between Germany, Austria, 
Spain, France, Belgium, Luxemborg and the Netherlands aimed at preventing cross-
border crime and promoting cross-border policing. Finland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Greece, Sweden, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary have also signed the treaty. 
It provides for the creation of a network of national databases to promote the exchange of 
information between law enforcement authorities in the contracting States.  Provision is 
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made for reciprocal access to databases containing DNA profiles. The provisions of the 
multilateral agreement have been integrated into the legislative framework of the 
European Union under the Third Pillar. The treaty has been incorporated into a Council 
Decision which is binding on all member States. „While the treaty represents progress in 
the field of cooperation against crime, the implications of this treaty are far reaching. It 
raises privacy and data protection issues which will affect all EU citizens, primarily due 
to the absence of common legally binding data protection standards.‟24   
 The possibility of linkages of databases across borders exacerbates concerns relating 
to privacy.  Concerns are at their peak in the United Kingdom due to the British 
government‟s assent to the Prüm Treaty. The concern is that the samples and profiles of 
innocent individuals as contained in the NDNAD will now be accessible to other 
countries.  It has been argued that accession to the Prüm Treaty without informed debate 
sets a dangerous precedent for the European Union and that „privacy has become 
subservient to security.‟25  In 2001 member states of the European Union agreed on the 
use of a common set of DNA markers so as to facilitate the cross-border exchange of 
DNA profiles.
26
  Of crucial importance here is the European Union Data Protection 
Directive
27
 which permits transfer of data to countries outside the European Union only if 
such countries provide an adequate level of protection for such data.  
 
(iii) Retention of samples and profiles of persons not convicted of crimes 
This issue requires serious consideration.  Of even greater concern is the trend towards 
obtaining samples from persons who are merely arrested and not subsequently charged or 
convicted. The Marper judgment
28
 is invaluable in this respect as it discusses the impact 
of such actions on the individual‟s right to privacy.  In Marper the applicants argued that 
the retention of DNA samples and profiles of unconvicted persons is not proportionate to 
the aim of detecting and preventing crime. The court observed that the protection 
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afforded by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms „would be unacceptably weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques in 
the criminal-justice system were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing the 
potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life 
interests.‟29  The court engaged in a balancing exercise to determine whether the retention 
of the applicants‟ DNA was justifiable or not. It acknowledged the importance of DNA 
information in fighting crime.  Notwithstanding this it clearly stated that the question is 
not whether the retention of DNA information may in general be regarded as justified but 
whether the retention of DNA information of persons suspected, but not convicted, is 
justified.
30
  It held that the retention of profiles of unconvicted persons violates their right 
to privacy. 
 
(iv) Retention of samples and profiles of children 
The United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh 
Guidelines) provides that: „...youthful behaviour or conduct that does not conform to 
overall social norms and values is often part of the maturation and growth process and 
tends to disappear spontaneously in most individuals with the transition to adulthood; in 
the predominant opinion of experts, labelling a young person as “deviant,” “delinquent” 
or “pre-delinquent” often contributes to the development of a consistent pattern of 
undesirable behaviour by young persons.‟31  The inclusion of children‟s samples and 
profiles in a forensic database will serve only to stigmatise them. It is in total conflict 
with the Riyadh Guidelines.  
 
(v) Profile and sample retention periods 
It is often argued that in order for forensic databases to operate effectively, police must be 
given the power to retain DNA profiles obtained from samples. A few controversial 
issues arise here:  
                                                 
29
  Supra note 19 para 112. 
30
  Supra note 19 para 106. 
31
  Articles 5(e) and (f) of the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh 
Guidelines) (1990) Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 45/112 of 14 December 1990 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp47.htm,  accessed on 20 December 2008. 
  
31 
 
(1) Is it necessary to retain profiles and the samples that were used to generate such 
profiles?  Forensic DNA databases are created for the sole purpose of utilising stored 
DNA information as a tool in solving crimes. Proceeding on this basis, only the retention 
of DNA profiles can be justified.  The sample is only a means to an end, which is the 
creation of a DNA profile to be used for comparison against other profiles contained in a 
database.  It is submitted that once the sample has served its purpose there can be no 
legitimate justification for retaining it.  
(2) What purpose is sought to be achieved by the retention of samples? The argument 
frequently made in favour of retaining samples is that DNA will be available for future 
analysis using new and superior technologies. The mere retention of samples poses an 
enormous threat to individual privacy since the sample can always be used for further 
analysis unrelated to forensic purposes long after the individual is acquitted or released 
from prison. This is hard to justify in a democratic society based on constitutional values 
and principles.  
(3) If retention is necessary, what time limits, if any, should apply?  
In the United Kingdom bodily samples and DNA profiles may be retained indefinitely. 
This approach is hard to justify especially when coupled with the fact that some of these 
profiles and samples are obtained from people who are arrested but not subsequently 
charged or convicted.  There are a number of decided cases which successfully 
challenged the legality of identification using DNA profiles which should have been 
removed from the database.  R v B
32
 was a case involving the rape of a 66-year old 
woman.  A DNA profile was obtained from the semen and was entered in the National 
DNA database.  A year later the defendant was arrested and charged in connection with 
an unrelated offence of burglary. A saliva sample was taken from him. The defendant 
was subsequently acquitted of the charge of burglary and the sample should have been 
destroyed as soon as practicable after the acquittal but it was not.  A match was 
subsequently made between the DNA profile obtained from the semen and the DNA 
profile obtained from saliva taken from the defendant.  On the basis of the match between 
the two DNA profiles, the police arrested the defendant in connection with the rape of the 
66-year old woman. The police then obtained a DNA profile from a sample of hair 
                                                 
32
  Attorney General’s Reference  (No. 3 of 1999)  [2000] 2 Cr. App. R.416. 
  
32 
 
plucked from the defendant‟s head and compared this to the DNA profile obtained from 
the semen. On the basis of a match they charged the defendant with burglary, assault and 
rape relating to the woman.   
 The trial judge held that the DNA evidence was inadmissible as the saliva sample 
which had been used in generating the initial match should have been destroyed after the 
defendant‟s acquittal on the burglary charge. The court was basically saying that had it 
not been for the unlawful retention of the saliva sample, the whole series of events 
resulting in the defendant being charged with rape would not have materialised.  No 
initial match between the DNA profile obtained from the semen and the DNA profile 
obtained from the saliva would have been possible; the defendant would not have been 
arrested in connection with the rape, the sample of plucked hair would not have been 
obtained after the defendant‟s arrest in connection with the rape; a second DNA match 
between the DNA profile obtained from the semen and the DNA profile obtained from 
the plucked hair would not have been possible, and the defendant would not have been 
subsequently prosecuted, had it not been for the illegal retention of the saliva sample. The 
defendant was accordingly found not guilty.   
 In R v Weir
33
 the defendant had been charged with drug related offences.  A saliva 
sample had been taken from him and sent for DNA profiling. The case against the 
defendant was discontinued but the DNA sample was not destroyed. During investigation 
of a subsequent burglary the police found a match between the defendant‟s profile and a 
crime scene profile. The defendant was arrested and two blood samples were taken which 
confirmed the match. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed 
against his conviction on the grounds that the saliva sample should have been destroyed.  
The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction indicating that the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act of 1984
34
 prohibited the use of the saliva sample in the investigation 
relating to the burglary. 
 The defendants in the cases discussed above had been found guilty of crimes on the 
basis of DNA profile matches in cases where such profiles should have been removed 
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from the database.  The Criminal Justice and Police Act
35
 was subsequently promulgated 
to alleviate the problems being encountered with the retention of profiles. This Act 
permits the indefinite retention of samples and profiles of unconvicted persons.  In this 
regard the NDNAD is different from similar databases in other countries, including those 
in the rest of Europe.   
 The judgment of the ECtHR in Marper
36
 is also important in this regard.  The facts of 
the case are briefly as follows: both applicants were citizens of the United Kingdom.  
They had been arrested and charged in respect of different offences in 2001. At the time 
of the arrest S had been just eleven years old. Their fingerprints and DNA samples were 
taken upon arrest in accordance with the provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984. S was subsequently acquitted and the case against Marper was discontinued.  
Both applicants had then requested that their fingerprints and DNA samples be destroyed 
but both requests were refused. The applicants applied for judicial review of the decision 
by the police not to destroy their fingerprints and samples.  The Administrative Court 
rejected their application.
37
  This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
38
  The 
applicants thereafter appealed to the House of Lords but their appeals were dismissed.  
      The applicants then approached the ECtHR on the grounds that the retention of their 
fingerprints, biological samples, and DNA profiles by the police constituted an 
infringement of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.  Article 8 of the Convention provides as follows: 
„1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private…life… 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society…for the prevention of disorder or crime…‟ 
The applicants argued that the retention of their DNA samples and profiles was not 
necessary. They went on to submit that the power accorded to the police by the Criminal 
Justice and Police Act 2001 to retain samples and profiles of unconvicted persons was not 
proportionate to the aim of detecting and preventing crime.  In determining the matter the 
court observed the following general principles: 
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(1) The concept of privacy covers both the physical and psychological integrity of the 
person. 
(2) The mere storage of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to a 
violation of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 
 In reaching the decision that the retention of biological samples and DNA profiles 
constituted an interference with the applicants‟ right to respect for their private lives as 
encapsulated in Article 8 of the Convention, the court noted the following: 
(1) The United Kingdom is the only member state of the Council of Europe to 
expressly permit the indefinite retention of DNA profiles and samples of persons who 
have not been convicted of an offence.  Other States have set limits on the retention and 
use of data in an attempt to achieve a balance between competing interests. 
(2) In view of the potential future uses of DNA samples, the systematic retention 
thereof was sufficiently intrusive to amount to interference with the right to respect for 
private life as encapsulated in Article 8 of the Convention.   
(3)  DNA samples contain highly personal, sensitive information about the individual. 
This includes health-related information as well as information pertaining to relatives. 
(4)  Due to the nature and amount of personal information contained in samples, their 
retention per se amounts to a violation of the right to privacy. The fact that only the non-
coding sections of DNA are currently used by law enforcement agencies, does not detract 
from the fact that retention is a violation of the right to privacy. 
(5) The use of DNA profiles to identify genetic relationships causes its retention to be 
a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.   
(6) The use of DNA profiles for inferring ethnicity makes their retention sensitive and 
capable of violating the right to private life. 
 The court observed that „[t]he protection afforded by Article 8 of the Convention 
would be unacceptably weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques in the 
criminal-justice system were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing the 
potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life 
interests.‟39 The court also considered that „any State claiming a pioneer role in the 
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development of new technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right 
balance in this regard.‟40 
 A comparison of the Marper decisions by courts of the United Kingdom
41
 and that of 
the ECtHR
42
 reveals a marked difference in approaches to privacy interests. The courts in 
the United Kingdom weighed the risks to the applicants against the benefits to the State 
in retaining DNA samples and profiles. They found that the risks to the applicants were 
not great and were outweighed by the benefits of prosecuting and preventing crime.
43
  In 
arriving at this conclusion the courts emphasized the value of retained samples and 
profiles whilst underestimating the applicants‟ right to privacy.  The ECtHR, on the other 
hand, found that the provision for retention failed to strike a balance between the interests 
of the applicants and that of the State. The court acknowledged the need for the use of 
modern technology in the fight against crime but still held that the retention of samples 
and profiles of persons who have not been convicted of offences amounts to a 
disproportionate interference with the right to respect for private life.  
The ECtHR observed that „the protection afforded by Article 8 of the Convention 
would be unacceptably weakened if the use of modern scientific techniques in the 
criminal-justice system were allowed at any cost and without carefully balancing the 
potential benefits of the extensive use of such techniques against important private-life 
interests.‟44 The court also considered that „any State claiming a pioneer role in the 
development of new technologies bears special responsibility for striking the right 
balance in this regard.‟45 
  This judgment is clearly progressive and centred on respect for human rights.  A 
laudable aspect of the judgment is the refusal of the court to compromise human rights in 
the name of scientific progress. Those responsible for scientific advances are „forced‟ to 
take responsibility for their pioneering actions. This court is not alone in its approach. It 
has been noted that „scientists...have an ongoing responsibility to reflect on the human-
rights issues raised by the technologies they develop, and to lobby for appropriate 
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oversight and controls.‟46  It has been noted that the United Kingdom (excluding 
Scotland) has the „most inclusive and far-reaching legislative framework authorising the 
collection, storage and use of forensic DNA samples in the world.‟47    It is evident that 
approaches aimed at specific periods of retention based on the nature of the offence are 
more likely to pass constitutional muster.  
 
(vi) Speculative Searches 
Speculative searching refers to the process where the DNA profile of an arrested person 
is compared to stored crime scene profiles obtained in respect of unsolved crimes.  In the 
United Kingdom, s 23 of Home Office Circular 16/1995 clearly provided that the 
National DNA Database was intended as an intelligence database only and the results of 
any speculative search would not be used for prosecution purposes.  Home Office 
Circular 58/2004 changed this position by amending s 23 to provide that an arrestee may 
be prosecuted on the basis of a match resulting from a speculative search, provided there 
was other supporting evidence.
48
 
 
 
(c) South African concerns 
The Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Bill
49
 was drafted as part of the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development‟s review of the criminal justice 
system. The aim was to address certain shortcomings in the criminal justice system, 
including the absence of legislation to provide for the establishment and administration of 
a DNA database and the lack of legislative provision for the collection of DNA 
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evidence.
50
  The Bill therefore provided inter alia for the creation of a DNA database to 
assist in addressing the high crime rate in South Africa. Phase one of the Bill was signed 
into law on 1 October 2010.  The resultant Act
51
  does not include provisions relating to 
the envisaged DNA database. It is expected that this aspect will be addressed by means of 
another Bill which will be referred to as the DNA Bill.   
 The proposed DNA database, called the National DNA Database of South Africa 
(NDDSA), is expected to contain biological samples as well as DNA profiles derived 
from such samples. It is also expected to contain five indexes; namely, crime scene index, 
reference index, convicted offenders index, volunteer index, and Personnel, contract and 
supplier elimination index.  The provisions relating to DNA databases raises the 
following concerns:   
(1) The Bill is applicable to adults and children. A child is defined as a person under 
the age of 18 years.
52
 This is cause for concern as acknowledged by the European Court 
of Human Rights in the Marper decision.
53
   The court emphasised the special position of 
minors in the criminal justice sphere and the need for protection of their privacy at 
criminal trials. In doing so, the court drew on the provisions of Article 40 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. 
(2) Clause 3 of the Bill seeks to insert s 36B into chapter 3 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 55 of 1977. Section 36B(b) obliges a police official to take a non-intimate sample 
from arrested and convicted persons. A non-intimate sample is defined as „a sample of 
hair other than pubic hair, a sample taken from a nail or from under a nail, a swab taken 
from the mouth (buccal swab); a blood finger prick; or a combination of these.‟54  DNA 
analysis is conducted on the sample and the results are included in the NDDSA.  Non-
intimate samples may also be taken without warrant from persons suspected of having 
committed an offence.  This is for investigation purposes. 
                                                 
50
  See 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/invitations/2008_CrimLaw_ForensicProceduresAmendmentBill.pdf 
accessed on 26 April 2012. 
51
  Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Amendment Act 6 of 2010. 
52
  Ibid. 
53
  Supra note 19. 
54
  Clause 2 (s 36A (1) (i) (i)-(v)).  On the contrary, an intimate sample is defined in s 36A(1)(g) (i) – (iv) 
as „a sample of blood other than a blood finger prick, semen or any other tissue fluid, urine or pubic hair; a 
dental impression; a swab taken from a person‟s body orifice other than the mouth; or a combination of 
these.‟ 
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(3) The Bill permits speculative searching of databases.
55
  Speculative searching 
allows for comparison of DNA samples or profiles obtained in connection with a crime 
with those contained in the NDDSA.  (Fingerprints will be cross-checked against those 
stored in the e-NATIS and HANIS systems.)   
(4)  Permanent retention of samples and profiles as envisaged by the Bill is 
problematic.
56
  The wording of the Bill is similar to the relevant legislation in the United 
Kingdom. Provision is made for DNA samples to be retained after fulfilling the purpose 
for which they were taken or analysed. The Bill has identical provisions in respect of 
persons accused,
57
 convicted,
58
 and suspected
59
 of committing crimes.  The proposed 
section 15P(2)(a) provides that no DNA profile loaded onto the NDDSA may be 
destroyed.   
(5) The abovementioned situation is exacerbated in the case of the retention of 
profiles of persons who have merely been arrested but have not been convicted of any 
offence.  The rationale for the retention is unclear save to say that it helps to increase the 
size of the database. The inherent danger in this approach is that the database may be 
used for familial searching.  An analysis of the Marper case
60
 is useful in this respect.  
The applicants complained to the European Court of Human Rights about the retention of 
their fingerprints, biological samples and DNA profiles pursuant to s 64 (1A) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.  Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides for the right to respect for a person‟s 
private life.  The applicants argued that the retention of their fingerprints, cellular 
samples and DNA profiles interfered with this right.  They adopted the stance that such 
interference was more severe in the case of children due to the social stigma and 
psychological implications of such retention.  The government of the United Kingdom 
submitted that the applicants‟ concerns were not substantial enough to amount to an 
interference under the Convention.  Their argument was based on technical facts; namely, 
                                                 
55
  Clause 3 (Proposed s 36B(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977); clause 9 (Proposed ch 5B,  
s 15M of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995). 
56
  Clause 3 (Proposed s 36B(6)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977); clause 9 (Proposed ch 5B, 
s 15P(1)(a). 
57
  Clause 3 (Proposed s 36B(6)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977). 
58
  Ibid. 
59
  Clause 4 (Proposed s 36C(3)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977). 
60
  Supra note 19. 
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that the profiles stored in the database were merely sequences of numbers and the 
information in the database was of such a nature that it posed no threat to the reputation 
of the applicants.  The court held that due to the „…nature and amount of personal 
information contained in cellular samples, their retention per se must be  regarded as 
interfering with the right to respect for the private lives of the individuals concerned.‟61 
(6)   The provision relating to sharing of NDDSA information with foreign law 
enforcement agencies poses a great threat to privacy of individuals.  Volunteers whose 
information is contained in the volunteers index on the NDDSA are particularly 
vulnerable.  There is no provision in clause 9 of the Bill requiring that a volunteer must 
be informed that his/her information may be shared with foreign law enforcement 
agencies.  The concern with cross-border sharing of data is that the safeguards which 
exist in South Africa may not necessarily exist in the recipient country. There would no 
longer be any control over the handling, storage and use of the data once it leaves South 
Africa.  This has the potential to compromise the right to privacy.  Even within Europe, 
concerns have been raised about sharing or exchanging information amongst States.    
(7)  Clause 9 of the Bill provides for s 15K to be included in the South African Police 
Service Act stating that consent given by a volunteer cannot be withdrawn.  The rationale 
behind such a legislative provision is unknown.  Even minors who become volunteers by 
virtue of a parent‟s or guardian‟s consent, cannot have their profiles removed from the 
database. This is the only plausible conclusion based on the fact that the relevant section 
applies to children but provides no exceptions to accommodate them. Problems are likely 
to arise when a minor, whose information has been included on the volunteer‟s index by 
virtue of parental consent, subsequently and upon the attainment of majority status, 
decides to have his/her information removed from the database.  The Bill is rigid in its 
approach with no provision being made for exceptional or extraordinary cases. 
 The position that is envisaged in the Bill is untenable.  Many of the provisions violate 
the right to privacy and will not pass constitutional muster.  The Marper case is a good 
example of how competing rights should be balanced.  It is hoped that the provisions in 
the Bill will be tempered as the Bill proceeds through the legislative process.  If not, it 
risks being successfully challenged in court. 
                                                 
61
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2.3 GENETIC RESEARCH DATABASES 
 
(a) The emergence of genetic research databases  
In addition to forensic DNA databases there are other DNA databases which raise privacy 
concerns.  Other genetic databases are created mainly for the purpose of research.   They 
usually contain data which is obtained through DNA analysis as well as the biological 
material from which DNA samples are derived. Population genetic databases are used 
largely for medical and pharmacogenomics research.   Sutrop observes that „…all 
population- based genetic database projects have the same goal – they intend to identify 
susceptibility genes for common diseases and attempt to improve the medical care and 
health of the populations involved.‟62 
 Iceland may be regarded as the pioneer in the creation of population genetic 
databases.  In 1998 a private biotechnology company, deCODE Genetics, was licensed 
by the Icelandic government to compile an electronic database correlating the genetic, 
genealogical, and medical information of the entire population of Iceland.  This was 
authorised through the promulgation of the Health Sector Database Act.
63
   Three 
separate but interlinked databases were envisaged.  Presumed consent was considered 
sufficient for the medical and genealogical records databases and citizens had the choice 
to opt out of the medical records database. Genetic samples from the entire Icelandic 
population were required for the development of the genebank and these samples could 
only be obtained if citizens gave informed consent.  In May 2000, the Icelandic Biobanks 
Act
64
 was passed, which allowed deCODE Genetics to indirectly access samples held by 
other institutions. This process would be to the detriment of citizens as it would result in 
the informed consent requirement being bypassed by decode Genetics.  It was also in 
clear contravention of the universally accepted ethical requirement of informed consent 
for research involving human participants.  
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  Margit Sutrop „Human genetic databases: ethical, legal and social issues‟ (2004) 8 TRAMES 5 at 6. 
63
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64
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 In addition to being the first population genetic database, the Icelandic Health Sector 
Database attracted the most criticism for the reasons briefly mentioned above.
65
  In 2003 
the enabling statute, the Health Sector Database Act,
66
 was declared unconstitutional by 
the Icelandic Supreme Court.
67
  The court found that the Health Sector Database Act did 
not adequately protect the right to privacy since individuals could still be identified 
through the data contained in the database.   The main reason for the court‟s decision was 
that the Act violated the provisions on privacy contained in the Icelandic Constitution.
68
   
This case study is useful for any jurisdiction contemplating the creation of genetic 
databases. 
 After the initiation of the Icelandic Health Sector Database, databases were created in 
Estonia (Estonian Genome Project); Latvia (Unified Genome Database of Latvian 
Population); Canada (CARTaGENE); Singapore (Genome Institute of Singapore); 
Sweden (UmanGenomics);   and the United Kingdom (UK BioBank). 
 
 
(b) Concerns 
There are numerous concerns relating to the protection of privacy in the context of 
genetic research databases. Godard et al agree that DNA banking practices pose a threat 
to privacy.
69
      
 
(i) Protection of privacy 
Insofar as population genetic databases are concerned, there is a need to reassure 
members of the public that their personal information will be adequately protected.  
History and experience have diminished the trust between government and citizens. As 
                                                 
65
  See Hilary Rose The Commodification of Bioinformation: The Icelandic Health Sector Database  
(2001)  21 (Project funded by the Wellcome Trust) available at 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@msh_grants/documents/web_document/WTD00
3281.pdf  accessed on 20 April 2012. 
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  Supra note 63. 
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  Ragnhildur Gudmundsdóttir  v.The State of Iceland  No. 151/2003 (27 November 2003), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/genetic/iceland_decision.pdf  accessed on 20 April 2012. 
68
  Paragraph 1 of Article 71 of the Icelandic Constitution provides that „Everyone shall enjoy freedom 
from interference with privacy, home and family life.‟ 
69
  Béatrice Godard,  Jörg Schmidtke, Jean-Jacques Cassiman & Ségolène Aymé „Data storage and DNA 
banking for biomedical research: informed consent, confidentiality, quality issues, ownership, return of 
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aptly pointed out by Sankar, „[f]ew lessons from history and little in current politics 
reassure us that DNA held by the government is safe from being used for purposes that its 
citizens – if granted a choice- would prefer to avoid.  DNA collections that now seem 
little more than a clever hedge against the randomness of violent crime and wartime 
death, could become, without proper controls, a source for wide-ranging medical and 
social discrimination.‟70   
 Sankar‟s argument is not without merit as it is based on actual events which took 
place in the United States of America in the 1930‟s and 1940‟s.  She recalls the manner in 
which fingerprints taken by the armed forces fell into the hands of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation due to a changing political climate and became part of their records.   She 
notes that resistance by the armed forces based on protection of their members from 
stigmatisation eventually gave way to national security concerns. The point she makes is 
that there can never be any complete guarantee that DNA collected for one purpose will 
not be used by other government agencies for other purposes. Her suggestion therefore is 
that it is better not to collect DNA unless it is clearly necessary to do so.  This, it is 
submitted, is a fair argument based on unfortunate historical events.  The question which 
arises is how to protect the privacy of individuals in cases where their genetic information 
has been collected for a necessary purpose. 
 
(ii)  Access to genetic data for forensic purposes 
Concern arises from the inevitable interest of law enforcement agencies in the data 
contained in population genetic databases.  Even though law enforcement agencies have 
developed their own DNA databases, they are aware of the limitations of such databases; 
namely, that these are restricted to persons who have had some contact with the law. 
Potential access to research databases by law enforcement authorities threatens the 
privacy of database donors.  There has already been a decided case in the United 
Kingdom where information was seized from records of a clinical trial at a prison to 
prove that the accused had been aware of his positive HIV status during the period in 
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  Pamela Sankar „Topics for our times: The proliferation and risks of government DNA Databases‟ 
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which he had engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with his girlfriend.
71
 As a result 
of the accused‟s conduct and his failure to disclose his HIV status to his girlfriend, she 
had become infected with the virus.  The prosecution had sought a court order for access 
to records of a health testing programme which the accused had participated in during a 
previous period of incarceration.  The court adopted the stance that the right of society to 
the proper investigation of crime outweighed any confidentiality interest.  The court 
accordingly granted an order for de-encryption of the data and disclosure thereof. Based 
on this evidence, the accused received a five-year jail sentence for reckless and culpable 
conduct.  This case proves that information contained in non-forensic databases is not 
fully protected from disclosure for forensic purposes. 
 
(iii) Adverse impact on genetic research   
Lack of regulation of research databases may deter individuals from participating in 
genetic research. Even though consent is usually obtained for use of personal information 
in research, no consent is obtained for forensic use of personal information.  It is to be 
expected that individuals would be reluctant to volunteer as research participants if they 
suspect that they their participation could cause them harm.
72
 
73
  
 
(iv)  Cross-border sharing of genetic data 
It has been noted that „[w]hile biobanks are increasingly recognised as a crucial 
infrastructure for research, at the same time the widely varied practices in 
biobanking…may also pose a barrier to cross-border research and collaboration by 
limiting access to samples and data.‟74  It is important to ensure that genetic data receives 
a similar level of protection in all jurisdictions which it may be transferred to.  For this 
reason there have been calls for harmonisation of  biobanking practices.
75
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 Godard et al accordingly conclude that since DNA banking raises legal issues it may 
be necessary to „control the flow of banked DNA and DNA data; develop policies to 
regulate DNA banking more closely, and [e]nsure that DNA banking can perform its 
function without impinging on the rights and interests of individuals who have their DNA 
sample or DNA data in a bank.‟76  It is argued in this study that these objectives are best 
addressed through law.  
 
 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS  
There is a need for the legal regulation of DNA databases to prevent misuse of genetic 
information.  Our constantly increasing knowledge of human genetics is facilitating our 
use of genetic information in previously unimaginable areas. DNA technology has 
increased in prominence over the last two decades. The proliferation of DNA databases is 
proof of this. Legislative intervention is necessary to address the identified challenges 
so as to ultimately protect the individual‟s right to privacy.  The justification for 
legislative intervention has been discussed in chapter one.   
 The greatest challenge posed by the advent of forensic DNA databases is finding a 
way to balance the competing interests of the State in solving or detecting crime and the 
interests of the individual in preventing violations of his/her right to privacy.  Legislation 
needs to carefully balance the rights of the State and the individual since both parties 
have interests worthy of legal protection.  The decision of the ECtHR in Marper
77
  
supports this conclusion. 
 There is clearly a need for legislation to regulate forensic DNA databases in order to 
protect genetic privacy.  Samples cannot be covered by a data protection statute because 
they do not qualify as information for the purposes of data protection but this can be 
remedied by the introduction of a genetic privacy Act.  An effective and constitutionally 
sound genetic privacy statute must make provision for the following: 
(1) An oversight body to monitor databases and to decide on requests for access to 
data. 
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(2) Profile entry criteria and sampling (whose data should be included in the database 
and which categories of persons should have their DNA samples taken). 
(3) Profile removal/ sample destruction criteria. 
(4) Different periods of retention for data based on the nature of the crime. A 
schedule of crimes should be appended to the legislation. Only crimes against the 
person and all sexual offences warrant permanent retention of data on the 
database 
(5) Express prohibition against the use of data contained in forensic DNA databases 
for research and vice versa 
(6) A minimum age for inclusion in a forensic DNA database. This should be linked 
to the age of criminal responsibility 
(7) An option for revocation of consent by volunteers. The irrevocability of consent 
of volunteers is neither reasonable nor justifiable. Provision should be made for 
volunteers to revoke consent at any time.  This need is even more pressing in the 
case of minors.  
(8) Rules for the cross-border sharing of genetic data contained in forensic and non-
forensic DNA databases.  
The detection of crime and the conduct of prosecutions are priorities of governments 
across the world. It is a particularly serious issue in South Africa because of the high 
crime rate, especially violent crimes against the person. Forensic science has an 
important role to play in the criminal justice arena but it has to be used in a manner that 
does not amount to an unjustifiable limitation of the constitutionally entrenched right to 
privacy.   
Information contained in all genetic databases must be protected from unauthorised 
disclosure as well as indiscriminate use. The flow of genetic information to third parties 
such as insurance companies, employers, and researchers must be regulated so as not to 
violate the human rights of individuals whose data is stored in these databases.  This 
issue is discussed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Concerns relating to genetic discrimination raise new legal issues as the use of genetic 
technologies becomes more widespread.  The fear of genetic discrimination could result 
in clinical genetic testing not being utilised sufficiently or at all by the public.  This 
would defeat the aim of the Human Genome Project. The sequencing of the human 
genome, as accomplished by the Human Genome Project, holds great promise for health 
care in terms of genetic testing, pharmacogenomics, and gene therapy.  It is therefore 
necessary for policymakers and legislators to identify and remove obstacles to the 
realisation of the potential of the sequencing of the human genome.  One of the ways to 
achieve this is by protecting genetic privacy. This research proceeds from the premise 
that the potential for genetic discrimination can be minimised by regulating access to 
genetic information. Any legal response should therefore focus on controlling access to 
genetic information rather than attempting to control the use of genetic information once 
it is in the possession of a third party.  
 There are many areas of potential genetic discrimination such as housing, welfare 
benefits, education, insurance, and employment.  This list is not exhaustive.  Insurance 
and employment are, however, the two areas that are most often considered in 
discussions on genetic discrimination.  Partlett suggests that „insurance and employment 
are the two prime areas where genetic information may be misused.‟1  This is borne out 
by one definition that genetic discrimination refers to „differential treatment due to 
genetic status of an individual or family member with respect to employment and/or 
insurance benefits‟.2   A discussion of genetic discrimination in the insurance and 
employment spheres is therefore necessary for the purposes of this research.  The first 
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part of this chapter provides an overview of the interests of employers and insurers in 
genetic information, the reasons for such interests, and the nature of the threat posed by 
those interests. 
 The second aspect that is discussed in this chapter pertains to genetic research 
involving human participants.  The reason for this discussion is that genetic information 
which is discovered in the course of research renders participants vulnerable to genetic 
discrimination in the event of such information being disclosed to employers or insurers.  
The effect on family and ethnic group members is also mentioned briefly in an attempt to 
determine the adequacy of the conventional consent-based approach to vulnerability in 
research. The concept of vulnerability and its possible extension to genetic research 
participants as a group is therefore canvassed in this chapter. 
 The potential for genetic discrimination and the role of privacy protection as a tool for 
the prevention of genetic discrimination are discussed here.  This chapter, like the 
previous one, is intended to justify the need for genetic privacy protection legislation in 
South Africa due to the potential for genetic discrimination in the absence of such 
protection and the inadequacy of the current ethical framework.  It is not the aim of this 
chapter to comprehensively discuss genetic discrimination in any sector.  A 
comprehensive discourse on genetic discrimination is an academic exercise in its own 
right and cannot be done justice to within the parameters of this research. Although a 
detailed discussion of genetic discrimination is beyond the scope of this research, a brief 
discussion is warranted insofar as genetic discrimination provides motivation for the 
introduction of genetic privacy protection.  The actual incidence or mere fear of genetic 
discrimination is considered a catalyst for the introduction of genetic privacy protection.  
For these reasons, it receives attention here.   
 
 
3.2 INSURANCE 
Life insurance is intended to provide financial security to individuals and families in the 
event of death. It therefore serves an important societal purpose even though it is a 
private contract between two parties.  Information relating to inter alia an individual‟s 
age, sex, health status, lifestyle, and family medical history are indicative of the nature of 
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the risk being insured against and are therefore used for underwriting purposes. Genetic 
information, which can be used to determine the risk profile of an applicant, would 
therefore by be regarded by the insurance industry as important for the purpose of 
insurance underwriting.   
 Insofar as insurance is concerned, this discussion will focus on life insurance due to 
the fact that an individual‟s risk status is considered in the calculation of life insurance 
premiums.  The position in respect of health care is totally different.  The national health 
system comprises a private health system and a public health system.  The Medical 
Schemes Act
3
 defines the national health system as „the system within the Republic, 
whether within the public or private sector, in which the individual components are 
concerned with the financing, provision or delivery of health services.‟4  The two systems 
operate concurrently.  With private health care as provided for by medical aid schemes, 
contributions are determined on the basis of income and/or the number of dependants.
5
  
The Medical Schemes Act clearly states that the terms and conditions applicable to the 
admission of a person as a member of a medical aid scheme shall not provide for any 
other grounds, including age, sex, past or present state of health.
6
  State-funded 
healthcare does not exclude cover for any illness or disease.  It follows that the results of 
genetic tests cannot be used in the determination of contributions in the private health 
sector and no disease will be excluded from cover by the public health system on the 
grounds of it having a genetic component.  The issue of differential treatment based on 
genetic factors will therefore not arise in the context of health care.  However, the 
potential for unfair differential treatment does exist in the case of life insurance and for 
this reason the discussion in this chapter will be confined to genetic discrimination in life 
insurance as justification for the introduction of genetic privacy legislation in South 
Africa.   
 Insurers have an interest in genetic information for underwriting purposes.  This is 
acknowledged by the South African Medical Research Council (MRC) in its ethical 
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guidelines.
7
  Access to all relevant information is in keeping with the principle of 
uberrimae fides (utmost good faith), which is the cornerstone of insurance.  Insurers 
could possibly obtain genetic information in one of two ways: they may require 
applicants for insurance to undergo genetic testing or they may request applicants to 
disclose results of previous genetic tests.  This clearly poses a problem for individuals 
seeking insurance.  Three approaches to the problem can be identified: legislative 
prohibition, moratoria and the status quo.
8
   
 The legislative approach addresses the problem by using legislation to protect genetic 
privacy as is done in the Netherlands
9
 or to prevent genetic discrimination as is the case 
in the United States of America.  In Canada general privacy legislation
10
 may be used to 
protect genetic privacy.  This approach has been criticised by Joly et al for promoting 
genetic reductionism and genetic determinism.
11
  Moratoria on the use of genetic 
information by insurance companies are in place in the Netherlands
12
 and in the United 
Kingdom.  This approach provides an interim solution which is flexible and may be 
changed quite easily as the science of human genetics develops.  Although the use of 
moratoria seems less rigid, concerns have been raised about enforcement.
13
  The third 
approach of maintaining the status quo entails making no changes to the existing position. 
It is seen as slightly less attractive because it ignores the gravity of public concern about 
genetic discrimination.
14
 
 At this stage the actuarial relevance of genetic information has not yet been 
determined.  This may explain why there is not yet active lobbying by the insurance 
industry either for access to the results of genetic tests or for applicants to undergo 
compulsory genetic testing as part of the application process.  It is anticipated that once 
genetic tests becomes more readily available to the public and the use of such tests 
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becomes more widespread, insurance companies will be better positioned to start 
conducting actuarial studies in order to determine the actuarial relevance of genetic 
information.  Once that happens, genetic information will become very significant for the 
insurance industry and serious attempts will be made to gain access to genetic 
information.  It is for this very reason that genetic information must be protected from 
unauthorised disclosure. 
 
 
(a) Concerns 
 
(i) Unfair Discrimination  
Knowledge of a person‟s genetic status may lead to unfair discrimination.  Genetic 
discrimination is defined as „the differential treatment of individuals or their relatives due 
to actual or presumed genetic differences as opposed to discrimination based on 
phenotype‟.15  Differential treatment based on the results of genetic testing becomes 
especially problematic when discrimination arises from the results of predictive genetic 
testing as opposed to diagnostic testing.   
 At this stage the mere access to genetic information by insurers and employers is 
cause for concern.  It has been observed that „this has created a climate of fear in a field 
that should rather be teeming with hope and promise‟ and that „some people are now 
reluctant to be tested for fear that the information will be used against them‟.16  In 1997 
United States Jewish leaders requested officials of the National Human Genome 
Research Institute (NHGRI) to develop guidelines for genetic research on Ashkenazi 
Jews.
17
  They then met with members of the National Institutes of Health in April 1998, 
to discuss the meaning of genetic research for Jews; concern about the lack of legal 
protection against genetic discrimination; and fears of stigmatisation and denial of jobs 
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  Billings PR, Kohn MA, de Cuevas M, Beckwith J, Alper JS, Natowicz MR. „Discrimination as a 
consequence of genetic testing.‟ (1992) 50 American Journal of  Human Genetics 476. 
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and health insurance.
18
  This is due to the fact that genetic research appears to have 
targeted Ashkenazi Jews since they are at increased risk for certain genetic disorders.  
Common genetic disorders in the Ashkenazi Jewish population include Tay-Sachs 
disease, Gaucher disease (type 1), Bloom Syndrome, Canavan disease, torsion dystonia, 
familial dysautonomia,  fanconi anaemia (type C),  mucolipidosis IV,  Niemann-Pick 
disease (type A), congenital deafness, and non-classical adrenal hyperplasia.
19
   Recent 
research has found that Ashkenazi Jewish women are at higher risk of developing breast
20
  
and ovarian
21
  cancers.  The diseases most often referred to in literature on the topic are 
Tay-Sachs disease and Gaucher disease due to the high disease incidence and carrier 
frequency rates amongst Askenazi Jews.  Gaucher disease is the most common genetic 
disorder amongst Ashkenazi Jews with one in ten members of the population being a 
carrier of the Gaucher gene.
22
  Tay-Sachs disease is an incurable neurodegenerative 
disorder.  According to Charrow, one in every 26 – 30 members of the Ashkenazi Jewish 
population is a carrier of the Tay-sachs gene.
23
  The concern is that employers and 
insurers may discriminate against members of this group simply on the basis of their 
ethnicity without regard to the fact that not everyone is affected or that some members 
are merely disease mutation carriers.  
 
(ii) Adverse selection 
Adverse selection has been defined as „the process by which prospective policyholders 
may gain financial advantage through insurance purchase decisions based on risk 
characteristics known to them but unknown and not revealed to the insurer„.24  This is 
possible where a prospective insured has undergone genetic testing and, with full 
knowledge of the gravity of the test results, applies for insurance without disclosing such 
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test results to the insurer.  The insurer is then not able to properly assess the risk.  It 
creates concern because it threatens the viability of the insurance industry which in itself 
is based on uncertainty as to the materialisation of risks insured against.  The problem 
becomes more serious when exorbitant amounts of cover are applied for.  Polborn et al 
observe that governmental prohibition of the use of genetic information in the 
underwriting process will lead to „regulatory adverse selection‟.25  This statement is 
correct but the predicted harshness of such a situation may be tempered by the restriction 
of the prohibition to applications for insurance cover under a specified amount.  Insurers 
should be allowed to request the disclosure of genetic test results once the stipulated 
amount is exceeded.  This would prevent „regulatory adverse selection‟ as described by 
Polborn et al.
26
 
 
(iii) Adverse impact on future research prospects    
Genetic research requires the participation of human participants.  It is to be expected that 
individuals would be reluctant to volunteer as research participants if they suspect that 
they could suffer harm as a result of their participation.
27
  Harm may not necessarily be 
restricted to physical harm.  Monnye argues that „South Africa's unwillingness to 
recognise social and economic risks which will lead to protective measures being put in 
place will discourage future enrolments of prospective participants in research.‟28  In the 
case of genetic research this would mean that failure to acknowledge the potential for 
stigmatisation and genetic discrimination could lead to difficulty in recruiting research 
participants.  Green and Rickles observe that „it has become increasingly difficult to 
recruit individuals to participate in clinical research‟ and they suggest various possible 
reasons for such difficulty.
29
  The reasons suggested by Green and Rickles do not include 
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stigmatisation and discrimination but that may simply be attributed to the fact that their 
discussion is not focused on genetic research.   
 Stigmatisation and discrimination are risks that must be addressed in genetic research 
since these acts could lead to social and economic harm.  In view of concerns relating to 
potential genetic discrimination and stigmatisation, genetic research participants must be 
assured that their genetic information will not be disclosed to third parties, especially 
insurance companies and employers.  Failure to do so could result in unethical research 
practices and that in turn could result in the very difficulty described by Green and 
Rickles.
30
  The question which arises is whether ethical guidelines can adequately protect 
the privacy of genetic research participants.  This question is answered by analysing 
relevant international and national ethical guidelines, cases of unethical research 
involving human participants, and relevant literature. 
 In addition to the Nuremberg Code,
31
 the Declaration of Helsinki,
32
 and the 
WHO/CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects,
33
 all of which govern human research generally, there are two 
international instruments which deal specifically with human genetic data and research.  
The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights was adopted by the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 1997.
34
  
Article 7 of this Declaration provides that „genetic data associated with an identifiable 
person and stored or processed for the purposes of research or any other purpose must be 
held confidential in the conditions set by law.‟  The principles enunciated in the 
Declaration are standard-setting and non-binding in nature.  Article 7 therefore clearly 
relies on law as a tool for the promotion and enforcement of the principle of 
confidentiality.  Article 22 provides that „States should make every effort to promote the 
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principles set out in this Declaration and should, by means of all appropriate measures, 
promote their implementation.‟ As will be demonstrated below,35 ethical principles on 
their own have proven to be ineffective in curbing unethical research practices. This may 
be due to the fact that ethical guidelines lack enforceability.  Legislation, on the other 
hand, can provide methods of enforcement and penalties for non-compliance. Based on 
the examples provided below
36
 it is argued here that legislation is the „appropriate 
measure‟ for enforcement of ethical principles.   
 The second instrument, the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, was 
adopted by UNESCO in 2003.
37
  The aims of this Declaration are mainly to „ensure the  
protection of human rights in the collection, processing, use and storage of human genetic 
data whilst giving due consideration to freedom of research; to set out guiding principles 
for the formulation of legislation and policies on the collection, processing, use and 
storage of human genetic data; and to form the basis for guidelines of good practices in 
these areas.‟38  Like the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights,
39
  this Declaration is also a standard-setting document which is not binding on 
UNESCO‟s member States.  Article 4(a) accords special status to human genetic data.  
Based on this special status, article 4(b) provides that „[d]ue consideration should be 
given to the sensitivity of human genetic data and an appropriate level of protection for 
these data and biological samples should be established.‟  Do ethical guidelines provide 
an „appropriate level‟ of protection for the privacy of human genetic research 
participants?  Once again, in light of the cases of unethical research practices discussed 
below,
40
  it is fair to conclude that ethical guidelines do not provide an appropriate level 
of protection.  It follows from this conclusion that other steps need to be taken in order to 
provide an appropriate level of protection which should include enforcement mechanisms 
as well as penalties for non-compliance. These are issues that do not feature in the two 
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UNESCO Declarations discussed above.
41
  Due to the nature of the Declarations, no 
enforcement mechanisms or penalties for non-compliance can be built into them.    
 Article 14 of the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data
42
 deals with privacy 
and confidentiality and provides as follows: 
„(a) States should endeavour to protect the privacy of individuals and the confidentiality 
of human genetic data linked to an identifiable person, family or, where appropriate, 
group, in accordance with domestic law consistent with the international law of human 
rights.  
(b) Human genetic data, human proteomic data and biological samples linked to an 
identifiable person should not be disclosed or made accessible to third parties, in 
particular, employers, insurance companies, educational institutions and the family, 
except for an important public interest reason in cases restrictively provided for by 
domestic law consistent with the international law of human rights or where the prior, 
free, informed and express consent of the person concerned has been obtained provided 
that such consent is in accordance with domestic law and the international law of human 
rights. The privacy of an individual participating in a study using human genetic data, 
human proteomic data or biological samples should be protected and the data should be 
treated as confidential.  
(c) Human genetic data, human proteomic data and biological samples collected for the 
purposes of scientific research should not normally be linked to an identifiable person. 
Even when such data or biological samples are unlinked to an identifiable person, the 
necessary precautions should be taken to ensure the security of the data or biological 
samples.  
(d) Human genetic data, human proteomic data and biological samples collected for 
medical and scientific research purposes can remain linked to an identifiable person, only 
if necessary to carry out the research and provided that the privacy of the individual and 
the confidentiality of the data or biological samples concerned are protected in 
accordance with domestic law.  
(e) Human genetic data and human proteomic data should not be kept in a form which 
allows the data subject to be identified for any longer than is necessary for achieving the 
purposes for which they were collected or subsequently processed.‟ 
The above article refers to domestic law as a protection mechanism in respect of 
genetic data.  This implies that domestic law should clarify how genetic privacy will be 
protected.  This includes the protection of genetic data stored in genetic databases.
43
 The 
question which arises is whether existing South African law is adequate for this purpose.  
As explained below,
44
 HIV vaccine research and genetic research share many common 
ethical concerns.  The issues raised and conclusions reached by Strode et al in relation to 
HIV vaccine research can therefore be extended to genetic research. Strode et al consider  
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the current legal framework  to be  „inconsistent, ambiguous, and incomplete.‟45  Despite 
the existence of the National Health Act
46
 and ethical guidelines dealing specifically with 
HIV vaccine research in South Africa, Strode et al call for „specific legislation‟ to protect 
trial participants in HIV vaccine research.
47
  Their review of the existing ethical-legal 
framework leads them to conclude inter alia that research ethics committees should be 
compelled by law to apply national ethical standards and that law is needed to deal with 
issues such as protection of vulnerable research participants, informed consent, privacy 
and confidentiality in research, and protection from stigma.
48
  The question as to whether 
South African law is adequate for the protection of genetic privacy must be answered in 
the negative.  The adequacy of South African law on privacy is explored further in 
chapter four. 
 At the domestic level, the Department of Health has issued guidelines which provide 
a basis for the scientific and ethical integrity of research involving human participants.
49
  
This includes protecting the rights and safety of research participants although no 
reference to genetic research appears anywhere in the document.  It provides that 
„participants‟ right to privacy must be protected at all costs‟50 but refers only to the 
technological aspects of privacy protection.  The guidelines also provide that „Access to 
source data
51
 must take place within the requirements of the privacy legislation.‟52  No 
mention is made of the specific legislation that is being referred to.  
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 The guidelines also specify the types of research that need additional attention. These 
are: 
(1)  Research involving collectivities; 
(2)  research involving indigenous medical systems; 
(3)  emergency care research; 
(4)  research involving innovative therapy or interventions; 
(5)  research involving vulnerable communities; and 
(6)  HIV and AIDS clinical and epidemiological research.
53
 
It is interesting to note the special provision in respect of HIV and AIDS as well as the 
glaring absence of any reference to genetic research.  Unfortunately the drafters of the 
guidelines, who deemed it necessary to make special provision for HIV and 
epidemiological research, failed to acknowledge that similar considerations apply to 
genetic research.  Special provision for individuals with genetic disorders could prove 
useful in attracting research participants as well as protecting them from harm in 
research.  These guidelines, by their very nature, are vague.  Much is left to the 
interpretation of the reader.  This is far from ideal in an area as new and as complex as 
genetics. 
The Department of Health has also issued guidelines on ethics in health research.
54
  
Guideline 9 deals specifically with human genetic research
55
  and the privacy issues that 
are pertinent to genetic research.
56
  It acknowledges that in addition to the usual ethical 
issues inherent in human research, there are additional ethical issues which are unique to 
genetic research.  The approach to genetic research as reflected in these guidelines is 
most encouraging for those seeking greater protection for human genetic research 
participants. Unfortunately, though, these guidelines are not legally binding.  Research 
Ethics Committees are „encouraged to adopt these principles to guide their efforts in 
assessing all health research projects.‟57  This is followed by a note that „Compliance 
with these standards and with other national and international scripts reassures the public 
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that the rights, safety and well being of study participants are protected.‟58  The lack of 
enforcement mechanisms generally is a problem that is discussed by Strode et al in their  
analysis of the ethical-legal framework in respect of HIV vaccine research.
59
  Strode et al 
also suggest that research ethics committees be compelled by law to adopt national 
research ethics standards.
60
  Until that happens, there can be no guarantee of the 
application of these useful guidelines. 
 The MRC has published guidelines entitled „Guidelines on Ethics for Medical 
Research: Reproductive Biology and Genetic Research.‟61  Guideline 3 deals specifically 
with genetic research and practice.  This document merely contains recommendations as 
to how various ethical issues should be approached and often calls on the Department of 
Health to issue guidance on different matters such as maintaining confidentiality of 
genetic registers.  Unfortunately the guidelines are vague and not very helpful to those 
seeking definite answers to ethical questions posed by human genetic research.  The 
guidelines merely reiterate much of the relevant existing legal and ethical principles 
without taking matters any further. 
 As part of its guidelines for good practice in the health care professions, the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) has published guidelines entitled „General 
Ethical Guidelines for Health Researchers.‟62 These are based inter alia on the South 
African Constitution; the Department of Health‟s guidelines on Ethics in Health 
Research: Principles, Structures and Processes; the Medical Research Council‟s 
Guidelines for Ethics in Medical Research; and the Declaration of Helsinki.
63
  Guideline 
6.4 provides that health researchers should always „Recognise the right of research 
participants to expect that health researchers will not pass on any personal and 
confidential information that the latter learn in the course of their professional duties, 
unless the research participants agree; not breach confidentiality without sound reason 
and without the knowledge and consent of the research participants; and protect the 
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confidentiality of research data or other disclosures made by research participants.‟64 
These guidelines also categorise the inappropriate disclosure of research participant data 
as an act of scientific misconduct.
65
 These „ethical guidelines embody the ideals to which 
members of professions should aspire and subscribe.‟66  The document states that „a 
failure to do so may result in disciplinary action by the HPCSA and legal 
consequences.‟67  Of all the guidelines discussed thus far, this is the only one that 
mentions consequences for any breach thereof. It is unfortunate though that these 
guidelines can only be enforced against health researchers who are registered with the 
HPCSA.  The gap pertaining to lack of enforcement mechanisms still applies to all other 
health researchers. 
 It is acknowledged that international and national ethical guidelines do provide for the 
protection of confidentiality in research but history indicates that ethics alone cannot be 
relied upon to protect research participants.  Despite the existence of various ethical 
guidelines, many cases of unethical research have come to light over the years.
68
  South 
Africa, like other developing countries with a high burden of disease and high levels of 
poverty, is undoubtedly an attractive research site for researchers from developed 
countries.
69
  This is prevalent in the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) vaccine 
research which has been the focus of much attention by international researchers and the 
cause of much of the controversy regarding unethical research in South Africa. Even 
though this is not yet the case with genetic research, it is foreseeable that genetic research 
will follow a similar path as more indigenous populations are targeted for genetic 
research purposes. The ethical issues in HIV vaccine research are almost identical to 
those that plague the area of genetic research.  Strode et al identify the ethical issues in 
HIV vaccine research as those pertaining to international collaborations, vulnerable 
research participants, high levels of discrimination and stigma surrounding HIV, human 
rights issues, and potential conflict between public needs and participants‟ rights and 
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interests.
70
  Due to these ethical issues, they call for „substantive and procedural ethical-
legal safeguards…for research participants, while such critical research is facilitated.‟71  
These are the very same ethical issues which must be addressed in human genetic 
research. For the purpose of proving the inadequacy of ethical guidelines in protecting 
human participants in research, literature on the efficacy of ethical principles relating to 
HIV vaccine research will be briefly examined and the conclusions will be extended to 
genetic research due to the common ethical issues shared by the two areas of research. 
This justifies the discussion and the conclusions reached below. 
 Many commentators have observed that the ACTG 106 clinical trial
72
 involving the 
study of interventions for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, failed to 
comply with ethical guidelines relating to the standard of care in developing 
countries.
73,74,75
  Lurie and Wolfe are highly critical of the „double standards‟ that 
sometimes come into play when designing research to be conducted in developing 
countries.
76
  They refuse to accept that research which is considered unethical in 
developed countries can be considered ethical in developing countries.  Angell observes 
that „[t]here appears to be a general retreat from the clear principles enunciated in the 
Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki as applied to research in the Third 
World.‟77  Both authors call for a greater commitment to ethical standards.  In the 
absence of such commitment there can be no guarantee of protection for research 
participants.  Annas observes that „On the international level we have already seen that 
the Nuremberg Code, the Helsinki Declaration, and WHO/CIOMS guidelines are almost 
universally seen as advisory and ethical only.  They have no legal status in most 
individual countries, and they provide no mechanism for accountability or sanction of 
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researchers who disregard their precepts.‟78  It is clear from these comments and 
observations that ethical standards need enforcement and that mechanisms for such 
enforcement need to be created.  It is unlikely that these ethical instruments will be 
completely effective in curbing unethical research practices in a field as complex, 
diverse, and challenging as human genetics.   
  Research Ethics Committees have a crucial role to play in ensuring that research is 
conducted in an ethical manner.
79
  The Starting Antiretroviral Therapy at Three Points in 
Tuberculosis Therapy (SAPIT) clinical trial is a good example of failure to protect 
research participants from research-related harm.  The SAPIT trial was conducted in 
South Africa from June 2005 to July 2008 with the aim of determining the optimal time 
for the initiation of antiretroviral therapy (ART) in patients who were co-infected with 
HIV and tuberculosis (TB).
80
  As part of the study design one randomly assigned group 
of participants (sequential group) was to receive ART only after completion of TB 
treatment and not at any point during TB treatment.  More deaths occurred in this group 
than in the other two groups which received ART at different points during TB treatment 
(integrated groups).  The study has been criticised mainly on two grounds.  The first 
criticism is that ethical guidelines on the standard of care were not adhered to insofar as 
the sequential group was concerned.  Boulle et al find that by delaying ART until the 
completion of TB treatment, the SAPIT study failed to comply with the Declaration of 
Helsinki‟s recommendation81 or the South African Antiretroviral Treatment Guidelines82 
relating to the standard of care.
83
  They also find that participants were denied beneficial 
treatment which they would ordinarily have received had they not been assigned to the 
                                                 
78
  Annas, George J. „The changing landscape of human experimentation:  Nuremberg, Helsinki, and 
beyond.‟ (1992) 2:2 Health Matrix: Journal of Law-Medicine 119 at 126. 
79
  Udo Schüklenk  „Oversight, oversight, oversight‟ Editorial (2011) 25:3 Bioethics  ii. 
80
  Abdool Karim, Salim S; Naidoo, Kogieleum; Grobler, Anneke; Padayatchi, Nesri; Baxter, Cheryl; 
Gray, Andrew; Gengiah, Tanuja; Nair, Gonasagrie; Bamber, Sheila; Singh, Aarthi; Khan, Munira; Pienaar, 
Jacqueline; El-Sadr, Wafaa; Friedland, Gerald & Karim, Quarraisha Abdool „Timing of initiation of 
antiretroviral drugs during tuberculosis therapy‟ (2010) 362:8 The New England Journal of Medicine 697. 
81
  Supra note 32. 
82
  Department of Health National Antiretroviral Treatment Guidelines (2004) 1ed South Africa at 18, 
available at http://www.hst.org.za/uploads/files/sa_ART_Guidelines1.pdf accessed on 22 September 2011. 
83
  Andrew Boulle, Polly Clayden, Karen Cohen, Ted Cohen Fransesca, Krista Dong, Nathan Geffen, 
Ashraf Grimwood, Rocio Hurtado, Christopher Kenyon, Stephen Lawn, Gary Maartens, Graeme Meintjies, 
Marc Mendelson, Megan Murray, Molebong Rangaka, Ian Sanne, David Spencer, Jantjie Taljaard, 
Ebrahim Variava, W D Francois Venter & Douglas Wilson „Prolonged deferral of antiretroviral therapy in 
the SAPIT trial: Did we need a clinical trial to tell us that this would increase mortality?‟ (2010) 100:9 
South African Medical Journal 566 at 570. 
  
62 
 
sequential group in the SAPIT trial.
84
  The second criticism relates to the quality of 
ethical review.  Boulle et al conclude that „the ethical training of investigators and 
capacity of ethics committees in South Africa should be improved.‟85   
 Cleaton-Jones and Wassenaar respond to the abovementioned criticisms by 
comparing the relevant South African ethical requirements with federal regulations in the 
United States and by concluding that the former are „more stringent.'86  They argue that 
the South African ethical framework is in no way inferior to the position in the United 
States of America. They do acknowledge, however, that „the structural, legal and ethics 
requirements for ethics review of research in South Africa do not necessarily prevent 
poor-quality review from occurring.‟87  They also agree with Boulle et al88 that there is 
room for improvement as regards the training of research ethics committees but hasten to 
point out that the issue of training is not peculiar to South Africa.
89
   
 Based on the historical trail of unethical research as well as the more recent cases of 
unethical research that have been conducted in developing countries, it must be argued 
that Schüklenk is correct in his observation that  „it seems that we have good reasons to 
be worried about the implementation of research ethics standards.‟90   Schüklenk‟s 
observation is not made with specific reference to South Africa but with regard to 
research ethics committees in general.  It is evident that the system of ethical review by 
research ethics committees is not working exactly as intended, thereby jeopardising 
future research.  Strode et al observe a fragmented approach to human research ethics in 
South Africa
91
 and point to the legally non-binding nature
92
 of ethical guidelines.  Their 
review of the existing ethical-legal framework in South Africa leads them to conclude 
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inter alia that research ethics committees should be compelled by law to apply national 
ethical standards.
93
   
 There is clearly a need for adequate genetic privacy safeguards so as to promote 
genetic research and to fully realise the potential of the strides made by the Human 
Genome Project.  Such safeguards can only be created via legislation dealing specifically 
with the complex legal and ethical issues pertaining to genetic research.  This conclusion 
is supported by the observation of Strode et al that „The ethical-legal framework has, for 
the most part, the necessary institutions and some of the guidelines, but does not have 
many of the laws needed to protect and promote the rights of persons participating in 
research…‟94  It also appears to be widely accepted that research ethics committees are 
not functioning optimally.  Based on this it is fair to argue that the protection which is 
anticipated through the control and oversight to be exercised by research ethics 
committees may not necessarily materialise in all cases.  This is particularly true in 
respect of genetic research which is complex and relatively new.  Research ethics 
committees may not be adequately equipped to deal with the ethical challenges posed by 
genetic research.  This automatically creates a gap in protection for genetic research 
participants.   
 Non-binding ethical guidelines, non-specific legal protection, and the questionable 
capacity of research ethics committees do not augur well for the future of genetic 
research in South Africa.  It leaves research participants open to exploitation by 
researchers who are more likely to target research sites that are less regulated.  It also 
creates the difficulty described by Green and Rickles,
95
 which is that of reduced 
willingness to participate in research.  The gap in research protection must be closed and 
that can only be achieved through legislation dealing with the complex legal and ethical 
issues that prevail in genetic research.  This is the only way to secure participation in 
research and to protect research participants from research-related harm. 
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(iv) Adverse impact on clinical medicine  
Knowledge of an individual‟s genetic susceptibility to a particular disease makes it 
possible to design a treatment programme to prevent or delay onset of the disease. This is 
especially the case with complex diseases such as diabetes, asthma, cancer, and heart 
disease, to name a few. Complex diseases are sometimes referred to as multifactorial 
diseases since they can be traced to a combination of multiple genes and environmental 
factors. Due to the influence of environmental factors, their time of onset and severity are 
more difficult to predict than is the case with single-gene disorders. In order to obtain 
preventative health care, an affected individual must first undergo genetic testing. 
Genetic testing is defined as „an analysis performed on human DNA, RNA, genes, and/or 
chromosomes to detect heritable or acquired genotypes, mutations, phenotypes, or  
karyotypes that cause or are likely to cause a specific disease or condition.‟96 Without 
genetic testing it becomes difficult to detect susceptibility and devise appropriate 
preventive strategies for affected individuals.  
It is anticipated that genetic testing will, in due course, form a major component of 
clinical medicine insofar as it has the potential to assist in clinical decision-making. This 
is mainly due to the fact that almost all diseases have a genetic component.
97
  In the 
absence of adequate privacy protection mechanisms, however, individuals are likely to 
fear genetic discrimination based on the results of genetic testing and are therefore less 
likely to undergo such testing. Privacy protection paves the way for the integration of 
genetic testing into the health care system.   
 
 
3.3   EMPLOYMENT 
An understanding of the objections to employers‟ access to genetic information 
necessitates reference to the historical applications of genetic screening initiatives in the 
workplace.  There are published cases of genetic screening initiatives in the United States 
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of America which have given rise to concerns about possible genetic discrimination.
98
 
There was also a case in Germany where a teacher was refused permanent employment 
because she had a family history of Huntington‟s disease.99  The following statement by 
Miller, a commissioner at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the United 
States of America, is noteworthy:  
„We constantly are learning of the discovery of new genes. As the science of genetics 
explodes and the technology becomes more accessible, the issue of how society protects its 
workers against the misuse of genetic information become more important and legal and 
policy development in the area, more compelling. My concern, and a concern shared by 
many, is that if employers are permitted to consider genetic information in making 
personnel decisions, people may be unfairly barred or removed from employment for 
reasons that are wholly unrelated to their ability to perform their jobs.‟100 
 Kim argues that societal interests require that employers not be given access to the 
genetic information of employees.
101
  Employees naturally fear loss of employment or 
reduced employment prospects. This would be a major concern in countries which have 
high unemployment rates, high levels of poverty, and inadequate health care systems. 
The issue of consent to testing is important in the employment sphere. The question is 
whether it is correct to speak of voluntary informed consent in such an unbalanced 
relationship. Due to the power imbalance between employer and employee, it can never 
be assumed that an employee‟s consent to genetic testing is voluntary. 
 Miller states that „[l]egal protections are essential so that scientific breakthroughs are 
realised, privacy is preserved, and the workplace remains free from discrimination. 
Moreover, law can provide a uniform standard of conduct regarding the use of genetic 
information in the workplace.‟102  In the employment context genetic discrimination may 
arise from an employer‟s access to genetic information which discloses a susceptibility to 
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workplace hazards.  This is a challenging situation which requires a careful balancing of 
the employer‟s duty to prevent occupational injuries and diseases with the employee‟s 
right not to be unfairly discriminated against.  Law can be used to prevent workplace 
discrimination. This can be achieved by statutory protection of genetic privacy coupled 
with appropriate sanctions for contraventions of the statute. 
 
 
(a) Reasons for employers’ interest in genetic information 
Why would employers want to access employees‟ genetic information? One of the 
reasons advanced by employers has been the protection of employees from workplace 
hazards. In the early American case of Bentivegna v United States Department of 
Labor
103
 the court rejected this paternalistic approach of the employer in excluding a 
building repairer with diabetes from the workplace. Thereafter in the case of 
International Union v Johnson Controls Inc
104
 the United States Supreme Court also 
rejected the paternalism of the employer and held that, regardless of the supposed good 
intentions of the employer, their policy was still discriminatory. In this case the 
employer‟s „fetal protection‟ policy prohibited fertile women from being employed in 
positions where they would be exposed to lead.  The employer submitted that its policy 
was intended to prevent the women from harmful exposure to lead.  The Supreme Court 
held that the employer's fetal-protection policy was sex discrimination forbidden under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the following reasons: 
(1) the policy was facially discriminatory by requiring only  female employees to 
prove that they were not capable of reproducing. Exposure to unacceptable levels 
of lead had been shown to also affect sperm count and the policy should 
therefore have been made equally applicable to male employees; 
(2)  the employer's choice to treat all female employees as potentially pregnant 
showed sex discrimination; and 
(3) the beneficence of the employer's purpose did not undermine the conclusion that 
the employer's policy was sex discrimination.  
                                                 
103
  Supra note 98. 
104
  499 US 187 (1991). 
  
67 
 
 In the American case of Echazabal v Chevron USA
105
  the court found that the 
employer had acted in contravention of federal disability discrimination law by refusing 
to rehire an employee who had a liver condition. The court reached this decision even 
though the employer‟s reason for not wanting to re-employ the individual was that his 
existing liver condition might be aggravated by exposure to hazardous chemicals. A 
second possible justification for employers‟ interest in genetic information is the 
protection of co-workers from risks associated with a genetic disorder of a colleague. A 
good example would be that of an employee who operates a forklift at a construction site 
and who has a disease which causes him to have seizures. In this case it may be argued 
that the employer has a duty to provide a safe working environment for all workers and 
therefore has a right to know about risks posed by one worker to the safety of other 
workers.   
 A contrary argument would be that even an employee who does not have a genetic 
predisposition to such a disease can have a sudden physiological reaction to an unknown 
factor, which may endanger the lives of co-workers. For example, exposure to heat, 
hunger, dehydration, and other „non-genetic‟ factors, could also cause a person to lose 
unconsciousness. These are eventualities which no employer can always guard against.  
In order to balance the scales, however, it is submitted that where such an incident does 
occur, the employer must investigate the cause thereof. Even so, the employer should not 
be entitled to see the results of any genetic test. Based on the results of any tests that are 
done, the examining physician should determine whether the employee is fit to continue 
working in that particular position and should advise the employer accordingly. At no 
stage should the employee‟s medical diagnosis be disclosed to the employer. 
 A third reason that could be advanced by employers is the protection of the public. 
Commercial airline pilots are often used as an example to support this argument.  In this 
case it may be necessary to draw a distinction between the results of diagnostic and 
predictive tests.  Diagnostic genetic testing reveals whether a person has a particular 
disease at the time of testing.  Predictive genetic testing can be divided into two 
categories, namely predictive presymptomatic and predictive predispositional. Predictive 
presymptomatic tests reveal with certainty whether or not a person will develop a 
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particular disease sometime in the future whilst predictive predispositional tests simply 
indicate whether a person has a risk of developing a particular disease.   The issue here is 
whether or not employees who exhibit no clinical signs of disease should be subjected to 
genetic testing by the employer or have results of previous genetic tests disclosed to the 
employer.  It is submitted that due to the inherent requirements of a particular job or 
based on clinical signs, the employer may require the employee to undergo genetic 
testing. However, the attending physician should be prohibited from disclosing the results 
of any testing to the employer, save to inform the employer that the employee is not fit 
for that particular position.  This needs to have the force of law and genetic privacy 
legislation is clearly the answer. 
 Employers may possibly also be motivated by economic considerations to conduct 
genetic testing on employees. They could be interested in reducing compensation claims, 
excluding people who would need a lot of time off work due to illness thereby hampering 
productivity, and generally keeping costs down.  Whether or not this is acceptable 
depends to a large extent on the nature of the employer‟s business.  Based on inherent 
requirements of a job, an employer may resort to genetic testing. Examples would be jobs 
where there is exposure to hazardous chemicals (unsuitable for individuals with asthma); 
repetitive movements (unsuitable for those who have carpal tunnel syndrome); strenuous 
activity (not suited to those who have or who are carriers of sickle cell anaemia).  This 
list is not exhaustive.  The circumstances of each case will have to be investigated and a 
decision will have to be made on the merits. 
Legislation should be developed which prohibits the disclosure of genetic information 
to employers but which also provides that employers may request genetic testing in 
clearly prescribed circumstances if they can justify it based on strict  criteria specified by 
the legislation.  The approach of the legislature and the courts to the issue of HIV testing 
in the workplace may prove instructive in this regard.  South Africa‟s Employment 
Equity Act
106
 has a provision relating to HIV testing, which prohibits the testing of an 
employee for the purpose of determining HIV status, unless such testing is found to be 
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justifiable by the Labour Court.
107
 In the case of Joy Mining Machinery v NUMSA
108
  the 
court listed the following relevant factors: 
(1) the prohibition of unfair discrimination;  
(2) the need for HIV testing;  
(3) the purpose of the test;  
(4) the medical facts of the case;  
(5) employment conditions;  
(6) social policy;  
(7) the fair distribution of employee benefits;  
(8) the inherent requirements of the job; and  
(9) the category of the employees concerned.
109
 
The Court indicated that it also required information on:  
(1) the attitude of the employees;  
(2) whether the test was voluntary;  
(3) the financing of the tests;  
(4) pre-test preparation and counselling; and  
(5) the nature of the test and post-test counselling.
110
 
The court noted, however, that these additional factors do not go to justifiability but are 
merely for the purpose of assisting the court in its deliberations.  Even though this case 
deals with HIV testing, it does provide some indication of the approach of the courts in 
dealing with sensitive issues in the workplace.  
 
 
(b) Form and extent of protection 
Kim suggests that preventing harm in these contexts is most suitably addressed by the 
implementation of genetic information privacy protection as opposed to the creation of 
anti-discriminatory measures.  This is simply because the flow of information is easier to 
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monitor and enforce as opposed to the use of information once it is in the hands of an 
insurer or employer.
111
  Kim argues as follows: 
„The issue of genetic privacy, then, is prior to that of discrimination. If employers have 
access to workers‟ genetic information, divining when they have used that information 
improperly will be extremely difficult. If, however, that information is unavailable, 
discrimination on the basis of genetic traits becomes impossible.  Those concerned about 
preventing genetic discrimination, then, ought to be concerned first and foremost with 
protecting the privacy of workers‟ genetic information.‟112 
Kim favours an objective form of legal protection as opposed to a subjective test.  Insofar 
as the choice of a particular law is concerned, Kim accordingly argues that „the problem 
of genetic discrimination in the workplace is better understood using the model of 
privacy rights rather than the traditional antidiscrimination paradigm. Recasting the 
problem in this way…shifts the focus of any legal response away from divining an 
employer‟s “true” motivation, and toward defining and controlling the flow of protected 
information‟.113  This view has merit.  Proving an employer‟s true intention would be 
difficult and may only result in the dilution of any protection sought to be afforded by 
anti-discrimination legislation. 
It has been observed that restrictions on the collection of genetic information are 
often limited to future genetic testing and do not protect existing genetic information.  
Article 12 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, which states that 
genetic tests may be done only for health purposes or for scientific research linked to 
health purposes, and not for selective purposes in the domains of work or insurance, is 
cited as an example.
114
  Legislation, regulations, rules, and industry codes must also 
protect existing genetic information. This may not be entirely possible with regard to 
insurance due to fears of adverse selection but there is no reason why it cannot be done in 
the employment sphere. It is, after all, unlikely that an individual who has had a genetic 
test which reveals a predisposition to a certain disease will consciously seek employment 
in an environment which will bring about the onset of the disease. For example, a 
reasonable person who has a genetic predisposition to asthma will not seek employment 
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in a chemical plant where he or she will be exposed to harmful chemical fumes on a daily 
basis. I submit that the number of prospective employees who might ignore the results of 
predictive genetic tests is too small to have any significant adverse impact on the 
employer‟s business so as to warrant the disclosure of the employee‟s genetic 
information. 
 
 
3.4 GENETIC RESEARCH AND THE CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY 
The Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution of South Africa provides that „[e]veryone 
has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right…not to be 
subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent.‟115  In 
accordance with this constitutional right, the National Health Act
116
 seeks to protect 
research participants against unethical research practices.  Section 71 provides as follows: 
„(1)  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, research or 
experimentation on a living person may only be conducted- 
 (a)  in the prescribed manner; and 
 (b)  with the written consent of the person after he or she has been informed of the 
objects of the research or experimentation and any possible positive or negative 
consequences on his or her health.‟  
Except for the National Health Act,
117
 no other legislation seeks to enforce the 
constitutional rights of research participants. 
 The foundational principles of ethical research in South Africa are respect for the 
dignity of persons, beneficence and non-maleficence, and justice.
118
  In practice this 
requires inter alia risk-benefit assessments, precautionary measures to protect the privacy 
of participants, and informed consent.  There are various domestic
119
 and international
120
 
ethical guidelines which do provide some form of protection to research participants in 
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South Africa but these cannot be legally enforced.  The domestic ethical guidelines are 
discussed in detail in chapter seven.  It is important for the purpose of this discussion to 
note the following observations regarding human genetic research as contained in the 
Research Ethics Guidelines issued by the Department of Health in 2004: 
„Participants may be at risk of harm arising from the use of genetic information, 
including stigmatisation or unfair discrimination, and adoption of exclusionary 
policies. Researchers should recognise that special care must be taken to protect the 
privacy and confidentiality of genetic information. Research ethics committees should 
require researchers to consider whether a proposed genetic study might lead to a 
potential harm to participants, and what steps can be implemented to obviate such 
harm. The results of genetic tests, especially those that provide information about 
future health, could be used, potentially, by third parties such as insurance companies 
and employers to assist with decisions concerning research participants and their 
families. By participating in genetic research, people should not be put at risk of being 
deprived of benefits available to other members of the community.‟121 
These observations clearly reflect an acknowledgement that external harm may befall 
genetic research participants and the guidelines aim to address the threat via ethical 
principles of research.  Whether this amounts to adequate protection in the context of 
genetic research is a question which will be addressed further in this chapter.  
 The issue of vulnerability is important in medical research involving human 
participants.  The importance of this issue is heightened in the context of genetic research 
which often targets ethnic groups and families.  Such groups and families become 
vulnerable to external harm in the form of genetic discrimination.  The discovery of the 
prevalence of certain genetic disorders in certain ethnic groups has created concern 
amongst members of such groups.  Examples would be the prevalence of Tay-Sachs 
disease and breast cancer amongst individuals of Ashkenazi Jewish descent as well as 
sickle-cell disease amongst African Americans.  The possible implications of such 
discoveries for employment and insurance prospects amongst such groups must be 
addressed.  Unfortunately there does not appear to be consensus on the definition of 
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vulnerability in bioethics discourse.  What is clear, though, is that the concept remains a 
useful one even though it evades precise definition. 
 Genetic research holds great promise for medical science and must therefore be 
encouraged.  In order for such research to continue and for its potential to be fully 
realised, it is necessary to alleviate the fear of genetic discrimination.  Whether this can 
be achieved by the requirement of informed consent and the conventional concept of 
vulnerability is debatable.  The aim of this discussion is to identify the deficiencies in the 
current framework. 
 
 
(a) Historical Background 
The atrocities committed by German Nazi scientists and physicians during World War II 
were exposed during the Nuremberg medical trials
122
 (often referred to as the Doctors‟ 
Trials) held in 1946.  During the trials it emerged that prisoners in concentration camps 
had been used as research subjects in inhumane and degrading experiments without their 
consent. These experiments caused enormous pain, suffering, permanent disability, and 
often death. The gravity of the revelations made during the trial led to the development of 
the Nuremberg Code
123
 in August 1947.  This Code sets out the following ten basic 
ethical principles of clinical research: 
(a) Voluntary consent of subjects is essential. 
(b) The research must be necessary and for the good of society. 
(c) The research must be justifiable on the basis of anticipated results.   
(d) Unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury should be avoided. 
(e) Research should not be undertaken where there is reason to believe that death or 
disabling injury may result. 
(f) The degree of risk to be taken should not be greater than that determined by the 
humanitarian importance of the objective of the research.  
(g) Steps must be taken to protect subjects against even remote possibilities of injury, 
disability, or death. 
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(h) Research should be undertaken only by persons qualified to do so. 
(i) A subject should have the right to withdraw from an experiment at any stage. 
(j) A researcher must be prepared to terminate an experiment at any stage if he has 
cause to believe that continuation is likely to result in injury, disability or death of 
the subject.
124
 
 The Nuremberg Code is a concise statement of ethical principles.   In 1964 the World 
Medical Association developed the Declaration of Helsinki
125
 which is a statement of 
guiding ethical principles for those who undertake research involving human participants.  
This document is more comprehensive and far-reaching than the Nuremberg Code.  It 
recognises that some research participants are vulnerable and need special protection.  It 
also emphasizes respect for the privacy of research participants. 
 Unfortunately the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki were not entirely 
successful in curbing unethical research practices.  Beecher, a Harvard researcher, 
exposed more than twenty unethical studies in an article published in 1966.
126
 A well-
known example of unconscionable and unethical research is that of the Tuskegee Study 
of untreated syphilis which was conducted in the United States from 1930 to 1970.  In 
that experiment a group of four hundred poor and uneducated African-American men 
with syphilis were left untreated for a period of forty years so that researchers could 
follow the natural course of the disease.  At the time penicillin had been identified as 
treatment for syphilis but this information was withheld from the participants.  Eventually 
congressional hearings were held and the study was terminated.  Another well-known 
case is that of hepatitis research at the Willowbrook State School for mentally disabled 
children in New York.  Between 1956 and 1972 children at this school were used as 
„subjects‟ to study the course of infectious hepatitis and to test the effects of potential 
treatment.   
 The ensuing furore caused by the exposure of these unethical studies prompted the 
government of the United States of America to take action to regulate clinical research. 
The first step was the passing of the National Research Act of 1974, which created the 
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National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research.  The commission compiled the Belmont Report
127
 which discussed 
three ethical principles of research, namely, respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.  
The report specifically acknowledges vulnerable groups and bases their non-involvement 
in research on the principle of justice.  In this regard it provides as follows: 
„One special instance of injustice results from the involvement of vulnerable subjects.  
Certain groups, such as racial minorities, the economically disadvantaged, the very sick, 
and the institutionalized may continually be sought as research subjects, owing to their 
ready availability in settings where research is conducted.  Given their dependent status 
and their frequently compromised capacity for free consent, they should be protected 
against the danger of being involved in research solely for administrative convenience, or 
because they are easy to manipulate as a result of their illness or socioeconomic 
condition.‟128  
In 2002 the Council for International Organizations and Medical Sciences (CIOMS) 
and the World Health Organisation (WHO) developed International Ethical Guidelines 
for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects.
129
  These guidelines provide that 
„all research involving human subjects should be conducted in accordance with the basic 
ethical principles, namely respect for persons, beneficence and justice.‟130  They deal 
with the application of ethical guidelines in research involving human participants.  
According to the guidelines „[r]espect for persons incorporates at least two fundamental 
ethical considerations; namely: 
(a) respect for autonomy, which requires that those who are capable of deliberation 
about their personal choices should be treated with respect for their capacity for 
self-determination; and 
(b)  protection of persons with impaired or diminished autonomy, which requires that 
those who are dependent or vulnerable be afforded security against harm or 
abuse.‟131 
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(b) Vulnerability in genetic research 
All of the instruments discussed above take cognisance of the fact that certain individuals 
and groups need more protection than others in the research setting. Such groups are 
deemed „vulnerable‟ and more stringent requirements accordingly apply for approval of 
their participation in research.  Two major problems with the concept of vulnerability in 
research involving human participants can be identified: lack of consensus regarding the 
definition of vulnerability and failure of conventional definitions of vulnerability to adapt 
to „new‟ areas of research.  The unfortunate result of these problems is that some search 
participants who genuinely require additional protection cannot and do not receive it.  
This ultimately compromises important research.  The problem is heightened in the area 
of genetic research which is sensitive but crucial for advances in medicine and health 
care.  
The issue of vulnerability is undoubtedly very important in research involving 
human participants.  The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights
132
  
provides specifically for respect for human vulnerability. Article 8 provides that „In 
applying and advancing scientific knowledge, medical practice and associated 
technologies, human vulnerability should be taken into account. Individuals and 
groups of special vulnerability should be protected and the personal integrity of such 
individuals respected.‟  The International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) recently 
released a Report on the Principle of Respect for Human Vulnerability and Personal 
Integrity.
133 
 This report focuses on article 8 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human Rights
134
 and points out that „the specific task of this Article is to address 
special vulnerabilities that occur, whether as a consequence of personal disability, 
environmental burdens or social injustice, in the contexts of health care, research and 
the application of emerging technologies in the biomedical sciences.‟135 
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 Unfortunately the concept of vulnerability in research involving human participants 
evades precise definition.  Various definitions may be found in international and 
domestic ethical guidelines but none are completely adequate.  The following examples 
are indicative of the vagueness surrounding this concept. The previous (2004) version of 
the Declaration of Helsinki
136
 described vulnerability as follows: 
„Some research populations are vulnerable and need special protection. The particular 
needs of the economically and medically disadvantaged must be recognized. Special 
attention is also required for those who cannot give or refuse consent for themselves, for 
those who may be subject to giving consent under duress, for those who will not benefit 
personally from the research and for those for whom the research is combined with 
care.‟137 
The current (2008) version of the Declaration of Helsinki
138
 provides as follows: 
„Some research populations are particularly vulnerable and need special protection. These 
include those who cannot give or refuse consent for themselves and those who may be 
vulnerable to coercion or undue influence.‟139 
The CIOMS guidelines
140
 define vulnerability as „a substantial incapacity to protect 
one‟s own interests owing to such impediments as lack of capability to give informed 
consent, lack of alternative means of obtaining medical care or other expensive 
necessities, or being a junior or subordinate member of a hierarchical group.   
Accordingly, special provision must be made for the protection of the rights and welfare 
of vulnerable persons.‟141  The guidelines also provide that „vulnerable persons are those 
who are relatively (or absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests. More 
formally, they may have insufficient power, intelligence, education, resources, strength, 
or other needed attributes to protect their own interests.
142 
 Groups that are deemed 
vulnerable are those who lack the capacity to consent; subordinate members of 
hierarchical groups such as medical and nursing students, subordinate hospital and 
laboratory personnel, employees of pharmaceutical companies, and members of the 
armed forces or police; elderly persons; residents of nursing homes; people receiving 
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welfare benefits or social assistance and other poor people and the unemployed; patients 
in emergency rooms; some ethnic and racial minority groups; homeless persons; nomads; 
refugees or displaced persons; prisoners; patients with incurable disease; individuals who 
are politically powerless; and members of communities unfamiliar with modern medical 
concepts.
143
  There are no specific guidelines dealing with genetic research. 
 The South African position is reflective of the international consent-based approach.  
Research ethics guidelines issued by the Department of Health (DOH) define vulnerable 
participants as follows: 
„Individuals whose willingness to volunteer in a clinical trial may be unduly influenced 
by the expectation, whether justified or not, of benefits associated with participation, or 
of a retaliatory response from senior members of a hierarchy in case of refusal to 
participate. Examples are members of a group with a hierarchical structure, such as 
medical, pharmacy, dental, and nursing students, subordinate hospital and laboratory 
personnel, employees of the pharmaceutical industry, members of the armed forces, and 
persons kept in detention. Other vulnerable participants include patients with incurable 
diseases, persons in nursing homes, unemployed or impoverished persons, patients in 
emergency situations, ethnic minority groups, homeless persons, nomads, refugees, 
minors, and those incapable of giving consent.‟144 
 The DOH guidelines for clinical trials
145
 identify participants whose involvement 
need special attention.  These include children and adolescents; women;  people with 
mental disabilities or substance abuse related disorders; persons in dependent 
relationships or comparable situations; prisoners; and persons highly dependent on 
medical care.
146
  In a similar vein the MRC regards pregnant women, children, 
adolescents, prisoners, people with mental disabilities, the elderly, students, and persons 
in dependent relationships as special groups who require special attention.
147
  The 
emphasis in both sets of guidelines is on capacity to provide informed consent and 
voluntariness. 
 Unfortunately none of the abovementioned instruments regard genetic research 
participants as vulnerable even though they are exposed to an increased risk of 
stigmatisation (social harm) as well as potential discrimination by insurers and employers 
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(economic harm).  Due to the nature of genetic information, genetic research participants 
are more susceptible to social and economic harm than other human research participants 
are. The IBC report on vulnerability, recognises „threats to privacy engendered by the 
possession of genetic information‟ which „would include access to the genetic data of 
patients by researchers, insurance companies, employers and governments.‟148  The 
report notes further that „Such disclosures would engender major vulnerabilities to 
restrictions of civil liberties.‟149  Even though this is the case, genetic research 
participants are not deemed vulnerable either by international or domestic ethical 
instruments.  The aim here is to find the reasons for such non-inclusion and to suggest 
ways to remedy the situation so as to adequately protect human genetic research 
participants. 
 It is argued here that the problem of non-inclusion of genetic research participants as 
a vulnerable group lies with the foundation of the definition of vulnerability.  The 
conventional view, as reflected in the international and domestic ethical guidelines 
discussed above,
150
  is that vulnerable persons are those who lack the ability to provide 
informed consent and those who are susceptible to coercion. This includes mentally 
disabled persons, children, prisoners, pregnant women, foetuses, economically or 
educationally disadvantaged persons.  The conventional grounds on which additional 
protection is required cannot accommodate genetic research participants as a vulnerable 
group.  The determination of vulnerability is based on lack of capacity to consent and on 
susceptibility to coercion or exploitation, neither of which is automatically satisfied in the 
case of genetic research participants.   
 Levine et al are of the view that existing definitions are both „too broad and too 
narrow.‟151  They argue that the concept has lost its force because too many groups are 
now considered vulnerable.  This is why the existing definitions may be considered too 
broad. On the other hand, they argue that certain research participants who do require 
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additional protection are not receiving it because they are not deemed vulnerable.
152
  This 
is where existing definitions prove to be too narrow. Levine et al are critical of the 
„almost exclusive emphasis‟ on capacity to give consent, to the exclusion of other 
factors.
153
  They argue that this results in the concept of vulnerability being too narrow.  
Hurst shares this view as she also argues that current definitions of vulnerability are 
either too broad or too narrow.
154
  She refers to definitions which „encompass humanity 
in its entirety‟ as overly broad.155  Definitions which restrict vulnerability exclusively to 
those who lack the capacity to give informed consent or who are more susceptible to 
exploitation, are viewed by Hurst as being too narrow.
156
  Such narrow definitions 
inevitably exclude certain participants who require greater protection.  In the end such 
narrow definitions may defeat the very purpose of the concept of vulnerability in 
research, which is to protect participants from harm.  These arguments indicate that the 
conventional definition of vulnerability should be revisited.   
 Research Ethics Committees evaluate special risks in respect of vulnerable groups.  
However, due to the generally accepted conventional definition of vulnerability, research 
participants cannot be regarded as vulnerable purely on the basis of their participation in 
genetic research.  This is so even though there are special risks that must be considered in 
genetic research.  There is thus clearly a deficiency in the current framework which must 
be addressed if critical genetic research, which is ultimately in the interest of humanity as 
a whole, is to be fostered.  The following observation by Levine et al captures the cause 
of the problem relating to the concept of vulnerability: 
„The concept of vulnerability, however, fails to address less settled situations arising from 
the context in which contemporary research is conducted.  The research enterprise has 
changed dramatically since the 1970s when the current approach to understanding the 
ethical issues was largely formulated.  Unlike the research that set the context for the 
existing ethical framework, research today has many complicating features, including 
increasing privatization and globalization of research; a growing number of complex, 
multisite trials and office-based trials, with treating physicians as researchers; rapid 
development in the pipelines for novel agents, many based on genomic and proteomic 
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discoveries; and, most recently, an elevated concern with public health threats such as 
bioterrorism and new or resurgent infectious diseases.‟157 
 It is apparent that the definition of vulnerability has not kept pace with the changing 
scope of research involving human participants. Genetic research brings to the fore two 
major issues for consideration.  First, the increased potential for social and economic 
harm needs to be considered.  The first step would be the due recognition of social and 
economic harm.  These types of harm are not new to research ethics and are referred to in 
the Belmont Report.
158
  Monnye argues, however, that social and economic risks have not 
received due recognition in South Africa.
159
  His criticism is supported by reported cases 
demonstrating the consequences of non-recognition of social and economic risks in South 
Africa specifically.
160
  Among these consequences are employment discrimination and 
physical harm inflicted by members of a community on one individual due to the 
disclosure of individuals‟ HIV status.  These consequences are possible in the case of the 
disclosure of genetic conditions as well since individuals belonging to ethnic 
groups/communities with a known susceptibility to certain genetic conditions may be 
stigmatised or discriminated against.  The example of the Ashkenazi Jewish population 
may be used here in support of this assertion.  As discussed above,
161
 in 1997 United 
States Jewish leaders met with members of the National Institute of Health to discuss the 
meaning of genetic research for Jews; concern about the lack of legal protection against 
genetic discrimination; and fears of stigmatisation and denial of jobs and health 
insurance.
162
  
 Based on Monnye‟s argument as well as the concerns of the Ashkenazi Jewish 
population, it can be argued that potential social and economic harm need to be dealt with 
in research in order to protect research participants and thereby foster research in critical 
areas such as genetics. The definition of vulnerability needs to evolve in order to address 
this issue.   Such evolution requires the recognition of other harms in addition to the 
conventional physical harm associated with research. This recognition will facilitate the 
revision of the definition of vulnerability to include susceptibility to other types of harm.    
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It is clearly not helpful to rely on outdated concepts which cannot satisfactorily address 
new challenges in research.  The definition of vulnerability must be revisited if the 
concept is to retain its usefulness as a tool for the protection of human research 
participants. 
 Secondly, the potential for harm to family members and members of ethnic groups, 
who may not themselves be participants in research (non-participants), must be seriously 
considered in deciding whether or not to extend the definition of vulnerability to include 
genetic research participants.  As mentioned above, the definitions of vulnerability, both 
internationally and domestically, are predominantly consent-based.
163
  In terms of this 
approach individuals who lack capacity to consent or who are more likely to be coerced 
or exploited, are deemed vulnerable.  If applied to genetic research, it means that „non-
vulnerable‟ participants will be informed of the risks and benefits applicable to the 
research and they will be requested to agree to participate with full knowledge of such 
risks and benefits.  It is assumed that all risks, including potential risks to non-
participants will be disclosed by researchers.  The difficulty here lies in the fact that 
participation of one individual in research may have social and economic consequences 
for non-participants.  The individual may be willing to bear the risk of social and 
economic harm in his/her personal capacity and this will be indicated by his/her 
furnishing of informed consent.  There is, however, no guarantee or proof that non-
participants would be willing to bear those same risks.  
 Can the consent which is furnished by a genetic research participant be deemed to 
apply in respect of affected non-participants?   The answer has to be „no‟ simply because 
a research participant does not have inherent legal authority to consent for or on behalf of 
non-participants.  One then has to address this dilemma.  I submit that the solution lies in 
classifying all genetic research participants as vulnerable, thereby creating an automatic 
responsibility for researchers to implement additional safeguards in genetic research as is 
the position with research involving other vulnerable groups.  The current position is that 
genetic research will require additional safeguards only where it involves existing 
vulnerable groups. Such groups include those who lack the ability to provide informed 
consent and those who are susceptible to coercion.  Genetic research participants cannot 
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be accommodated within the existing consent-based definition of vulnerability. The 
suggested inclusion of genetic research participants as a vulnerable group would 
therefore require an extension of the definition of vulnerability as discussed further 
below.
164
  
 The suggested extension of the definition of vulnerability may be justified further on 
the basis of the importance of genetic research as acknowledged by UNESCO‟S 
International Declaration on Human Genetic Data.
165
  The Declaration recognises that 
„human genetic data have a special status on account of their sensitive nature.‟166 It also 
acknowledges that „the collection, processing, use and storage of human genetic data are 
of paramount importance for the progress of life sciences and medicine.‟167  Article 7 of 
the Declaration deals specifically with non-discrimination and non-stigmatisation.  It 
provides as follows: 
„(a)  Every effort should be made to ensure that human genetic data and human 
proteomic data are not used for purposes that discriminate in a way that is intended 
to infringe, or has the effect of infringing human rights, fundamental freedoms or 
human dignity of an individual or for purposes that lead to the stigmatization of an 
individual, a family, a group or communities. 
(b)  In this regard, appropriate attention should be paid to the findings of population-
based genetic studies and behavioural genetic studies and their interpretations.‟  
The Declaration captures the benefits of and threats to genetic research.  It is clear that 
genetic information is necessary for scientific progress and that certain types of genetic 
research can only be conducted amongst certain population groups.  Adequate safeguards 
must be put in place to secure the participation of the required groups.  The Declaration 
indicates what steps should be taken by States to protect the privacy of individuals.  It is 
expected that the required level of protection will be achieved through domestic law. 
Genetic information requires additional protection because it can also reveal sensitive 
information about family members who may not themselves have been involved in the 
research.  As mentioned above, there is thus the potential for harm to non-participants as 
well.
168
  There are so many issues to consider in genetic research that evaluation of 
special risks should be compulsory for research ethics committees.  This can only be 
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guaranteed if genetic research participants are deemed to be a vulnerable group on the 
basis of their increased susceptibility to social and economic harm.  
It is clear from the discussion above that the conventional consent-based approach to 
vulnerability is not adequate for genetic research.  This is due mainly to the familial and 
hereditary characteristics of genetic information.  I would therefore argue that the 
solution lies in extending the definition of vulnerability to include increased susceptibility 
to additional harm due to or resulting from participation in research.  It will then become 
possible to classify human genetic research participants as vulnerable purely on the basis 
of increased susceptibility to social and economic harm in the form of stigmatisation and 
discrimination by insurers and employers.  The classification of genetic research 
participants as vulnerable will compel research ethics committees to insist upon more 
stringent privacy protection mechanisms for genetic research, thereby protecting 
participants and affected non-participants from research-related harms.  This vulnerability 
should be recognised by law and research ethics committees should be legally compelled 
to ensure compliance with the requirements for additional protection. 
 The suggested extension of vulnerable groups to include genetic research participants 
is likely to receive criticism on two grounds.  The first criticism is likely to be that too 
many groups are already deemed vulnerable and the addition of a further group serves 
only to further stretch the limited resources of research ethics committees whilst making 
the concept of vulnerability „too nebulous to be meaningful.‟169  Levine et al are critical 
of the ongoing extension of the category of vulnerable groups.
170
  They analyse the 
definitions of vulnerability in the Declaration of Helsinki
171
 and in the CIOMS 
guidelines
172
 and conclude that nowadays almost everyone is considered vulnerable in the 
context of research.  For this reason they consider vulnerability to be too broad to make a 
significant impact on the protection of research participants.  
The second criticism is likely to relate to the categorisation of all genetic research 
participants as vulnerable.  Levine et al argue that „the strategy of relying on categorical 
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vulnerability…is flawed.‟173  An obvious flaw which they discuss is the stereotyping of 
„whole categories of individuals‟ without any thought being given to the special 
circumstances of the individuals who fall within a particular category.
174
  Categorical 
vulnerability focuses on the whole rather than the constituent parts of a vulnerable group.  
The criticisms leveled by Levine et al are clearly not without merit.  They do, however, 
attempt to temper their criticisms by stating as follows: „public policy is a blunt 
instrument and sometimes it is necessary to set cut-offs or designate whole groups for 
special treatment because individualised decision making is not feasible.‟175 
Levine et al are not alone in their views regarding the flaws in the concept of 
categorical vulnerability.  Schroeder and Arnason have since taken the argument a step 
further by raising the issue of false categorisations.
176
  In order to illustrate their point 
they use an example of an unemployed person in Sweden versus an unemployed person 
in Zimbabwe.
177
  Both of these individuals share the unfortunate plight of being 
unemployed but the Swedish person is undoubtedly better off because of the extent of the 
support that he/she receives from the State. The situation of an unemployed Zimbabwean 
is more desperate and he/she is therefore more susceptible to exploitation for research 
purposes.  This example shows that even though certain individuals may share a common 
characteristic, their susceptibility to harm may not be the same due to other factors.  It 
clearly demonstrates the dangers of categorizing entire groups as vulnerable without 
considering relative risks. Schroeder and Arnason make a valid point which must be 
addressed if the concept of vulnerability is to continue being used for the protection of 
human research participants. 
 In response to the criticisms by Levine et al and Schroeder and Arnason against the 
categorisation approach, it must be pointed out that genetic research lends itself to the 
conventional categorisation approach and there is no possibility of a false categorisation.  
This is so because all genetic research participants, irrespective of personal attributes or 
circumstances, are susceptible to stigmatisation and genetic discrimination.    The IBC 
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report notes that
 „
while some groups of people can always be considered vulnerable 
because of their status (e.g. children), others may be vulnerable in one situation but not in 
another.‟178  Genetic research participants fall into the former group because their 
vulnerability is not determined by circumstances but by their status.  After considering 
the opposing views on the issue of vulnerability in research, I must conclude that group 
categorisation is not satisfactory for medical research but is ideal for genetic research 
involving human participants.   
 
 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Genetic discrimination in employment and insurance have not yet become major 
problems anywhere in the world but the fact that many governments are proactively 
taking steps to prevent genetic discrimination indicates an acceptance of the fact that 
there is no turning back from the genomic era.  The rapidly advancing science of human 
genomics means that it is only a matter of time before the threat becomes reality.  Failure 
of law and ethics to keep pace with the science of genomics means leaving people 
exposed to breaches of privacy, genetic discrimination, and exploitation in research.  The 
fear of genetic discrimination has consequences for genetic research by deterring 
participation in such important and much-needed research. This should serve as sufficient 
motivation for the introduction of genetic privacy protection mechanisms.  Preventing 
harm in the contexts of employment and insurance is most suitably addressed by the 
implementation of genetic information privacy protection as opposed to the creation of 
anti-discriminatory measures.  This is simply because the flow of information is easier to 
monitor and enforce as opposed to the use of information once it is in the hands of an 
insurer or employer.
179
  
 In the insurance context there is clearly a need for the introduction of privacy 
protection mechanisms due to the importance of genetic information for underwriting 
purposes.  The insurance industry is not yet actively lobbying for access to genetic 
information but that is only because the actuarial relevance of genetic information has not 
                                                 
178
  Supra note 133 para 7. 
179
  Kim op cit note 101. 
  
87 
 
yet been determined.   Insurers are likely to seek access to genetic to genetic information 
in order to avoid adverse selection.  Moratoria on the use of genetic information by 
insurance companies is one approach to protecting genetic privacy but concerns have 
been raised about enforcement.
180
  Maintaining the status quo is another approach but it 
cannot be encouraged because it ignores the gravity of public concern about genetic 
discrimination.
181
  In an area as sensitive and as far-reaching as human genetics, it is safer 
to rely on legislation as a protective mechanism due to its status and enforceability.  
Employers could possibly seek to justify gaining access to genetic information of 
employees on the basis of protection of employees from workplace hazards, protection of 
co-workers, or protection of the public.  They should, however, not have an automatic 
right of access to genetic information of employees.
182
  Legislation, regulations, rules, 
and industry codes must protect existing genetic information. Genetic testing at the 
request of employers may be reasonable and necessary if it is based on the inherent 
requirements of a job but there is no need for the disclosure of actual test results to the 
employer.   Based on the results of any genetic testing that is done, the examining 
physician should simply determine whether the employee is fit to continue working in 
that particular position and should advise the employer accordingly. Legislation should 
be developed which prohibits the disclosure of genetic information to employers but 
which also provides that employers may request genetic testing in clearly prescribed 
circumstances if they can justify it based on strict criteria specified by legislation.    
Human participation in genetic research is necessary.  In order to encourage such 
participation it is necessary to reassure prospective participants that their genetic 
information will be protected from unauthorised disclosure which could lead to  
stigmatisation and discrimination.   Ethical guidelines do provide for the protection of 
human research participants but these lack enforcement mechanisms and Research Ethics 
Committees are not functioning optimally.  Despite the existence of these mechanisms 
there are still many cases of unethical research practices in South Africa and the rest of 
the world. These mechanisms can therefore not be relied upon to enforce the protection 
of genetic research participants. Potential stigmatisation and genetic discrimination 
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arising from genetic research involving human participants warrants the introduction of 
genetic privacy legislation. Statutory genetic privacy protection will provide genetic 
research participants with the required assurances thereby encouraging participation in 
and fostering genetic research.   
Genetic research participants are vulnerable to social and economic harm and they 
accordingly require additional protection in research.  A unique aspect of genetic research 
is that the vulnerability of participants to social and economic harm, extends to non-
participants as well due to the familial nature of genetic information.  The conventional 
consent-based definition of vulnerability does not address the unique familial aspect of 
vulnerability in genetic research.  If the concept is to retain any significance in genetic 
research, it must be extended to include considerations of susceptibility to additional 
harm in the form of social and economic harm.  Based on the inherent susceptibility of 
genetic research participants to social and economic harm, they should automatically be 
deemed vulnerable.  A classification of genetic research participants as vulnerable will 
compel researchers to consider additional protection for participants which will then also 
automatically address concerns regarding harm to non-participants.  
Concerns relating to potential genetic discrimination and the need to promote genetic 
research require protection of genetic privacy.  This protection can only be achieved 
through legislation. The adequacy of the South African privacy legislation in this respect 
is accordingly discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
PRIVACY: THE SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The concept of privacy is a dynamic one which is constantly being reshaped in 
accordance with the changing needs of society. Privacy, as a right of personality, is 
constantly under threat due to modernisation, globalisation, innovation, and the 
introduction of new technologies.  Since it is so affected by change, it cannot be a rigid 
concept. It has to promote legal certainty whilst simultaneously being flexible enough to 
accommodate societal demands and maintain efficacy, failing which it will only offer 
limited protection. 
   To this day privacy remains an elusive concept which evades precise legal definition. 
By its very nature it is a concept which is difficult to define.  The discussion which 
follows on the various definitions proposed over the years by legal commentators, 
together with criticisms of such definitions, proves this point. 
   The right to privacy is protected by the common law and the Constitution.
1
  Genetic 
information privacy is not yet the subject of debate in South Africa but it demands 
attention based on the reasons discussed in chapter one.
2
  Even though the right to 
privacy enjoys constitutional protection, the challenges posed by a combination of 
genetic technology and information technology require legislative intervention.   Urgent 
calls for legislative intervention in situations involving the collection of personal data 
have been spurred by the threat that this poses to the privacy of individuals.
3
  Neethling et 
al observe that the creation of databanks „pose an immense threat to the individual‟ due to 
the use of computer technology.
4
 They also note that „South African commentators are 
unanimous that the creation of such measures through legislation is a matter of great 
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urgency.‟5  As far as genetic information is concerned, the threat arises in the context of 
the creation of DNA databases.  There is no legislation in South Africa aimed at the 
regulation of human genetic databases. Insofar as the regulation of forensic DNA 
databases is concerned, the individual‟s right to privacy has to be balanced against the 
interest of the state in solving crime.  
   Data protection measures are clearly very limited in South Africa. The South African 
Law Reform Commission recently completed its investigation into personal data 
protection and also developed a draft data protection Bill for South Africa.
6
  This draft 
Bill is a general data protection statute which stipulates general rules for data protection 
and is expected to be supplemented by sectoral laws and industry codes of practice. 
   This chapter commences with a historical perspective of the right to privacy. It traces 
the protection of personality rights from Roman and Roman-Dutch law to the current 
constitutional protection of the right to privacy in South Africa. The works of prominent 
Roman and Roman-Dutch jurists are considered together with contemporary legal 
literature and judicial decisions.  This is followed by a discussion of the definition of 
privacy with brief examples of the various definitions that have been suggested.  The aim 
of such an exercise is to highlight the inherent definitional difficulties posed by the 
concept and the resultant difficulty in devising adequate protection.  The objective of this 
chapter is to illustrate how the law of privacy in South Africa has developed from Roman 
times to the current day and to determine whether current legal protection mechanisms 
can adequately protect genetic privacy.    
 
 
4.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
(a) Roman Law 
The origins of the modern right to privacy can be traced to the protection of personality in 
Roman law. Originally the protection of personality in Roman law, through the Twelve 
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Tables, was aimed at protecting bodily integrity.
7
  Buckland observes that this was the 
first express legislation in the Roman state dealing with private law and that they 
consisted of ancient Latin custom together with some influence of Greek law.
8
  As far as 
protection of personality was concerned, provision was made for the imposition of fixed 
pecuniary penalties in cases of physical harm to the person.  „Injuria‟9 referred to minor 
forms of physical injury.
10
  McQuoid-Mason observes that Table VIII.1 penalised the 
making of defamatory statements, which conduct clearly did not constitute an affront to a 
person‟s bodily integrity, but did constitute an affront to the reputation and dignity of the 
person.
11
  His argument is based on translations of Table VIII.1 as provided by Ortolan, 
Goodwin and De Villiers.
12
  He accordingly argues that the Twelve Tables protected 
more than just bodily integrity as an aspect of personality.  
 McQuoid-Mason goes on to argue that the word „injuriarum‟ as it appeared in Table 
VIII.4 included affronts to a person‟s honour.13  His line of reasoning is that if Table 
VIII.1
14
 dealt with infringements of reputation and dignity, and Tables VIII.2
15
 and 
VIII.3
16
 dealt with bodily injury, it follows that Table VIII.4 which is a general clause 
should apply to both.  Table VIII.4 provides: „si injuriarum faxit alteri, XXV poena 
sunto‟ which was translated as: „for any injury whatsoever committed upon another the 
penalty shall be 25 asses.‟  Once again, McQuoid-Mason‟s arguments indicate that 
infringements of personality going beyond the physical realm, were recognised and 
penalised through the Twelve Tables. De Villiers, however, argues that at that stage the 
word „injuria‟ had not yet acquired the meaning of an offence against the person, 
reputation or dignity.
17
  He does concede, though, that an injuria may have involved 
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„some degree of ignominy‟.18  This also shows that ancient Romans were aware of 
affronts to dignity and saw the need to penalise such behavior, albeit in a subtle way. 
   The Twelve Tables were replaced by praetorian edicts out of necessity during the 
middle of the sixth century A.U.C.
19
  The stagnant pecuniary penalties in terms of the 
Twelve Tables had become ineffective and the Romans were becoming more aware of 
personality infringements.  The praetorian edicts introduced two significant changes to 
deal with these issues.  First, they eliminated fixed pecuniary penalties by providing for 
the determination of the amount by judicial officers based on the seriousness of the 
injury.  Secondly, they extended the actio injuriarum to non-physical interests.
20
  
McQuoid-Mason observes that certain non-physical interests protected by the edict, 
namely, convicium (public ridicule) and ademptata pudicitia (affronts to chastity) bear 
some resemblance to modern notions of privacy.
21
  The praetors‟ edicts later became the 
actio injuriarum aestimatori, an action which has survived to this day. 
   The introduction of the Lex Cornelia de Iniuriis  around the year 672 A.U.C.extended 
protection beyond the physical person to the non-physical realm, albeit by subjecting 
certain conduct to criminal sanctions.  Provision was made for the offences of striking or 
beating another person.  A distinction was drawn between the two acts.  Beating was seen 
as an act causing physical pain whilst striking did not necessarily cause such pain. 
Striking was an offence regardless of the fact that it may not have caused physical pain. 
Of greater significance was the provision of an offence for forcibly entering the home of 
another.
22
   McQuoid-Mason notes that „this is often regarded as the best example of the 
recognition of a right to privacy by the Romans.‟23  Neethling observes that this amounts 
to recognition of privacy as a personality interest for the first time in Roman law.
24
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   Classical law considered the praetorian edicts together with the Lex Cornelia in 
extending the actio injuriarum to include any affront to another‟s personality rights, 
thereby creating a general delict in respect of infringements of personality rights.
25
 The 
classical law recognised iniuriae relating to corpus, fama and dignitas.  The former two 
were more easily defined whilst dignitas eluded definition.  Neethling et al
26
  and 
McQuoid-Mason
27
 comment on the vagueness of this concept.  In summarizing the legal 
position in classical law, Neethling et al state that the actio iniuriarum  became available 
in all cases of infringements of corpus, fama, or  dignitas and that dignitas was a wide 
concept encompassing those personality interests which had not been separately 
identified in Roman law.
28
  Privacy was clearly included in the concept of dignitas.
29
 The 
law recognised two forms of invasion of privacy, namely, forcible entry into another‟s 
home
30
 and the premature disclosure of the contents of another‟s will.31  McQuoid-Mason 
suggests, however, that in addition to these, several other forms of injuriae, similar to the 
modern concept of invasion of privacy in the United States, were recognised.  These are 
intrusions, publication of private facts, and putting a person in a false light.
32
 It is evident 
that privacy was becoming an important personality interest in the classical period.  The 
three elements of the actio injuriarum were intention to injure (animus injuriandi), 
impairment of personality (corpus, fama or dignitas), and wrongfulness (boni mores). 
   The reign of Justinian is marked by the development of the Corpus Juris Civiliis. 
McQuoid-Mason correctly concludes that many of the examples of injuriae found in the 
Digest of Justinian would, in modern times, be recognised as invasions of privacy.
33
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(b) Roman-Dutch Law 
The position in Roman-Dutch law reflected that of the classical Roman law.  Voet‟s 
definition of injuria is based on the definition posed by the Roman jurist Ulpian.
34
 This 
definition which provides that an injuria is „a wrongful act committed in contempt of a 
free person by which his person, dignity, or reputation is intentionally impaired‟ has been 
accepted by South African courts.
35
 
   The Roman-Dutch law adopted the actio injuriarum from Roman law.  The elements 
of the actio injuriarum, namely, intention, wrongfulness, and impairment of a personality 
right, remained the same as in Roman law.  Wrongfulness was determined according to 
the prevailing boni mores of society. The concept of dignitas remained wide enough to 
encompass those personality rights which were not separately catered for, including 
privacy. 
 
 
4.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF PRIVACY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
(a) The definition of privacy 
Various definitions of privacy have been proposed by lawyers and academic 
commentators over the years thereby stimulating legal and jurisprudential debate, 
provoking criticism, and encouraging constructive analysis, but with no generally 
accepted definition emerging. O‟Regan J once remarked that this concept has troubled 
lawyers since at least the end of the nineteenth century.
36
   Davis and Steenkamp, on a 
similar note, remark that „the ambit and scope of privacy has been a vexed question for 
more than a century.‟37  Ackermann J described privacy as an amorphous and elusive 
concept which has been the subject of much scholarly debate.
38
  Devenish describes
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privacy as „a perplexingly paradoxical right‟.39  Neethling et al define privacy as „an 
individual condition of life characterised by seclusion from the public and publicity‟ 
encompassing „all those personal facts which the person concerned has himself 
determined to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he 
has the will that they be kept private‟.40 Neethling points out that it is the individual 
himself or herself who determines which of his or her private facts to disclose and in so 
doing determines the scope of his or her interest in privacy.
41
  This definition, although 
accepted by the courts,
42
 has not escaped criticism. Burchell comments that such a 
definition „not only opens the floodgates of litigation to the hypersensitive but also 
creates an internal inconsistency in the law that some aspects of personality…are tested 
both subjectively and objectively while privacy would be tested subjectively only‟.43  
This criticism lacks merit as it ignores the boni mores criterion which serves to limit 
claims of privacy to those which are reasonable. Neethling sets out the position quite 
succinctly as follows: „privacy will be protected where a person has a subjective 
expectation of privacy…which society considers to be objectively reasonable…‟44 
   McQuoid-Mason, in proposing a definition of invasion of privacy, refers to an 
individual‟s  „right to seclusion in his private life‟.45  A common thread which emerges 
from the suggested definitions of privacy is a right to seclusion in a person‟s private life. 
Neethling cautions against equating seclusion exclusively with spatial seclusion since this 
may create the incorrect impression that privacy entails only physical or spatial 
seclusion.
46
   
   The concept of „the right to be left alone‟ surfaces frequently in discussions 
pertaining to the definition of the right to privacy.  In NM v Smith
47
 the Constitutional 
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Court, per Madala J, observed that the right to privacy is akin to the right to be left alone. 
This view has drawn criticism from Neethling who states that it is inadvisable to equate 
the right to privacy with a right to be left alone because the latter is too wide to be of 
practical benefit in these circumstances.
48
  Neethling suggests that „the right to be left 
alone, as a concept of the right to privacy, should therefore rather be left alone.‟49  
Neethling‟s criticism is not without merit. The concept of a right to be left alone is too 
wide to be of assistance in curbing the definitional debate around the concept of privacy.  
Madala J also stated that „privacy encompasses the right of a person to live his or her life 
as he or she pleases‟.50  Neethling once again rejects this view as he rightly feels that such 
a definition covers freedom of activity and not the right to privacy.
51
 
   The courts have also ventured definitions of privacy over the years. The 
Constitutional Court in the Bernstein case stated as follows:       
„A very high level of protection is given to the individual‟s intimate personal sphere of 
life and the maintenance of its basic preconditions and there is a final untouchable sphere 
of human freedom that is beyond interference from any public authority. So much so that, 
in regard to this most intimate core of privacy, no justifiable limitation thereof can take 
place. But this most intimate core is narrowly construed. This inviolable core is left 
behind once an individual enters into relationships with persons outside this closest 
intimate sphere; the individual‟s activities then acquire a social dimension and the right 
of privacy in this context becomes subject to limitation.‟52    
This view was reiterated by the Constitutional Court in NM v Smith.
53
  Neethling 
criticises this definition for being too narrow as it excludes those aspects of a person‟s 
life which may not necessarily form part of their inner sanctum but which he or she 
prefers to keep private.
54
 
 
 
(b) Development of the Common Law 
The South African law of delict is based on the principles of Roman and Roman-Dutch 
law. As discussed above, the actio injuriarum, a common law delictual action which is 
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used to protect privacy, originates from Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The inception of 
such principles into South African law was not, however, completely unhindered.  
Certain early court decisions sought to restrict the concept of dignitas to dignity and 
honour and to require insult (contumelia) as an element of this iniuria.
55
 The Appellate 
Division rejected this approach in Foulds v Smith.
56
  Van Den Heever J.A. observed that 
too much emphasis was being placed on the element of contumelia in the actio 
iniuriarum.
57
  The courts thereafter, in the case which has been described as the „locus 
classicus for the recognition of the right to privacy in South African law‟58 reiterated the 
point that insult was not an element of the iniuria relating to privacy.
59
  Neethling 
supports the decision in O’Keeffe v Argus Printing60 as being in conformity with the 
common law and recognizing privacy as an independent right of personality.
61
  He 
submits that the independence of the right of privacy is confirmed by its recognition and 
protection as a fundamental right in the Bill of Rights.
62
  His conclusion is that privacy is 
„an independent right of personality which has been delimited as such within the concept 
of dignitas.‟63  
   It is generally accepted that the infringement of privacy under the common law can 
take two forms only, namely, unauthorised intrusions and unauthorised disclosure of 
private information.  The wrongfulness element of the actio injuriarum clearly adds a 
dimension of flexibility and contemporaneity to the action. Consideration of the 
prevailing boni mores of society prevents stagnation of the action but allows the action to 
remain relevant in any given time period.  It also accommodates changing societal 
attitudes flowing from technological change and scientific advancement.  It is evident 
that the actio injuriarum has survived to this day because of its ability, through the 
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wrongfulness element, to adapt to the changing needs of society. It is this facet of the 
action which is likely to pave the way for the protection of genetic privacy. 
The advent of a democratic constitutional dispensation has neither eradicated nor 
diminished the importance of the common law in South Africa. The common law remains 
an important pillar of the legal system. Section 39(3) of the Constitution makes it clear 
that the common law retains its significance and applicability, insofar as it is consistent 
with the Bill of Rights. This is reaffirmed by section 8(3)(a) which obliges courts to apply 
and, where necessary, to develop the common law when giving effect to fundamental 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The section provides as follows:  
„When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of 
subsection (2), a court – 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the 
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation 
is in accordance with section 36(1).‟ 
   It is clear that it is intended for the common law and the constitution to work in 
harmony so as to retain age-old legal principles which can only be enhanced by 
constitutional values, thereby achieving a legal order which is built on a strong 
foundation and is able to withstand legal scrutiny.  This was the view of the 
Constitutional Court even when the interim Constitution
64
 was in operation.  In Du 
Plessis v De Klerk,
65
 which dealt with the interim constitution,
66
 Mahomed J remarked 
that:  
„the common law is not to be trapped within the limitations of its past. It need not be 
interpreted in conditions of social and constitutional ossification. It needs to be revisited 
and revitalized with the spirit of the constitutional values defined in…chapter 3 of the 
constitution and with full regard to the purport and objects of that chapter.‟67    
He proceeds as follows:  
„The interpretation which I have come to favour has the advantage of giving to the 
different Divisions of the Supreme Court, including its Appellate Division, a very clear 
and creative role in the active evolution of our constitutional jurisprudence by examining, 
and in suitable circumstances expanding, the traditional frontiers of the common law by 
infusing it with the spirit of chapter 3 of the Constitution and its purport and objects.‟68 
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   Section 173 of the final Constitution empowers superior courts to develop the 
common law, taking into account the interests of justice. In developing the common law, 
the courts are obliged, in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, to promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  Fulfilling this constitutional mandate is, 
however, not as simple as it appears on paper. In this regard Harms J duly observes as 
follows: 
„Some believe that the common law is perfect and unaffected by the Bill of Rights. 
Others consider the Bill of Rights to have granted the judiciary a hunting licence on the 
common law, making the positive law a matter of judicial discretion and allowing the 
courts to infringe upon the domain of the legislature and to ignore precedents.  The 
common law consists of a myriad rules developed over many centuries involving great 
minds. It represents a fine web, the disturbance of which at one point may have severe 
unexpected consequences elsewhere….The constitution…does not provide a trench from 
which the common law may be attacked…Sections 39(2) and 173 of the Constitution do 
not place a machete in the hands of the judge to decapitate or to castrate, but it provides 
modeling clay out of which art must be created capable of withstanding the heat of the 
oven‟.69   
    The importance of common law is acknowledged in this excerpt and attention is 
drawn to the fact that in tampering with the common law, courts must consider the 
resultant ripple effects of such a course of action.  There will invariably be situations 
where a given set of facts will trigger a reconsideration of relevant common law 
principles in the light of constitutional values. This does not mean that every situation 
requires such an approach.  It is submitted that the Constitution acts as a catalyst for law 
reform.  However, the undertaking of such reform by the courts poses its own challenges.  
   The Constitutional Court has cautioned against the blurring of roles of the legislature 
and the judiciary, pointing out that the doctrine of separation of powers must always be 
borne in mind in law reform.  To this end, the Constitutional Court in Masiya v Director 
of Public Prosecutions,
70
  per Nkabinde J, stated as follows:  
„The development of the common law on the other hand is a power that has always 
vested in our Courts. It is exercised in an incremental fashion as the facts of each case 
require. This incremental manner has not changed but the Constitution in s 39(2) provides 
a paramount substantive consideration relevant to determining whether the common law 
requires development in any particular case. This does not detract from the constitutional 
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recognition, as indicated above, that it is the Legislature that has the major responsibility 
for law reform. Courts must be astute to avoid the appropriation of the Legislature‟s role 
in law reform when developing the common law.  The greater power given to the Courts 
to test legislation against the Constitution should not encourage them to adopt a method 
of common-law development which is closer to codification than incremental, fact-driven 
development.‟71 
   Nkabinde J offered the view of Kentridge AJ in the Du Plessis case
72
 as support for 
her approach to the separation of powers.  In that case Kentridge AJ had quoted the 
following excerpt from the Canadian case of R v Salituro
73
  in support of his own view:  
„Judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and 
economic fabric of the country.  Judges should not be quick to perpetuate rules whose 
social foundation has long since disappeared.  Nonetheless there are significant 
constraints on the power of the judiciary to change the law…In a constitutional 
democracy such as ours it is the Legislature and not the courts which has the major 
responsibility for law reform…The judiciary should confine itself to those incremental 
changes which are necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic and 
evolving fabric of our society.‟74 
     Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security
75
 is another example of a case where the 
Constitutional Court cautioned that the Legislature remains the major engine for law 
reform.  This case dealt with the development of the common law delictual duty to act.  
Ackerman and Goldstone JJ quoted with approval the dictum in the Canadian judgment 
of R v Salituro.
76
  They discussed the obligation imposed on courts by section 39(2) of 
the Constitution to develop the common law.  They stressed the point that the obligation 
is not discretionary but that „in exercising their powers to develop the common law, 
judges should be mindful of the fact that the major engine for law reform should be the 
Legislature and not the Judiciary.‟77 
   The doctrine of separation of powers plays an important role where lawmaking is 
concerned.  It should not, however, prove detrimental to the development of the common 
law, where such development is necessary so as to align the common law with 
constitutional values. The ultimate aim of the drafters of the Constitution is for 
constitutional values to permeate the common law.  This can only be achieved if the 
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common law is developed with regard to the spirit, objects and purport of the 
Constitution.   
   Dersso draws attention to the two different sets of circumstances in which courts may 
be called upon to develop the common law.
78
 The first situation arises where the common 
law has to be developed in order to align it with the Bill of Rights. Development in this 
situation is mandatory. The second situation arises where the common law has to be 
developed according to the changing social, moral and economic conditions in society. 
This would require incremental development which occurs on a case by case basis.  
Dersso correctly observes that the majority in the Masiya case failed to make this 
distinction.
79
  He sums up the position regarding the separation of powers as follows: 
„…where the development of the common law is required in order to give full effect to 
the Bill of Rights, the separation of powers doctrine should not unduly hinder the courts. 
But such development can be legitimate and coheres with the doctrine of separation of 
powers only if it is limited to giving full effect to the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. 
Thus, where the development of the common law goes beyond what is required to give 
full effect to the Bill of Rights, it may unreasonably usurp the constitutionally mandated 
powers of the legislature and thus may amount to a breach of the doctrine of separation of 
powers. Outside of this, however, the development of the common law by courts to give 
effect to the Bill of Rights does not constitute a breach of the doctrine of separation of 
powers as it does not preclude the legislature from enacting laws in accordance with its 
legislative objectives.‟80  
It is submitted that in the Masiya case the Constitutional Court placed undue emphasis on 
separation of powers in an attempt to justify the decision not to develop the common law 
fully.  Dersso‟s criticism of the reasoning of the majority is justifiable and meritorious.  
The majority judgment has been aptly criticised as a failure of the Constitutional Court to 
fulfil its constitutional mandate.  
 The approach of South African courts to the development of the common law is 
neither unanimous nor satisfactory. The controversial decision of the Constitutional Court 
in the Masiya case
81
  bears testimony to this.  The majority reiterated the stance adopted 
in a previous case before them that it is the legislature and not the judiciary which has the 
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major responsibility for law reform.
82
  It appears that the majority felt they would be 
usurping the role of the legislature if they were to extend the definition beyond the ambit 
of the facts presented to them.  This judgment placed great emphasis on the doctrine of 
separation of powers, much to the detriment of necessary law reform.   
     The Masiya case, from its inception in the Regional Court, through to its conclusion 
in the Constitutional Court, illustrates the inconsistency in the approaches of our courts to 
the development of the common law. This judgment supports the statement above that the 
approach of our courts is neither consistent nor satisfactory. The approach of the majority 
reflects an element of rigidity which does not augur well for the development of the 
common law in accordance with constitutional values.  It stifles rather than encourages 
development of the common law thus making it one that is likely to inhibit the progress 
of the law in step with societal, environmental and scientific change.  Based on this rigid 
approach as well as the failure of the Constitutional Court to draw a distinction between 
situations where full development of the common law is mandatory and situations where 
incremental development is permitted, it appears likely that the issue of genetic privacy 
will be left in the hands of the Legislature unless facts peculiar to this issue are presented 
to the Constitutional Court.  Even then one cannot be certain that this court will seize the 
opportunity presented to it.  Partial development or incremental development of the 
common law by the judiciary will not suffice in this case.  
 The protection of genetic privacy cannot be left to the courts.  Prior to the Masiya 
judgment,
83
 the Constitutional Court displayed its reluctance to develop the common law 
in NM v Smith.
84
  The applicants in this case were HIV positive women whose names had 
been published in a book by the respondents.  The first respondent was a journalist who 
had authored the biography of the second respondent.  The third respondent was the 
publisher of the book.  The applicants contended that their rights to privacy, dignity and 
psychological integrity had been intentionally or negligently violated by the disclosure of 
their HIV status by the respondents.  They based their claim for damages on the actio 
injuriarum.  The applicants argued inter alia for the development of the actio injuriarum 
to provide a remedy in the case of negligent publication of confidential medical 
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information in line with the constitutional protection afforded to their rights of privacy, 
dignity and psychological integrity. They argued that those who negligently publish 
confidential medical information without consent should be held liable except where 
public interest demands otherwise.
85
   
The majority held that the respondents knew or foresaw the possibility that the 
applicants had not consented to the disclosure of their identities in the book and that they 
knew that their conduct was wrongful.  Based on this, the majority concluded that the 
respondents had the requisite animus injuriandi.  As a result, they did not consider this an 
appropriate case for deviating from established principles of common law.
86
  Madala J 
did, however, remark that the approach of the majority should not be interpreted to mean 
that the common law should or could never be developed as argued for by the 
applicants.
87
  It is clear that the court was not dismissing the idea of developing the 
common law.  The court simply did not consider such development to be required by the 
facts of the case.   
 Neethling correctly observes that in adopting such a stance „the Constitutional Court 
missed a golden opportunity to develop the common law and introduce negligence 
liability for violation of the right to privacy, especially for media defendants.‟88  This was 
the first time that the issue of the development of the actio injuriarum relating to privacy 
had come before the courts.
89
  The facts of this case provided the ideal opportunity for the 
court to consider extending the common law of privacy in line with the extended 
common law of defamation, especially since two of the respondents were considered to 
be media defendants.
90
  The facts did not indicate conclusively that the respondents had 
acted intentionally.  The judges held differing views as to whether intention had been 
established on the facts.  It was therefore a case which was ripe for consideration of 
negligence as a fault criterion for invasions of privacy by media defendants but the court 
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refused to do so.  Neethling is therefore justified in stating that a golden opportunity has 
been missed.
91
 
   The next question which arises in the context of the development of the common law 
is whether the actio injuriarum adequately protects the right to privacy and if not, whether 
this sounds a call for the development of the common law relating to invasions of 
privacy.  This question may be answered by reference to the development of the common 
law of defamation. Thomas observes that iniuria postulates intention since it has its basis 
in contumelia, and for that reason it cannot be extended to cover negligent acts.
92
  
Notwithstanding this basic principle, the common law of defamation has been extended 
by the introduction of a negligence criterion in respect of defamation by the media.   
   Views amongst members of the academic community are divided insofar as the 
introduction of a negligence criterion for invasion of privacy is concerned. Some argue 
that National Media Ltd v Bogoshi
93
 introduced a negligence criterion for the media 
whilst others vehemently disagree with one commentator even suggesting that a limited 
negligence criterion has been introduced for defamation by the media. Neethling‟s view 
is that negligence has been accepted as a fault criterion for defamation by the mass 
media.
94
  His view is that proof of the publication of defamatory statements by the media 
raises a presumption of negligence and the onus is then on the defendant to rebut the 
presumption.  Midgley‟s view is that intention remains the sole fault criterion but the 
media may raise the defence of lack of knowledge of unlawfulness in cases where they 
were not negligent in publishing the offending material.
95
 
96
   He is of the opinion that the 
Supreme Court of Appeal did not intend to extend the fault criterion to include 
negligence.  He supports his view with the statement that the court did not indicate that 
proof of publication would give rise to a presumption of fault either in the form of 
intention or negligence.  He also points out that a presumption of negligence is different 
from a presumption of intention since the inquiry into negligence is objective rather than 
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subjective and for this reason public policy may not favour a presumption of 
negligence.
97
    
   Burchell accepts that the courts have recognised liability based on negligence in 
cases of defamation by the media. His view is that the Bogoshi judgment has introduced a 
defence of reasonable publication as well as a negligence criterion for defamation by the 
media.
98
 He remarks that those commentators who dispute this do not attach sufficient 
weight to certain important aspects of the Bogoshi judgment. The first of these 
overlooked aspects, according to Burchell, is that the Bogoshi court did not need to 
overrule the decision in Pakendorf v De Flamingh
99
 in order to introduce a new defence 
excluding unlawfulness since it is generally accepted that the list of defences excluding 
unlawfulness is not closed and the concept of strict liability did not exclude defences 
which negated unlawfulness.   The second aspect identified by Burchell relates to the 
distinction between the unlawfulness inquiry and fault in regard to unlawfulness.  His 
view is that since media defendants would be held liable unless they were not negligent 
in the circumstances of the case, the reference to „ignorance or mistake at the level of 
lawfulness‟  did not refer to the unlawfulness inquiry but to the lack of knowledge of 
unlawfulness which had to be reasonable.  He relies on the reasonableness element in 
support of his view that Bogoshi meant for the media to be held liable on the basis of 
negligence, which is an objective inquiry, as opposed to intention, which postulates a 
subjective inquiry.
100
 
 Scott rejects the idea of the Bogoshi judgment having introduced negligence as the 
new fault criterion.  The only concession she makes is that Bogoshi may have introduced 
a limited negligence criterion by allowing a defendant to prove reasonable mistake only 
where such mistake negates the unlawfulness of conduct.  Her view is that intention 
remains the fault criterion and a new defence of reasonable mistake has been introduced 
which may be pleaded only in respect of unlawfulness of conduct.
101
  Fagan contends that 
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knowledge of unlawfulness is not an element of intention and for that reason the newly 
introduced defence of reasonable publication goes only to unlawfulness.
102
 
   This then begs the question whether there is room for negligent invasions of privacy 
in our law.  The development of the common law of defamation might prove instructive 
in this regard as both are actionable under the actio injuriarum.  The Bogoshi  judgment 
103
 is a landmark ruling which changed the landscape of the common law of defamation 
in conformity with constitutional values.  The appellants in this case were members of the 
media who were sued for damages arising from the publication of a series of allegedly 
defamatory articles.  The lower court, in relying on the reasoning in Pakendorf,
104
 found 
against them.  On appeal the appellants contended that the Pakendorf case
105
 had been 
wrongly decided.  They argued that their defence that publication was lawful because it 
was reasonable and had been done without animus injuriandi was valid under the 
common law.  They also argued in the alternative that strict liability of the press for 
defamation was unconstitutional since it infringed the right to freedom of speech and 
expression which was contrary to the spirit, purport and object of the constitution.  
   The Supreme Court of Appeal in Bogoshi
106
 found that the common law had been 
incorrectly applied in Pakendorf.
107
  The court found that the Pakendorf
108
 court had not 
attempted to strike a balance between the right to reputation and freedom of expression.  
It appeared that freedom of expression had not been accorded the weight it deserves.  The 
court, per Hefer JA, accordingly rejected the concept of strict liability, stating that this 
should have been done in Pakendorf.  The judge made it clear that in arriving at this 
decision, the court was not engaging in the exercise of revising the common law of 
defamation so as to align it with constitutional values.  The court was instead simply 
restating the common law principle which had been incorrectly stated in Pakendorf.
109
  
The court held that even though strict liability was found to be unacceptable, the media 
could not be allowed to escape liability on the basis of absence of animus injuriandi.  In 
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adopting such an approach, the court had to find an alternative to strict liability. The court 
found a solution in the concept of negligence.  This entailed holding media defendants 
liable unless they were not negligent in the circumstances.   The court held that the onus 
is on the defendant to prove that he was not negligent and this could be achieved by 
proving that the publication was reasonable.
110
  
 The court in Marais v Groenewald 
111
 supported the Bogoshi decision
112
 to develop 
the common law by introducing a negligence criterion in defamation actions under the 
actio injuriarum.  Van Dijkhorst J based his support for the imposition of a negligence 
criterion on the approach adopted by Neethling.
113
  He indicated that this reflected a 
balance between the right to a good name and the right to freedom of expression.  He also 
remarked that the benefit of imposing liability based on negligence is that it prevents 
unjust situations where individuals who defame others are allowed to escape liability on 
the grounds that they lacked knowledge of the unlawfulness of their conduct even if such 
lack of knowledge was due to the defendant‟s own negligence.  Since intention was the 
sole fault criterion for a defamation action under the actio injuriarum prior to the Bogoshi 
decision,
114
  it followed that lack of knowledge of unlawfulness would be fatal to a 
plaintiff‟s claim.115  Van Dijkhorst J went a step further than the Bogoshi116 court by 
extending the negligence criterion to non-media defendants.  He pointed out that the harm 
caused by a non-media defendant can be just as great as that caused by a media defendant 
and saw no reason to treat them differently.
117
   
   McQuoid-Mason poses the question whether the courts should recognise liability for 
negligent invasions of privacy.
118
  In seeking an answer, he draws a parallel between 
actions for defamation and invasion of privacy. He notes that a plaintiff in a defamation 
action can succeed in a claim for patrimonial loss arising from the negligent making of a 
defamatory statement.  He submits that the same ratio can be made applicable to 
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invasions of privacy thereby allowing a plaintiff to claim for patrimonial loss resulting 
from the negligent invasion of his or her privacy.  McQuoid-Mason‟s approach is only 
the starting point in the discussion as to whether there is room in our law for negligent 
invasions of privacy causing non-patrimonial loss.  It is not a complete solution.  He 
appears to be aware of the limitations of his approach when he states that the extension of 
the concept of patrimonial loss by the recognition of emotional shock as physical injury 
„may have an important bearing on actions for negligent invasions of privacy.‟119  He 
proceeds to point out that a negligent invasion of privacy resulting in emotional shock 
may result in a claim for patrimonial loss. 
   What then is the legal position regarding negligent invasions of privacy resulting in 
non-patrimonial loss?  This is clearly a lacuna in the law which must be addressed from a 
constitutional perspective.  After all, the Constitution provides blanket protection of 
privacy without limits based on the type of fault.  It is the common law that creates a 
distinction.  The distinction is neither reasonable nor justifiable in a constitutional 
dispensation.  It is clear that the current common law position treats personality 
infringements as less serious than physical harm by permitting claims for patrimonial loss 
arising out of intentional or negligent conduct under the actio legis aquiliae and the action 
for pain and suffering whilst claims for non-patrimonial loss due to impairment of 
personality are restricted to instances of intentional harm under the actio injuriarum.  This 
position is untenable in a constitutional dispensation as it is contrary to constitutional 
values and it dilutes the importance of constitutionally entrenched personality rights such 
as the right to privacy.   
   In NM v Smith, Madala J, on behalf of the majority, noted that negligence does not 
suffice as a form of fault under the actio injuriarum.
120
  O‟Regan J, in a dissenting 
judgment, found that the respondents had not acted intentionally.  This conclusion led her 
to inquire into whether negligence can suffice for breach of privacy.  She concluded that 
members of the media should act with „due care and respect for the right to privacy‟121 
and they should be held liable for negligent invasions of privacy.  Her conclusion was 
based on the development of the common law of defamation.  She did not see a need to 
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differentiate between the fault criterion for defamation and that for invasions of privacy 
by the media.
122
 She accordingly concluded that the media should be held liable for 
negligent invasions of privacy as is the case with defamation by the media.  
 Sachs J, in a separate judgment, adopted a similar approach to that of O‟Regan J 
insofar as the development of the common law was concerned.  He clearly stated that the 
relevant principles relating to defamation are „eminently transportable to the law of 
privacy‟.123  This meant that he also agreed that the media should be held liable for 
negligent invasions of privacy.  Langa CJ, in his separate judgment, also agreed with the 
approach of O‟Regan J to the development of the common law.  The Chief Justice 
recognised a need to hold the media to a higher standard than ordinary people.  He did 
remark that he did not consider it appropriate to extend the negligence standard to 
ordinary people as that „would be to extend the law too far into intensely personal 
space‟.124  This is regrettable as privacy is equally subject to invasion by ordinary people 
as by members of the media.  The negative consequences of such a stance are discussed 
below.  
 The minority approach to the development of the common law as adopted by 
O‟Regan J, Sachs J and Langa CJ reflects progressive thinking which is more likely to 
enable the Constitutional Court to fulfil its constitutional mandate than the approach 
adopted by the majority.  Interestingly though, this otherwise laudable approach would 
have resulted in the second defendant being found not liable for invasion of privacy.  This 
is because Langa CJ
125
 and O‟Regan J126 held that the second respondent, who was the 
subject of the biography, was not a media defendant.  As a result the negligence criterion 
would not have been applied to the second respondent.  The inquiry would have ended 
once it was found that the second respondent had not acted with the requisite animus 
injuriandi.  The first and third respondents, who were determined to be media defendants, 
would have been held liable on the basis of negligence.   
 This case reflects an unsatisfactory situation insofar as non-media defendants are 
concerned.  It is clear that even though the second respondent was not a media defendant, 
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she was fully aware of the need for privacy in cases involving HIV-positive individuals.  
This is borne out by the following comment relating to the first and second respondents, 
by Sachs J:  
„…both have an honourable history of raising public awareness of the need to deal 
sympathetically and efficaciously with the pandemic.  The fact that persons with their 
record are being called to account for failure to ensure that highly sensitive private 
medical facts about identified individuals were not inappropriately revealed, serves to 
underline the need to hold firmly to stringent standards of respect for privacy in this area.  
These are standards that the profession has set for itself, and that the law demands of 
all.‟127 
The facts of the case make it difficult to justify a finding that the second respondent was 
not liable.  This case illustrates the need to extend the negligence criterion to non-media 
defendants.  It proves, albeit on facts peculiar to this case, that a non-media defendant is 
not entirely different from a media defendant.  I would argue that a non-media defendant 
is not so different from a media defendant as to justify the imposition of a negligence 
criterion in respect of one and not the other.  In defamation cases a distinction between 
media and non-media defendants is drawn based on factors such as the greater potential 
of the media to cause harm by defamatory publication, resources available to the media to 
prevent harm, and the extent of the harm that can be caused by the media.
128
  These 
factors are used to justify placing a heavier burden on the media.  Non-media defendants 
can escape liability for defamation if they can rebut the presumption of animus injuriandi 
whilst media defendants have to prove that they did not act negligently. 
 The nature of the harm caused by invasions of privacy by media and non-media 
defendants is the same.  The focus should accordingly be on the harm sought to be 
prevented as opposed to the extent of the harm that a particular entity is capable of 
causing.  In the case of genetic privacy there is potential for unauthorised disclosure of or 
access to genetic information by employers, insurers, medical staff, and database 
controllers.  All of these entities would be categorised as non-media defendants, which 
means that even if the common law is developed to impose liability for negligent 
invasions of privacy they cannot be held liable.  
 The situation can be rectified through further development of the common law. Such 
development will be mandatory if the courts consider the development necessary so as to 
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align the common law with the Bill of Rights.  Viewed through the lens of NM v Smith,
129
 
one cannot be certain that the courts will follow this route.  On the other hand the courts 
may find that the desired changes to the common law are necessitated by changing social 
and moral conditions.  If this latter view is taken, the courts will adopt an incremental 
approach to the development of the common law.  This means that the possible extension 
of the common law to cover negligent invasions of privacy will be considered only if a 
case with the requisite facts presents itself.   
 This situation is far from satisfactory in the case of genetic privacy.  Human genetics 
is a rapidly developing field.  The law needs to keep pace with the science so as to 
provide adequate protection to individuals.  Genetic information holds great potential for 
discrimination.  Because of the serious consequences that may arise from a breach of 
genetic privacy, there is a need for proactive rather than reactive lawmaking.  The 
common law must be developed when legislation does not regulate an issue.  Based on 
the attitude and the uncertainty of our courts as to how to proceed in this arena, the 
necessary protection is more likely to be achieved through the Legislature and not 
through the judiciary.  This would entail the promulgation of a genetic privacy statute 
which would inter alia prohibit all negligent invasions of genetic privacy. 
 
 
(c) Constitutional developments 
The South African Constitution
130
 protects the right to privacy. Section 14 provides that: 
„Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have – 
(a) their person or home searched; 
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possessions seized; or 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.‟ 
The introductory line postulates a general right to privacy.  It is thus obvious that the list 
which follows is not an exhaustive one.  There is scope for the recognition of other 
aspects of the right to privacy.  McQuoid-Mason identifies two groups of constitutional 
                                                 
129
  Supra note 36. 
130
  Supra note 1. 
  
112 
 
rights to privacy.
131
  The first group entails protection against intrusions and interferences 
with private life. The second group protects privacy against disclosures of private facts. 
 The Bill of Rights has both vertical and horizontal application. It therefore regulates 
relationships between individuals and the State; as well as relationships between 
individuals.  „Individuals‟ includes juristic persons.132  The vertical and horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights prove significant in the context of genetic privacy which 
can be infringed by the State as well as by individuals, including juristic persons such as 
insurance companies and corporate employers.  The right to privacy is not absolute.  It 
may be limited in accordance with s 36 of the Constitution which provides for reasonable 
and justifiable limitations of rights.  Section 7(2) of the Constitution places a duty on the 
State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.  This would 
include promulgating legislation for the protection of genetic privacy since the common 
law protection is inadequate. 
   How has the advent of the Constitution affected the right to privacy?  This can be 
ascertained by a comparison of pre-constitutional and post-Constitutional Court cases 
which indicate the changing attitude of courts towards the protection of privacy.  The 
development of the right to privacy can be traced through case law.  A few specific 
approaches can be determined.  The early decisions equated privacy with dignity.  
Contumelia, which was an essential element of infringements of dignitas, thus became an 
essential requirement for invasions of privacy.  Thereafter the courts modified their 
approach to require an intention to insult.  That constituted a clear improvement on the 
previous situation.  The courts eventually progressed to viewing privacy as an 
independent right of personality within the concept of dignitas. 
 
(i) Pre-constitution cases 
Earlier cases of R v Umfaan,
133
 R v Holliday,
134
 and R v R
135
 took the approach that 
infringements of dignitas required an element of degradation, insult or contumelia.  
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O’Keeffe v Argus Printing136 has been referred to by Neethling as the locus classicus for 
the recognition of an independent right to privacy in South African law.
137
  The plaintiff‟s 
claim under the action injuriarum arose out of the unauthorised publication of her 
photograph for advertising purposes.  Watermeyer AJ interpreted the dignitas concept 
widely enough to include all rights relating to dignity, including the right to privacy.  
McKerron observes that this case went further than any previous case in recognizing the 
existence of a right to privacy in South African law.
138
  In S v A,
139
 Botha AJ accepted 
that the right to privacy is included in the concept of dignitas.  He recognised the right to 
privacy as an independent personality right.  This reasoning follows on from that in the 
O’Keeffe case.140  Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films141 confirmed that the 
right to privacy is an independent right of personality within the concept of dignitas.
142
 
 
(ii) Post-constitution cases 
The judgment of Bernstein v Bester
143
  has been referred to by Currie and de Waal as the 
Constitutional Court‟s „richest and most comprehensive interpretation of the right‟.144  
The applicants in this case challenged the constitutional validity of sections 417 and 418 
of the Companies Act, 1973.  They argued that these sections invade a witness‟s right to 
privacy by forcing the witness to disclose confidential documents.  In addition they 
argued that the compulsory production of documents amounted to a seizure in terms of 
section 13 of the interim constitution.
145
  The court conducted a thorough analysis of the 
right to privacy. This case describes the impact of the interaction between the individual 
and society on the right to privacy. The following note by the Constitutional Court is 
significant in this regard: 
„The truism that no right is to be considered absolute implies that from the outset of 
interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right accruing to another 
citizen.  In the context of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a 
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person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home environment, which is 
shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community.  This implies that 
community rights and the rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on a 
citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a 
concrete member of civil society.  Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, 
but as a person moves into communal relations and activities such as business and social 
interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.‟146 
The Constitutional Court‟s approach to privacy protection is set out in this case. The 
quotation indicates that the right to privacy is not absolute. It proceeds to explain how the 
right to privacy becomes attenuated.  This is a useful approach in the context of limitation 
of the right to privacy. The court has continued to follow the Bernstein approach in 
subsequent cases as will become clear from the discussion of the cases below. 
 In Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa
147
  the applicant 
challenged the constitutionality of s 28(1) of the Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Act, 1965.  The applicant argued that the powers given to inspectors to enter any 
premises where they reasonably suspect medicines to be and to inspect any document 
found there, violated the right to privacy under s 13 of the interim constitution.
148
 Sachs J 
observed that a concept of a „continuum of privacy rights‟ had been developed in the 
Bernstein
149
 case.
150
  He indicated that the continuum „may be regarded as starting with a 
wholly inviolable inner self, moving to a relatively impervious sanctum of the home and 
personal life and ending in a public realm where privacy would only remotely be 
implicated.‟151  According to him, the determination as to whether a regulatory inspection 
amounts to a search or seizure in the context of the right to privacy, would have to be 
done on a case by case basis.
152
  He considered the privacy continuum to be a useful tool 
in this inquiry.  In respect of a search and seizure he noted that „the more public the 
undertaking and the more regulated, the more attenuated would the right to privacy be 
and the less intense any possible invasion.‟153  The continuum concept serves as a useful 
tool in evaluating the extent of the invasiveness of a regulatory inspection.   
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 The approach adopted by Sachs J in the Mistry case was followed in the 
Constitutional Court case of Magajane v North West Gambling Board.
154
 This case dealt 
with the right to privacy in the context of regulatory inspections.  The applicant 
challenged the constitutionality of sections 65(1)(b) and (d) of the North West Gambling 
Act, 2000. The applicant argued that these sections violated his right to privacy by 
authorizing inspections of unlicensed premises and seizures of property. The court relied 
heavily on its reasoning in Mistry in arriving at a decision. In so doing, Van Der 
Westhuizen J observed that „this court undertook its most expansive consideration of the 
right to privacy in the context of regulatory inspections in Mistry.
155
  Van Der 
Westhuizen J equated the „continuum of privacy‟ with „a series of concentric circles 
ranging from the core, most protected realms of privacy to the outer rings that would 
yield more readily to the rights of other citizens and the public interest.‟156  This concept 
can be traced back to the Bernstein case.
157
 
      In NM v Smith
158
 the Constitutional Court reaffirmed its view of privacy as set out in 
the Bernstein case.
159
  The court recognised the importance of privacy insofar as medical 
information is concerned.
160
  The court regarded medical information as „highly sensitive 
and personal information‟.161  The importance of privacy rights in the medical context 
and more specifically in HIV cases was reaffirmed by the court which noted that 
inadequate protection of privacy may have adverse consequences for the fight against the 
disease.  Proper privacy protection, according to the court, would encourage HIV positive 
individuals to seek treatment and positively influence health policy.
162
  The court rejected 
the respondents‟ assumption that private medical information remains private only while 
it is in the hands of physicians and medical staff.  This, the court remarked, assumed that 
the individual automatically consented to disclosure of his or her medical information to 
persons outside the healthcare setting.  Such an approach was fundamentally flawed as it 
                                                 
154
   Magajane v Chairperson, North West Gambling Board 2006 (5) SA 250 (CC). 
155
  Ibid 266G-H. 
156
  Ibid 266B; 268E. 
157
  Supra note 38. 
158
  Supra note 36. 
159
  Ibid 261G -262B. 
160
  Ibid 263A-J. 
161
  Ibid 263A. 
162
  Ibid 263B-E. 
  
116 
 
failed to consider the desire of the individual to keep his or her medical information 
confidential.  This judgment has strengthened the right to privacy insofar as medical 
information is concerned. 
 It is clear from the discussion of the above cases why Bernstein has been referred to 
as the Constitutional Court‟s „richest and most comprehensive interpretation of the 
right‟163  to privacy and why it continues to be followed by the court.   
 
 
4.4 LEGISLATION AND LAW REFORM 
The South African Law Reform Commission recently completed its investigation into 
privacy and data protection.  The terms of reference for this investigation were as 
follows: 
(1)  To investigate all aspects regarding the protection of the right to privacy of a 
person in relation to the processing (collection, storage, use and communication) of his, 
her or its personal information by the State or another person. 
(2) To recommend any legislative or other steps which should be taken in this 
regard.
164
 
The report correctly notes that the right to privacy is not specifically protected by any 
particular piece of legislation.
165
 There are certain statutes which do have clauses 
pertaining to protection of privacy but these statutes are not dedicated solely to privacy or 
information protection.
166
  The Commission has recommended a draft Protection of 
Personal Information Bill
167
 which is intended to remedy this problem insofar as the 
processing of personal information is concerned.  It accordingly deals only with 
information privacy and protects only recorded information. The purpose of the bill is to 
give effect to the constitutional right to privacy by safeguarding a person‟s personal 
information when processed by responsible parties, subject to justifiable limitations that 
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are aimed at balancing the right to privacy against other rights and promoting the free 
flow of information.
168
   
  The bill takes the form of a general information protection statute which gives effect 
to internationally recognised core information protection principles. The information 
protection principles as set out in the report require that information must be: obtained 
fairly and lawfully; used only for the specified purpose for which it was intended; 
adequate, relevant and not excessive to purpose; accurate and up to date; accessible to the 
subject; kept secure; and destroyed after its purpose is completed.
169
  The intention is that 
sector-specific statutes and codes of conduct for the various sectors may be developed at 
a later stage.  The savings clause in the bill provides that it does not affect the operation 
of any other personal information protection statute which is not in conflict with it.
170
  
The report acknowledges the negative consequences of inadequate information protection 
in the area of genomic research.
171
  The list of consequences includes stigmatization, 
insurance discrimination, and employment discrimination. 
   Sections 25 and 30 are relevant for the purposes of this discussion.  Section 25 makes 
provision for inter alia the special protection of health information privacy.  The section 
reads as follows: 
 „25.  Unless specifically permitted by this Part, a responsible party may not process 
personal information - 
a)  concerning a child who is subject to parental control in terms of the law; or 
b)  concerning a data subject's religious or philosophical beliefs, race or ethnic 
origin, trade union membership, political opinions, health, sexual life, or criminal 
behaviour. 
 
   Section 30 of the draft Bill provides the following exemptions to the prohibition on 
the processing of personal information concerning health:   
„30.(1) The prohibition on processing personal information concerning a data subject's 
health or sexual life, as referred to in section 25, does not apply to the processing by - 
(a) medical professionals, healthcare institutions or facilities or social services, if this 
is necessary for the proper treatment and care of the data subject, or for the administration 
of the institution or professional practice concerned; 
(b)  insurance companies, medical aid schemes, medical scheme administrators and 
managed healthcare organisations, provided that this is necessary for - 
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(i) assessing the risk to be insured by the insurance company or covered by the 
medical aid scheme and the data subject has not objected to the processing; 
(ii)  the performance of an insurance or medical aid agreement; or 
(iii)  the enforcement of any contractual rights and obligations. 
(c) schools, if this is necessary to provide special support for pupils or making special 
arrangements in connection with their health or sexual life; 
(d)  institutions for probation, child protection or guardianship, if this is necessary for 
the performance of their legal duties; 
(e) the Ministers for Justice and Constitutional Development and of Correctional 
Services, if this is necessary in connection with the implementation of prison sentences or 
detention measures; or 
(f) administrative bodies, pension funds, employers or institutions working for them, if 
this is necessary for – 
(i) the implementation of the provisions of laws, pension regulations or collective 
agreements which create rights dependent on the health or sexual life of the data subject; 
or 
(ii) the reintegration of or support for workers or persons entitled to benefit in 
connection with sickness or work incapacity. 
(2)  In the cases referred to under subsection (1), the information may only be 
processed by responsible parties subject to an obligation of confidentiality by virtue of 
office, employment, profession or legal provision, or established by a written agreement 
between the responsible party and the data subject. 
(3)  Responsible parties that are permitted to process information concerning a data 
subject‟s health or sexual life in terms of this section and are not subject to an obligation 
of confidentiality by virtue of office, profession or legal provision, are required to treat 
the information as confidential, unless they are required by law or in connection with 
their duties to communicate the information to other parties who are authorised to process 
such information in accordance with subsection (1). 
(4)  The prohibition on processing any of the categories of personal information 
referred to in section 26, does not apply if it is necessary to supplement the processing of 
personal information concerning a data subject's health, as referred to under subsection 
(1)(a), with a view to the proper treatment or care of the data subject. 
(5)  Personal information concerning inherited characteristics may not be processed in 
respect of a data subject from whom the information concerned has been obtained, 
unless- 
(a) a serious medical interest prevails; or 
(b)   the processing is necessary for the purpose of scientific research or statistics. 
(6)  More detailed rules may be prescribed concerning the application of subsection 
(1)(b) and (f).‟ 
 
The Bill has been described as procedural and not substantive.
172
  The drafters have 
indicated that the Bill is about attaining good data management and not about addressing 
all privacy issues.
173
  This may explain why the Bill has limited reference to substantive 
issues pertaining to genetic privacy.   
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There is no attempt made in the Bill to address specific concerns relating to the 
privacy of genetic information or even to define genetic privacy.   This may be due to the 
claim that the Bill is procedural, it is not intended to address specific privacy concerns 
and it envisages the promulgation of other legislation to deal with other areas of privacy. 
Sections 25, 30(1), 30(2), 30(3), 30(4) and 30(6) of the bill deal with information relating 
to health.  Section 30(5) deals with genetic information as it refers specifically to 
„personal information concerning inherited characteristics‟.  It is clear that a distinction is 
being drawn between genetic information and other health information.  This 
interpretation is further justified upon a reading of s 30(6) which provides that more 
detailed rules may be prescribed in respect of the processing of health information by 
insurers
174
 and employers.
175
  
   Section 30(5) permits the processing of genetic information only where a serious 
medical interest prevails or where the processing is necessary for the purpose of scientific 
research or statistics.  It follows that the processing of genetic information by employers 
and insurers is prohibited without exception.  This is different from the position regarding 
other health information and is cause for concern as it fails to recognise the interests of 
employers and insurance companies.  There are circumstances where employers and 
insurance companies should have the right to process genetic information.  For example, 
employers who offer services to the public will need to ensure that their employees don‟t 
pose a threat to the safety of the public.  Insurers need certain information for risk 
assessment and in order to prevent adverse selection.
176
  The type of genetic information 
that may be processed and the circumstances in which such processing may take place, 
need to be specified.  A blanket prohibition on the processing of genetic information by 
insurers and employers is not reflective of a balancing of interests.  It is unlikely that such 
a provision will pass constitutional muster. 
   The commission acknowledges that information privacy is closely linked to other 
privacy concerns and proposed legislation would have to be closely linked to legislation 
in such other areas.  A further observation made by the commission is that proposed 
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legislation would have to address problems in areas which are not yet regulated.
177
  Based 
on the savings clause
178
 in the Bill, it must be accepted that all other legislation dealing 
with the protection of information privacy must be compatible with the bill or risk being 
invalidated.  Insofar as s 30(5) is concerned, the problem is that it prohibits the 
processing of genetic information by insurers and employers thereby preventing other 
legislation from providing to the contrary.  A contrary provision in other legislation will 
have the effect of diminishing rather than extending the protection afforded by s 30(5) of 
the Bill.  For this reason such contrary provision will not prevail.  A genetic privacy 
protection statute will have to be in harmony with the bill, which means that it cannot 
make provision for the processing of genetic information by insurers and employers even 
in specially prescribed circumstances.  This will result in that statute also falling foul of 
the constitution.   
   The second problem with s 30(5) is that it provides for the processing of genetic 
information in general terms with no further provision for the prescribing of detailed 
rules concerning the application of the subsection.  Section 30(6) clearly provides for the 
prescribing of more detailed rules in respect of the processing of health information by 
insurers and employers.  There is no consent requirement for the processing of genetic 
information in the research context.  A balance needs to be struck between access to 
genetic information for research purposes and the research subject‟s right to privacy. 
Section 30(5)(b) in its current form is vague, wide and not balanced.  As far as health 
information is concerned, there is a requirement that the processing of information may 
take place if the individual has not objected thereto.  These points illustrate the 
inconsistencies between the treatment of genetic information and other health 
information.   
   The consequences of s 30(5) of the Bill do not augur well for the protection of genetic 
privacy.  The resultant restriction on any planned genetic privacy legislation insofar as 
the processing of genetic information by employers and insurers is concerned is subject 
to constitutional attack.  The consequences for genetic research and the privacy rights of 
research subjects are also untenable.  The subsection will have to be deleted in its entirety 
                                                 
177
  Supra note 6 at 140. 
178
  Supra note 167  s 5. 
  
121 
 
or couched in less restrictive terms in order for the Bill to survive constitutional scrutiny.   
The cursory manner in which the bill deals with genetic privacy is clearly indicative of 
the need for a specific genetic privacy protection statute.  
 
 
4.5 THE RIGHT TO GENETIC PRIVACY 
The concept of genetic privacy has not received adequate attention from academic 
commentators, lawyers, judicial officers, lawmakers or policymakers in South Africa.  
Two noteworthy attempts by Slabbert in 2007
179
 and 2008
180
 to introduce the debate into 
South African law are worth mentioning here.  Slabbert undertook a brief comparative 
study of the state of genetic privacy protection in the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Switzerland and South Africa.  She concludes that genetic privacy in South Africa is 
„protected in a multi-layered, piecemeal fashion‟181 and that there is a need for specific 
protection of genetic information „due to its unique and complex nature‟.182   She does 
not, however, propose a specific genetic privacy protection statute.  No similar specific 
commentary on genetic privacy in South Africa has been found. Due to the dearth of 
South African literature on the issue of genetic privacy, much reliance is placed here on 
the writings and views of international commentators.  Much work has been done in this 
field in other countries.  Genetic privacy is important as it promotes medical research, 
encourages people to seek medical help in the form of genetic testing, and encourages 
genetic screening for preventable disorders.  The benefits of human genomics can only be 
fully realised if people are guaranteed protection of their right to privacy.  
   The reasons for the requirement of genetic privacy protection are multifarious.
183
  
These include inter alia the uniqueness of genetic information, capacity of information 
technology to link genetic information to an individual, predictive nature of genetic 
information, and uses to which genetic information can be put.  Gostin proposes the 
following justification for the protection of genetic information: 
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„Genomic data are qualitatively different from other health data because they are 
inherently linked to one person.  While non-genetic descriptions of any given patient‟s 
disease and treatment could apply to many other individuals, genomic data are unique.  
But, although the ability to identify a named individual in a large population simply from 
genetic material is unlikely, the capacity of computers to search multiple databases 
provides a potential for linking genomic information to that person.  It follows that non-
linked genomic data do not assure anonymity and that privacy and security safeguards 
must attach to any form of genetic material.‟184 
 Laurie states that „the history of privacy has been beleaguered by obscanturism and 
imprecision‟185  Like the right to privacy, the concept of genetic privacy poses 
definitional difficulties.  Laurie views genetic privacy as a „contemporary exemplar of the 
crisis that has dogged the protection of personal privacy for many years.‟186  He observes 
that the concept of genetic privacy raises the same concerns and creates the same 
difficulties as those posed by the general concept of privacy.  Allen, in the same vein, 
observes that the concept of genetic privacy is riddled with the same difficulties that 
continue to plague the concept of privacy.
187
  
   Laurie‟s legal exposition of genetic privacy is an accurate reflection of the difficult 
legal issues created by the concept.  The aspect of definition is just one such issue but it 
has major consequences for the protection of genetic privacy in general.  This is due to 
the fact that a sound definition forms the cornerstone of an effective protection 
framework.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to carve out rules for the protection of an ill-
defined concept.  It follows that the first step in genetic privacy protection would be to 
define genetic information.  This would be followed by a proposed definition of genetic 
privacy which would in essence be the protection of genetic information privacy.  
     Allen adopts the approach that the old concept of privacy applied to genetic 
information, constitutes genetic privacy.  She also observes that genetic privacy 
originally entailed information privacy but the concept has become four-dimensional.  
The four dimensions are informational, physical, decisional, and proprietary privacy.  
Informational privacy deals with access to information; physical privacy with access to 
individuals and personal spaces; decisional privacy with the right to make personal 
choices based on genetic information; and proprietary privacy with the individual‟s 
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ownership interest in his or her genes.
188
  Allen correctly notes that the informational 
dimension of genetic privacy is addressed by means of legislation, policy guidelines, and 
codes of professional ethics whilst the other three dimensions usually receive less 
attention.
189
  This is not an untenable situation since a breach of informational privacy 
has the potential to cause the kind of harm which the law seeks to prevent.  It is thus 
understandable why, in a privacy discourse, the focus would be on the informational 
dimension of genetic privacy.  
   The protection of genetic privacy in South Africa should focus on informational 
privacy since this aspect of genetic privacy bears the risk of harm to individuals.  The 
threat of such harm has to be minimised in order to protect the constitutionally 
entrenched right to privacy. 
 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The right to privacy is protected by the common law and the Constitution.  Since the 
advent of the Constitution the common law has been developed in a manner which 
amounts to a balancing of rights.  This, in effect, reflects a permeation of the common 
law with constitutional values, as intended by the drafters of the Constitution. 
Recognition of the right to privacy in South Africa has undergone positive change in 
recent times as illustrated by the court decisions discussed above.  The courts have 
progressed from viewing privacy as an aspect of dignitas to recognising it as a separate 
right of personality within the concept of dignitas.  The Constitution recognises the right 
to privacy as a fundamental right in the Bill of Rights, thereby affording the right the 
highest level of protection against infringement.  This is indicative of the changing 
societal perceptions of privacy and the increasing level of importance being attached to 
the right.  The investigation conducted by the South African Law Reform Commission, 
which culminated in the recommendation of a Protection of Personal Privacy Bill, is also 
a reflection of changing needs of society insofar as the processing of personal 
information is concerned.  
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   Genetic privacy is a modern concept which also demands specific protection against 
infringement.  As discussed above, human genomics is an area which holds untold 
promise for modern medicine insofar as hereditary conditions are concerned.  Its full 
potential has yet to be realised. The realisation of this positive potential is threatened by 
the negative potential for stigmatisation and unfair discrimination which can arise from 
the unauthorised disclosure of an individual‟s genetic information.  These threats have to 
be minimised in order to ensure that a science which holds such promise for the human 
race can continue to flourish.  The law has a pivotal role to play in this regard.  It can 
promote the science by protecting individual privacy, thereby benefiting mankind and 
medicine as a whole. 
   On the basis of the discussion above, the following conclusions have been reached: 
(1) The current legal framework does not provide adequate protection to genetic 
information privacy. 
(2) The common law does not provide adequate protection against invasion of privacy.  
There is no scope for relief under the actio injuriarum in cases of negligent invasions of 
privacy.  
(3) The common law should be developed to introduce negligence as a form of fault for 
negligent invasions of genetic privacy by the media as well as by ordinary citizens. In 
genetic privacy cases, the introduction of a negligence criterion can be justified on the 
basis that the information is sensitive and the patient has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. It would also take care of situations where medical staff who are not necessarily 
bound by ethical rules or confidentiality agreements, are legally obliged to exercise 
caution when dealing with genetic information. 
(4) The incremental approach to common law development as adopted by the courts is 
not adequate for the purposes of dealing with genetic privacy.  Law reform which occurs 
on a case-by-case basis cannot be expected to keep pace with the rapidly expanding 
science of human genomics.  This leaves loopholes in the law which can be exploited by 
insurance companies and employers to the detriment of the individual. 
(5) The Protection of Personal Information Bill does not adequately protect genetic 
information as its treatment of genetic privacy is merely cursory.  There are no 
substantive provisions dealing with genetic privacy. 
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(6) The relevant provisions of the Protection of Personal Information Bill are too wide 
to pass constitutional muster.  The bill does not reflect a proper balancing of interests as it 
fails to take cognizance of employers‟ and insurers‟ interest in genetic information. 
(7) The protection of genetic privacy requires specific legislative intervention.  Even 
though the right to privacy enjoys common law and constitutional protection, the 
challenges posed by a combination of genetic technology and information technology 
cannot be adequately addressed through these mechanisms. 
(8) The savings clause in the Protection of Personal Information Bill does not affect the 
operation of any other personal information protection statute which is not in conflict 
with it.  The bill specifically provides that if more extensive safeguards for the protection 
of personal information are provided by other statutes, the more extensive safeguards will 
prevail.
190
  A genetic privacy protection statute will not conflict with the provisions of the 
bill and will provide more protection to genetic information than that which is anticipated 
by the bill.   
(9) Difficulties concerning the definition of genetic information and the right to genetic 
privacy do not constitute adequate justification for not legislating for the protection of 
genetic information. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
PRIVILEGE 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
 „The protection of privacy afforded by the privilege is…not a means to the end of assuring 
competent medical or therapeutic treatment; protection of privacy is an end in itself.  An 
individual‟s right of privacy is a fundamental tenet of the…legal tradition, protected by common 
law, statutory provisions, and the Constitution.  To be sure, the legal protections currently 
afforded privacy in these contexts….make it clear that privacy is a widely recognised legal 
interest – an interest that courts and legislatures should accord considerable weight when 
deciding whether to recognize or establish…a privilege.‟1 
 
Privilege refers to the right of an individual to refuse to disclose admissible evidence in judicial 
proceedings.  Confidential communications are not automatically protected by the common law. 
In South Africa privilege only applies to confidential communications between lawyer and 
client.  Confidential communications between doctor and patient are not subject to any protection 
from disclosure in judicial proceedings.  Genetic information, which, although bearing its own 
unique characteristics, falls within the realm of medical information, would be protected by 
ethical rules of confidentiality but would not be subject to any privilege in law.  
 Since the study of human genomics is still relatively new, it is necessary for researchers to 
earn the trust of potential research subjects, without whose co-operation genetic research would 
not be possible.  The benefits that genetic research may yield for society and governments in 
terms of healthcare, are significant enough to warrant protection of genetic information from 
disclosure.  In addition, due to limited understanding of the science of human genetics, there is 
potential for ostracism and discrimination on the basis of genetic information, which provides 
further motivation for protection from disclosure.  A concept of „genetic information privilege‟ 
as a means of protecting genetic privacy is therefore worth investigating.  
  This chapter accordingly explores the possible introduction of a statutory genetic information 
privilege.  It is acknowledged at the outset, though, that a statutory genetic privilege cannot be 
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absolute as it must accommodate the interests of vulnerable individuals as well as those of 
society as a whole.  Examples would be children and the interest of society in combating crime.  
A statutorily recognised judicial discretion to excuse a witness from giving evidence in breach of 
a social or ethical value is also considered.  This, in turn, necessitates an understanding of the 
historical background of the privilege as well as an examination of recent developments 
pertaining to the privilege.  An analysis of legal professional privilege is undertaken in an 
attempt to determine why confidential communications between lawyer and client are deemed 
worthy of protection from disclosure in judicial proceedings whilst confidential communications 
made to other professionals do not enjoy the same protection.  The aim is to establish whether 
the rationale behind legal professional privilege is the only rationale which can be used to justify 
the introduction of new privileges and if so, why.   
  In examining the law on this topic, emphasis is placed on developments in English law since 
South African rules on privilege originate in English law.
2
  English cases are discussed because 
South African courts have been guided by such decisions in regard to rules of privilege.  Where 
necessary, developments in other jurisdictions are briefly considered as these can prove useful 
and their use is encouraged by the South African Constitution.
3
  The emphasis on English law is, 
however, dominant and this is due to the influence that English law has had on South African 
rules relating to privilege.   
  Section 14 of the National Health Act
4
 provides that health information is confidential.  One 
of the exceptions to this rule occurs when health information is required to be disclosed in terms 
of a court order.
5
  Health information, unlike legal information, is not fully protected from 
disclosure. 
 
 
5.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
The origin of testimonial privilege can be traced back to Roman law.
6
 
7
  Although Radin found 
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 no proof that the Roman law gave rise to or influenced the development of the privilege in 
English law, he does not rule out the possibility that it may have done so.
8
  Ho‟s view is that the 
influence of Roman law on the development of the privilege in English law was minimal.
9
     
 Wigmore‟s treatise on privilege10 features most prominently in writings on this topic.  
According to Wigmore, legal professional privilege is the oldest privilege in respect of 
confidential communications.
11
  Despite the wide acceptance of the treatise, it has attracted 
thought-provoking criticsm.  Auburn draws attention to what he considers to be an inconsistency 
relating to the dating of the origin of privilege.
12
  Wigmore
13
 claims that the privilege arose in the 
sixteenth century in response to the advent of testimonial compulsion via the Perjury Act, 1562,
14
 
thus implying, according to Auburn, that the privilege has „always been an important part of the 
law of testimonial compulsion‟.15  Auburn observes that testimonial compulsion existed in the 
Chancery Courts since the fourteenth century but privilege was only introduced in such courts 
after its introduction in the common law courts in the sixteenth century.
16
  He accordingly finds 
it difficult to reconcile this with Wigmore‟s assertion that the rule relating to legal professional 
privilege „appears to have commended itself at the very outset as a natural exception to the then 
novel right of testimonial compulsion.‟  He attributes this inconsistency to the failure to draw a 
distinction between Chancery and common law courts.  The origin of testimonial privilege is 
clearly not a settled issue. 
  The earliest relevant court decision made after the promulgation of the Perjury Act
17
 is Berd 
v Lovelace
18
 where the court found that a solicitor could not be called as a witness in a case 
where he was engaged as a legal representative.  Tapper
19
 observes that the modern concept of 
privilege is usually ascribed to the judgment of Lord Brougham in Greenough v Gaskell
20
 in 
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1833.  In R v Derby Magistrate’s Courts21  the court acknowledged that the law relating to 
privilege has been established since the Greenough decision.
22
  According to Tapper, this case 
resolved many uncertainties regarding the privilege, including the question as to what purpose is 
served by the privilege. 
  Respect for the confidentiality of communications between doctor and patient was 
recognised in Roman-Dutch law.
23
  However, even at that stage no testimonial privilege in 
respect of medical information existed.  De Villiers notes that doctors were bound to secrecy 
unless required by a court of law to disclose medical information relating to a patient.
24
  This 
legal position still prevails in South Africa. 
 
 
5.3 THE RATIONALE BEHIND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE 
A cursory view of the subject may create the impression that protection of confidentiality is the 
rationale behind privilege.  That is not entirely correct.  Whilst it is acknowledged that 
„confidence lies at the very heart of legal professional privilege‟25 it is accepted that 
confidentiality itself has never amounted to sufficient justification for recognition of a privilege.  
This is borne out by Auburn‟s observation that „…privilege is not a branch or variant of any 
over-arching doctrine of confidentiality…‟26 
 Two rationales for the introduction of rules of legal privilege become evident from a study of 
the relevant literature. The first is that of „honor among gentlemen.‟  Wigmore observes that this 
was accepted as sufficient justification for a witness‟s refusal to testify, which was evident from 
the trials that took place in the seventeenth century.
27
   This obligation of honor was originally 
considered to be the rationale behind legal privilege since most lawyers were gentlemen and 
were bound by an obligation to respect confidential communications made to them.  Radin 
indicates that this was the position insofar as barristers were concerned.
28
  Attorneys, however, 
were not gentlemen but were regarded as servants and therefore bound to keep their masters‟ 
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secrets.
29
  This obligation stemmed from the duty of loyalty owed by a servant to his master.  
Radin regards this position as comparable to that of a slave in Roman law, who was not allowed 
to testify for or against his master because he was considered to be part of his master‟s family 
and bound by a duty of fidelity.  
Radin observes that from the eighteenth century onwards the attorney‟s duty of loyalty to the 
client began to overshadow the notion of honor as the rationale of the privilege.
30
  The evolution 
of the rationale for the privilege became evident in the English cases of Greenough
31
 and Bolton 
v Liverpool Corporation
32
 where Lord Brougham emphasised the foundation of the rule as being 
the right of the client to obtain legal advice in confidence.  The second rationale behind the 
privilege is the promotion of the smooth administration of justice.  In this respect, the court in 
Greenough stated as follows: 
„The foundation of the rule is not difficult to discover.  It is not (as has sometimes been said) on 
account of any particular importance which the law attributes to the business of legal advisers, or 
any particular disposition to afford them protection,…But it is out of regard to the interests of 
justice, which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on, 
without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the Courts, and in those matters 
affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings.‟33  
The above approach was followed in Derby which provides an authoritative, yet somewhat 
controversial, exposition of the rationale behind legal professional privilege.
34
 Lord Taylor 
observed that „legal professional privilege…is a fundamental condition on which the 
administration of justice as a whole rests‟35 and suggested that legal professional privilege might 
even be a human right protected by the European Convention of Human Rights.
36
  This judgment 
has been criticised for its uncompromising approach.  It failed to recognise a public interest that 
was even greater than the smooth administration of justice.
37
  In a later judgment the Privy 
Council observed that „the public interest could scarcely have been higher than it was‟ in this 
case.
38
  Even then the court in Derby refused to accept that any other interest could be strong 
enough to override legal professional privilege. 
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 The position described in Derby is a reflection of the common law position.  It is an 
uncompromising, rigid approach which seeks to portray the lawyer-client relationship as 
inviolate.  The approach prevails even in cases where doing so would result in grave injustice to 
a litigant, thereby defeating the ends of justice. From a constitutional perspective the restrictive 
common law position can clearly never be justified in South Africa. It is encouraging to note that 
South African commentators are aware of the shortcomings of the common law approach as well 
as the fact that such position is unlikely to pass constitutional muster.  In 2003 Zeffert et al
39
 
anticipated that the common law situation is likely to change in view of the new constitutional 
dispensation which recognises the right of all individuals „not to have the privacy of their 
communications infringed‟.40  They indicate that „an assault on the old position may thus be 
anticipated since the common law undoubtedly constitutes a limitation of this right.‟41  This 
prediction is well-founded and will soon be realised.  An extension of the common law will then 
be required and if that is not forthcoming, alternative means of protecting other privileged 
communications will have to be investigated. 
 
 
5.4 CRITICISM OF THE PRIVILEGE 
„Attacked as impediments to the truth, praised as guarantors of individual privacy‟42 privileges 
have always been controversial in all jurisdictions. It is understandably difficult to reconcile the 
concept of privilege with the necessity for all available evidence to be placed before court.  
Privilege may be viewed as a curtailment of the opportunity to place all admissible evidence 
before the court.  Hence it may be considered to be nothing more than an exclusionary rule.  A 
further complication is caused by the fact that even if the privilege is viewed as an exclusionary 
rule, it would fall into the category of extrinsically exclusionary rules rather than intrinsically 
exclusionary rules.  The latter are more easily justifiable due to the fact that they exclude 
evidence which may be regarded as „unreliable‟ or „diluted‟.  Examples of such evidence would 
be hearsay and opinion evidence.  Extrinsically exclusionary rules prove difficult to rationalise 
because they result in the exclusion of reliable evidence on the basis of extrinsic factors such as 
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public policy.  These extrinsic factors have no bearing on the quality or the value of the evidence 
sought to be adduced.  The exclusion of good, valuable evidence in a judicial system which aims 
to uncover the truth at almost any cost, is hard to justify.  It is therefore imperative that the calls 
for new privileges be theoretically and constitutionally sound as the privilege itself appears to go 
against the grain of the judicial truth-seeking mandate. 
The argument that all evidence must be made available to the court, must be balanced against 
the view that the pursuit of truth may cost too much.‟43  The privilege can be viewed either as an 
aid or as a threat to fact-finding in litigation.  It can be seen as an aid since it prevents perjury 
whilst the threat lies in its ability to prevent the disclosure of pertinent information. A privilege 
does result in the exclusion of evidence but such exclusion is a consequence, not an objective, of 
the privilege.  Louisell observes that: 
„…to conceive of the privileges merely as exclusionary rules is to start out on the wrong road and, 
except by happy accident, to reach the wrong destination.  They are, or rather by the chance of 
litigation may become, exclusionary rules; but this is incidental and secondary.  Primarily they 
are a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed 
relationships, from the state‟s coercive or supervisory powers and from the nuisance of its 
eavesdropping.‟44  
The justification for legal professional privilege has been attacked by Tapper
45
 who sees no 
reason why it deserves such an elevated status as was accorded to it by the court in Derby.
46 
  
Tapper questions why confidential communications between lawyer and client should be 
deserving of protection from disclosure when other confidential communications arising in the 
course of other
 
professional relationships are not so protected
.47 
 He states that:
 
„…it is not self-evident why the prosecution of disputes, especially perhaps those which a 
lawyer‟s client instigates, is so much more deserving of being fostered than say, the receipt of 
treatment or psychological counseling which a medical practitioner‟s patient needs ….if anything 
most people would probably expect communications with their advisers about their private 
medical and financial affairs to be more resistant to disclosure than those relating to legal 
disputes.‟48 
The cause of the anomaly described above by Tapper can be attributed directly to Wigmore‟s 
four-part test which sets out the following four requirements that must be satisfied in order to 
establish a privilege against the disclosure of communications: 
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(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance 
of the relations between the parties. 
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously 
fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must 
be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
49
 
  Only a few types of confidential communications have been able to pass the test in order to 
qualify for a privilege.  According to Wigmore himself, confidential communications between 
doctors and patients do not satisfy all of the requirements.  This argument is most often used to 
reject calls for a medical privilege.  In spite of Wigmore‟s approach, the United States of 
America has wide medical privilege protection.  Those American States which have granted 
statutory recognition to medical privilege have used confidentiality and the right to privacy as 
justification for such recognition.  This has been the approach since 1828 when New York 
became the first American state to recognise medical privilege.  McHale observes that in the 
United States of America Wigmore‟s approach is being overtaken by the privacy approach,50  
which is in keeping with the recognition of a constitutional right to privacy.  It is foreseeable that 
South Africa will follow the same route by virtue of the fact that the right to privacy is a 
constitutionally entrenched right here. 
In Derby the court emphasised the absolute nature of legal professional privilege.
51 
 In S v 
Safatsa, Botha JA cautioned that „any claim to a relaxation of the privilege... must be approached 
with the greatest circumspection.‟52   The exercise of caution is wise but as pointed out by Zeffert 
et al „it is unlikely that the South African Courts would follow the highly conservative approach 
of the House of Lords.‟53  The human rights ethos which permeates all aspects of South African 
law will not permit the kind of absolutism or rigidity displayed by the House of Lords in 
Derby.
54
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5.5 ALTERNATIVES TO THE COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE 
The history of privilege and its rationale indicate that its extension to the medical profession 
under the common law is not likely.  In the unlikely event of such an extension taking place, it is 
still anticipated that such development will not occur in time to deal with the challenges posed by 
the rapidly advancing science of human genomics. This, together with the fact that certain 
categories of medical information are highly confidential, demand that alternative means of 
protecting such information be investigated.  The following alternatives have already been 
canvassed in certain other jurisdictions, namely, the Unites States, United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand.  The reception has not always been positive but the idea has been 
brought to the fore for consideration. 
 
 
(a) Statutory recognition 
The creation of privilege by statute provides a solution to the non-recognition of medical 
privilege by the common law.  Three reasons for this can be identified. First, a statutory privilege 
will be able to circumvent the common law rationale for privilege, which is that of promoting the 
smooth administration of justice.  Confidentiality and the constitutional right to privacy can be 
used to justify a statutory medical privilege but not a common law privilege.  Secondly, a 
statutory privilege will allow for all aspects of the privilege to be clearly set out immediately 
without having to wait for the rules to be settled by the judiciary over long periods of time as has 
happened with the common law legal professional privilege.  Thirdly, court cases involving 
human genetics are bound to revolve around highly technical information.  Due to the fact that 
the impact of human genetics on law is a relatively new and highly technical area, a statutory 
privilege will assist the judiciary in dealing with cases involving genetic information in a 
consistent and reasonably predictable manner. 
 
 
(b) Public policy exclusionary rule 
In South African law,
55
 as in English law, communications are not automatically protected by 
virtue of their confidentiality. The stance of the English law was reiterated by the court D v 
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NSPCC.
56
  In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning emphasized the value of confidentiality.  In 
what may be seen as an attempt to circumvent the fact that no privilege automatically attaches to 
confidential communications, Lord Denning suggested a presumption against disclosure unless 
the disclosure was in the public interest.  Unfortunately this approach was rejected in the House 
of Lords.  The judges did not find any public interest in protecting confidentiality itself but were 
open to the idea that confidential information may be protected if there is a sufficiently strong 
public interest for doing so.  The relevant point made in this case is that the categories of public 
interest can change according to social conditions.
57
  This statement opens the door to the 
recognition of a public policy exclusionary rule for medical information.   
  Mc Hale observes that to date there has been only one English case where the courts have 
attempted to move towards the recognition of such a rule.  She accordingly questions whether it 
is wise to wait for the courts to develop a public policy exclusionary rule.  In support of her 
argument she refers to the following quote from Malone v MPC
58: „It is no function of the courts 
to legislate in a new field.  The extension of existing laws and principles is one thing. The  
creation of an altogether different right, another. At times judges must, and do, legislate; but as 
Holmes J once said, they do so intentionally and with molecular rather than molar motions.‟59   
McHale argues that even if it does happen, the public policy exclusionary rule may not be the 
solution as it „lacks the precise definition that a specific statutory defined privilege may 
provide‟.60  She suggests that „any privilege should…contain a considered response to the 
problem posed by the variable levels of confidentiality which exist in medical practice.‟61  This is 
a significant argument as the different levels of confidentiality attaching to the various categories 
of medical information is one that is frequently used to reject medical privilege. 
  There is scope for a public-policy exclusionary rule in respect of genetic information.  A 
comparison can be drawn between genetic information, which by its very nature is sensitive, and 
other sensitive medical information. The Appellate Division and the Constitutional Court have 
already acknowledged the need to protect the confidentiality of communications relating to 
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HIV/AIDS
62
  in Jansen Van Vuuren v Kruger
63
 and  NM v Smith
64
 respectively. This was done in 
an attempt to encourage individuals to seek medical care when afflicted by diseases of a sensitive 
nature.  It is undoubtedly in the public interest for diseases such as HIV/AIDS to be treated and it 
is equally important for research into these diseases to be encouraged by protecting the privacy 
of infected persons.  Another important argument is that by protecting confidential 
communications made in the course of confidential relationships, the law of privilege will be 
giving due recognition to the right to privacy.
65
 
 
 
(c) Judicial discretion  
English cases are not clear as to whether a judge has a judicial discretion to exclude evidence 
where a confidential relationship exists and where such disclosure would be in breach of a social 
or ethical value involving public interest.  The Law Reform Committee in England indicated that 
a judge has a discretion to exclude evidence where disclosure would be a breach of some ethical 
or social value and non-disclosure would be unlikely to result in serious injustice in the particular 
case.
66
  This view was later challenged by the Criminal Law Revision Committee.  The 
committee‟s view was that a judge does not have the discretion to exclude relevant evidence 
merely on the basis of confidentiality.
67
 
In Trust Sentrum v Zevenburg doubt was expressed as to whether a judge in South Africa is 
vested with a wide discretion to permit a witness (or any other person) to refuse to disclose 
information where disclosure would be a breach of some ethical or social value.
68
  South African 
courts have acknowledged the existence of a judicial discretion to exclude evidence in criminal 
cases if such admission would be unfair
69
 or prejudicial.
70
   However, in Botha, Leon J expressed 
doubts as to whether a judge in civil proceedings has any discretion to exclude admissible 
evidence.
71
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A discretionary rule is not advisable as it does not promote certainty.  This is more so the case 
in respect of information based on new technologies and science. 
 
 
5.6 PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
As early as in 1776, the House of Lords, in the Duchess of Kingston‟s case, rejected the claim of 
physician-patient privilege.
72
  Calls for the introduction of such a privilege have often been 
rejected on the basis that confidentiality itself does not constitute a valid justification for the 
existence of a privilege. Another reason given is that not all medical information is deserving of 
the same level of confidentiality, which makes it difficult to devise a statutory privilege.   
The concept of medical privilege has always been non-existent in the common law.  This 
may be attributed to the fact that in English law confidentiality is not considered to be a separate 
head of privilege.
73
  Confidential communications are therefore not automatically protected.
74
     
McHale‟s view is that there is no inconsistency between allowing legal professional privilege 
and denying medical privilege since the former is protected „…not because of its inherent 
confidentiality, but rather because of considerations of the smooth administration of justice.‟75  It 
is generally accepted that since confidentiality cannot be established as the rationale behind legal 
professional privilege, these views must be correct.  Once accepted, the possibility that 
confidentiality may be used as justification for the extension of privilege to other confidential 
communications, must be rejected.  It follows that calls for the introduction of new privileges 
would have to be motivated on other grounds except confidentiality.   
According to Wigmore, a privilege should be recognised only if it satisfies all of the 
requirements of his test.
76
  Wigmore‟s view has always been that medical privilege does not 
satisfy such requirements and that it can therefore never qualify as a privilege.  Insofar as the 
recognition of medical privilege by American states is concerned, Wigmore evaluates the 
privilege for compliance with his four-part test and concludes that there is none.  He concedes 
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that the medical privilege meets the third requirement but is generally quite scathing in his 
criticism of such a privilege.
77
   
 With regard to the first requirement, Wigmore argues that only a few facts that are 
communicated to a doctor are ever truly confidential.  He accepts that there are certain medical 
conditions which may require confidentiality but argues that a blanket privilege cannot be 
justified. With regard to the second requirement he argues that the absence of a privilege would 
not deter patients from seeking medical attention.  In support of this argument he points out that 
even in those jurisdictions where no medical privilege exists, patients continue to seek medical 
care.  It is interesting to note that legal professional privilege has been justified on the grounds 
that it is required for the full and frank disclosure by clients to their legal representatives.  As 
stated in Greenough, „if the privilege did not exist at all, everyone would be thrown upon his 
own legal resources; deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult 
any skilful person, or would only dare to tell his counselor half his case.‟78  In respect of the 
fourth requirement, Wigmore argues that conditions which are most often the subject of litigation 
are those that are usually „disclosable without shame‟ and matters of public knowledge.  The 
injury, he argues, lies in the withholding of this information from the courts and not in its 
disclosure to the courts.   
Legal professional privilege, to which medical privilege is often compared, is not based on 
confidentiality but on the interests of the smooth administration of justice.  After a critical 
analysis of relevant cases, McHale found that all of the exclusionary rules of privilege and public 
interest are based on considerations of the administration of justice rather than on 
confidentiality.
79
  This makes it difficult to argue for a medical privilege based on the 
confidentiality of the communications between doctor and patient.  However, as will be argued 
later, confidentiality supported by a right to privacy, is a new matter for consideration.   
Van Dokkum argues that „a patient‟s privacy interest is therefore constitutionally protected 
and this should be accorded significant weight in the decision whether to establish a doctor-
patient testimonial privilege.‟80  He also argues that the approaches adopted by the courts in 
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recent cases
81
 have „swung the pendulum quite markedly in the direction of privilege attaching to 
medical confidentiality being regarded prima facie in the public interest rather than against it, 
whatever the nature of the proceedings.‟82 
 McHale observes that in jurisdictions where medical privilege is recognised „two strands of 
ethical reasoning‟ justifying such recognition have emerged, namely, utilitarianism and a human 
rights based justification.
83
  The utilitarian approach is based on a comparison of the costs and 
benefits of a particular privilege on a societal level.  It is thus an empirical approach.  It has 
received much criticism because of the difficulty in calculating costs and benefits which, in the 
case of a privilege, are intangible.  McHale suggests that it would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible to obtain empirical data to determine how the existence or absence of a privilege will 
affect communications between doctor and patient.
84
  The criticism relating to the empirical 
aspect of utilitarianism has been countered by Green and Nesson who point out that laws do not 
require empirical justification as they are usually based on behavioural assumptions.
85
  In 
concluding her critical analysis of the utilitarian approach, McHale objectively sums up the 
position as follows: 
„The fact that the utilitarian approach has been extensively criticized does not mean it should 
necessarily be abandoned: there are many uncertainties in ethical analysis.  But neither does the 
inherent uncertainty which accompanies any excursion into the realms of ethics justify our 
unquestioning acceptance of the theory on the grounds that uncertainty is an inevitable price to 
pay.  The flaws in utilitarianism are manifold: not least is the problem of the calculation of which 
interests are and which are not maximized by utility.‟86 
Wigmore‟s approach is regarded as utilitarian and it has been described as „the most 
influential rationale for privilege law‟.87  It emphasises the interests of society as a whole over 
the rights of individuals.  Although Wigmore‟s approach is regarded as utilitarian and 
utilitarianism has been used to justify the recognition of medical privilege in certain jurisdictions, 
Wigmore argues that medical privilege does not satisfy all the requirements of his utilitarian-
based test.  McHale attributes Wigmore‟s stance to a flawed application of the test and not to any 
possibility that utilitarianism may not be able to justify a medical privilege.  Traces of 
utilitarianism can even be found in Roman-Dutch law. De Villiers notes that even though „the 
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medical man‟ is bound to secrecy, this secrecy must take second place „where his obligations to 
society would be of greater weight than his obligations to the individual.‟88  This is clearly a 
utilitarian approach.   
   The human rights approach focuses on the rights of individuals and not on societal benefits.  
For this reason it is often thought that utilitarianism and human rights are opposing concepts 
which cannot be reconciled but I would argue otherwise.  It is possible to reconcile human rights 
and utilitarianism using rule utilitarianism.  Human rights are clearly based on values which 
society finds to be of paramount importance.  All rules and policies which are aligned with these 
values must surely then be in the interests of society as a whole, thereby leading to a greater 
good.  I would therefore argue that adopting a human rights based justification for the 
introduction of a new privilege is not entirely in conflict with Wigmore‟s rationale for the 
privilege.  There is no bar to the right to privacy being used to justify the introduction of a 
genetic information privilege.    
 McHale observes that doctors owe certain fundamental obligations to their patients in terms 
of  patients‟ human rights.89  Her view is that reliance upon a fundamental right provides a strong 
justification for a privilege.  The difficulty, however, lies in identifying the right that is to be 
relied upon in claiming such a privilege.
90
  McHale suggests that if the right is one that is already 
recognised in law then such recognition may be used to bolster the argument for the introduction 
of a privilege intended to protect the right in question.
91
  I would argue that the right to privacy 
as enshrined in the South African Constitution provides ample justification for the introduction 
of a privilege.  More specifically, I would rely on s 14(d) which provides that „everyone has the 
right to privacy, which includes the right not to have the privacy of their communications 
infringed.‟  Although subject to limitation, this right paves the way for the recognition of a 
privilege.  The confidentiality of a particular communication strengthens the argument in favour 
of the introduction of a privilege.  The argument is further strengthened when one party is bound 
by an ethical obligation not to disclose communications made to him or her in confidence. 
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According to Peiris there are three basic approaches to the recognition of medical privilege; 
namely, the category approach, the discretionary approach, and the principle approach.
92
  The 
category approach recognises specific categories of relationships as being subject to privilege, to 
the exclusion of all others.  For example, confidential communications between lawyer and client 
are subject to legal professional privilege whilst all other professional relationships are denied 
such privilege.  This seems to be the dominant approach in the common law.  It is a rigid 
approach which lacks the ability to accommodate changing circumstances and new challenges. 
For this reason, amongst others, it is far from satisfactory.  Peiris submits that the disadvantages 
of this approach „outweigh the merits of precision and stability‟.93  This approach is unable to 
accommodate change and that reason alone is sufficient justification for its rejection. 
The discretionary approach as described by the English Law Reform Committee „accords to 
the judge a wide discretion to permit a witness, whether a party to the proceedings or not, to 
refuse to disclose information where disclosure would be a breach of some ethical or social 
value, and non-disclosure would be unlikely to result in serious injustice in the particular case in 
which it is claimed.‟94  This approach is more flexible in allowing the courts to decide on a case-
by-case basis whether certain communications should be privileged or not.  In Trust Sentrum 
doubt was expressed as to whether a judge in South Africa is vested with a wide discretion to 
permit a witness (or any other person) to refuse to disclose information where disclosure would 
be a breach of some ethical or social value.
95
  South African courts have acknowledged the 
existence of a judicial discretion to exclude evidence in criminal cases if such admission would 
be unfair
96
 or prejudicial.
97
   However, in Botha, Leon J expressed doubt as to whether a judge in 
civil proceedings has any discretion to exclude admissible evidence.
98
 
The principle approach is based on Wigmore‟s exposition of privilege.  Peiris observes that 
„the fullest scope of judicial creativity‟ is allowed by this approach99  and that the core of this 
approach „consists of recognition of the incompleteness of existing categories, and the emphasis 
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on malleability and resilience as prime requisites of the judicial attitude to the problem.‟100  Van 
Dokkum,
101
 writing from the South African perspective, notes the difficulty in satisfying 
Wigmore‟s fourth requirement.  However, he observes that two fairly recent decisions by our 
courts indicate that the protection of medical confidentiality is in the public interest.
102
  In the 
course of this research it will be argued that the protection of genetic information from disclosure 
is clearly in the public interest due to the implications for family members as well as entire 
ethnic groups. 
 English courts have attempted to find a compromise between unqualified privilege and 
compulsory disclosure of confidential communications.  The approach adopted by the English 
courts amounts to a combination of the category approach and the discretionary approach.  As 
observed by Pereis „the traditional view espoused by the courts in England has favoured an 
extensive judicial discretion which enables a case-by-case evaluation of the propriety of 
disclosure, in competition with the ethical or social value which is transgressed by reception of 
the evidence.‟103  The Law Reform Committee of England considered the issue of privilege and 
declined to extend a statutory privilege to communications between doctor and patient.
104
  The 
committee‟s view was that the courts were coping well enough and there was therefore no need 
for an extension of the privilege.  The Committee rejected the idea that a statutory privilege 
would afford more protection than judicial discretion would.  The discretionary approach was 
favoured for its ability to accommodate changing needs and priorities of the law.  This is an 
attractive alternative insofar as new technologies are concerned. 
 Although the discretionary approach is appealing in the context of new technologies, its 
success depends on progressive thinking by judicial officers.  It is crucial for judicial officers to 
be willing to reassess the legal position in the light of the implications of the absence of a 
privilege for genetic information.  This would require sensitisation around the concerns that are 
peculiar to genetic information; namely, the heightened potential for economic and social harm, 
the implications for families, communities, and even entire populations, the adverse impact on 
future genetic research, and the impact on the individual‟s health in terms of utilising genetic 
health services.  The required progressive thinking is unlikely to take place if genetic information 
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is viewed merely as an extension of medical information or if it is viewed as information shared 
only between medical practitioners and patients.  It is therefore crucial for genetic information to 
be clearly defined. 
 It is expected that genetic information will be treated like other medical information unless it 
is clearly defined.  Even so, the fate of genetic privacy cannot be left to the discretion of judicial 
officers because their decisions will have irreversible consequences for individuals, families, 
communities, and entire populations.  Judicial officers are not keen to recognise new privileges.  
It is anticipated that the general lack of progressive thinking will hamper efforts to protect 
genetic privacy.  For this reason it is recommended in this research that a statutory genetic 
information privilege be introduced   
    Based on the general approach of South African courts towards privilege, the likelihood of 
the extension of privilege to other professions seems remote.  Notwithstanding this attitude, this 
research supports the idea of attaching a privilege to all confidential communications involving 
genetic information in an attempt to protect genetic privacy.  It is argued that in view of the 
current South African constitutional dispensation, which regards privacy as a fundamental 
human right, the protection of confidential medical information from disclosure in judicial 
proceedings is obligatory.  Such privilege may be based specifically on the relationship within 
which the genetic information is shared or on the nature of the information sought to be protected 
from disclosure.  For the purpose of privilege, it is argued that genetic information should be 
treated as a category of protected medical information, based entirely on its nature and not on 
any relationship.  No argument is made here for a blanket medical privilege because such a 
privilege would be based on the relationship between doctor and patient.  History has shown that 
there is almost no possibility of the recognition of a general medical professional privilege in the 
near future.  Genetic information, unlike traditional medical information, has characteristics 
which justify the need for added protection.  Hence, the argument for a genetic information 
privilege. 
 
 
5.7 THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH TO PRIVILEGE 
South African rules on privilege are based on the relevant English rules in this regard.  This was 
acknowledged by the court in 1912 in the case of General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance 
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Corporation v Goldberg.
105
    Smith J observed „…. that our Rules, are taken directly from the 
English Rules on the subject, and that we should be guided by the decisions which the English 
Courts have given upon these Rules.‟106  In South Africa, like in the United Kingdom, 
professional privilege applies only to the lawyer-client relationship.   Zeffert et al
107
 observe that 
the South African position is likely to change in view of the new constitutional dispensation 
which recognises the right of all individuals „not to have the privacy of their communications 
infringed‟.108  They state that „an assault on the old position may thus be anticipated since the 
common law undoubtedly constitutes a limitation of this right.‟109 
The right to privacy is protected by the Constitution.
110
  The Constitution recognises the right 
to privacy as a fundamental right in the Bill of Rights. Section 14 of the Constitution provides as 
follows: 
„Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have - 
(e) their person or home searched; 
(f) their property searched; 
(g) their possessions seized; or 
(h) the privacy of their communications infringed.‟ 
Section 14(d) is relevant for the purposes of the current discussion as it clearly protects private 
communications.  Confidential communications would undoubtedly fall into this category.  This 
right can be used to rationalise the privilege.  Every right is, however, subject to limitation in 
terms of section 33 of the Constitution.  
The Appellate Division judgment in Jansen Van Vuuren
111
  was delivered during the period 
of the interim Constitution.
112
  This case dealt with the unauthorised disclosure of the HIV status 
of the deceased by his medical practitioner.  The court placed great emphasis on the protection of 
confidentiality in cases involving HIV/AIDS due to social consequences for infected persons.  
The court found that in the case of HIV/AIDS there are „special circumstances justifying the 
protection of confidentiality‟.113  Harms AJA went so far as to state as follows: 
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„AIDS is a dangerous condition.  That on its own does not detract from the right of 
privacy of the afflicted person, especially if that right is founded in the doctor-patient 
relationship.  A patient has the right to expect due compliance by the practitioner with his 
professional ethical standards…‟114 
In awarding damages, the court took the view that the amount awarded should reflect the 
importance of the right to privacy.  The fact that professional ethical standards had not been 
adhered to by the medical practitioner was considered to be an aggravating factor.   
 NM v Smith
115
 dealt with the unauthorised disclosure of identities of HIV-positive volunteers 
who were participating in certain clinical trials.  The volunteers claimed that disclosure without 
their consent amounted to a violation of, inter alia, their right to privacy.  Madala J noted that 
„there are in the case of HIV/AIDS special circumstances which justify the protection of 
confidentiality bearing in mind that the disclosure of the condition has serious personal and 
social consequences for the sufferer.‟116   
The abovementioned cases, as decided by the highest courts in South Africa, reveal that the 
courts have taken cognisance of the link between medical confidentiality and the right to privacy, 
which is a constitutionally entrenched right.  Although the facts of these cases do not pertain to 
disclosure of medical information in judicial proceedings, the attitude of the courts towards 
medical confidentiality and its effect on the valuable right to privacy, is encouraging.  It indicates 
that courts are taking medical confidentiality seriously and are willing to see it as an extension of 
the patient‟s right to privacy.  This ultimately means that confidential communications should be 
protected.  It is, however, also important to remember that the right to privacy is not absolute so 
not all confidential communications will enjoy the same level of protection from disclosure.  It is 
reasonable to assume that the more sensitive information demands a higher level of 
confidentiality. 
 
 
5.8  GENETIC INFORMATION PRIVILEGE 
„Human genomic information is invested with enormous power in a scientifically motivated 
society.  Genomic information has the capacity to produce a great deal of good for society.  It can 
help identify and understand the etiology and pathophysiology of disease.  In so doing, medicine 
and science can expand the ability to prevent and ameliorate human malady through genetic 
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testing, treatment, and reproductive counseling.  Genomic information can just as powerfully 
serve less beneficent ends.  Information can be used to discover deeply personal attributes of an 
individual‟s life.  That information can be used to invade a person‟s private sphere, to alter a 
person‟s sense of self- and family identity, and to affect adversely opportunities in education, 
employment, and insurance.  Genomic information can also affect families and ethnic groups that 
share genetic similarities.‟117  
  
 The above note is a succinct explanation of the benefits and the dangers posed by genetic 
information, as given by Gostin.  He also establishes a justification for genetic privacy 
protection. Tapper notes that there must be „good cause… for the existence of any privilege‟ and 
„the crucial question is whether there is some interest protected by the privilege which is at least 
as significant as the proper administration of justice.‟118  In a similar vein, Mueller and 
Kirkpatrick suggest that requests for the introduction of new privileges be approached with 
caution.
119
 They suggest that the following factors be considered when evaluating requests for 
the introduction of new privileges: 
„(1) The importance to the community of the information sought to be protected; 
  (2) whether community values would be offended by governmental intrusion into the privacy 
of the relationship; 
 (3) the extent to which societal traditions and professional standards create a reasonable 
expectation of confidentiality in such a relationship; 
  (4) whether the purpose of the relationship depends upon full and open communication; 
  (5) the extent to which such communication would be impeded by non-recognition of a 
privilege; and 
 (6) the direct and indirect benefits to the public from encouraging the communication and 
protecting the privacy of the relationship in comparison to the cost to the litigation process 
resulting from the loss of evidence.‟120 
A brief comparison with Wigmore‟s four-part test121 reveals certain deficiencies in his test 
which will always lead to the rejection of medical privilege.  The first requirement of his test is 
that the communications in respect of which privilege is being claimed, must originate in a 
confidence that they will not be disclosed.  In the case of genetic disorders this is presumed 
because of the highly sensitive and familial nature of the information.  The second requirement 
that the element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of 
the relations between the parties, is also satisfied in the case of genetic disorders.  It is neither 
fair nor reasonable to compare genetic disorders with other common illnesses.  Unlike the 
                                                 
117
  Lawrence O. Gostin  „Genetic privacy‟ (1995) 23 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 320 at 323. 
118
  Op cit note 25 at 445. 
119
  Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick Evidence: practice under the rules (1999) 404. 
120
  Ibid. 
121
  At 138 above. 
  
147 
 
situation in respect of other ailments, individuals who suspect that they have genetic disorders 
are unlikely to seek medical help and testing if they do not have the assurance of confidentiality.  
This is due to fears of stigmatisation and discrimination.  South African courts have 
acknowledged the need for confidentiality in cases relating to HIV/AIDS because of the potential 
for stigmatisation, ostracism, and discrimination.
122
  There is no reason why the same approach 
cannot be adopted in respect of genetic disorders.  McHale describes Wigmore‟s view on 
confidentiality as simplistic.
123
   
 Wigmore‟s fourth requirement demands special attention. The requirement is that the injury 
caused by disclosure must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of 
litigation.  In the course of his argument on this point, Wigmore relies on the remarks made by 
Owen J in Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co.
124
  The following remarks by Owen J can be 
described as judgmental, outdated, presumptuous and one-dimensional to the point that the 
objectivity of the maker thereof is compromised: 
„In all the range of human affliction that one can think of but one class of diseases that he would 
hide from his friends and neighbours, and that is venereal diseases.  No other diseases, nor class 
of diseases, bring shame or humiliation or disgrace to the sufferer.  He who has acquired venereal 
disease by clandestine liaison has scant claim upon legislative consideration for protection from 
the shame which he has deliberately invited…this statute must be said to have been enacted to 
save from shame and disgrace those who by their own acts have forfeited their honor.‟125 
  Wigmore asserts a two-pronged argument in respect of the fourth requirement.  First, he 
asserts that no medical information, except that relating to venereal disease, is so confidential as 
to be subject to a privilege.  Secondly, he argues that only diseases which „bring humiliation or 
shame or disgrace to the sufferer‟ may require confidentiality but where such diseases have been 
acquired by „clandestine liaison‟ such desire for confidentiality should not prejudice innocent 
persons who may benefit from disclosure.  As remarked by Owen J: „The innocent should not be 
thus deprived of justice and made to pay the cost of the protection which this statute would 
afford to those who have forfeited all right to protection.‟126 
 This approach to medical privilege is problematic for three reasons. First, it assumes that 
every person who is infected with a venereal disease has acquired the disease by „clandestine 
liaison‟.  This fails to take cognisance of the reality that sexually transmitted diseases can be 
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acquired otherwise than by clandestine liaison, for example, through acts of sexual assault.  
Secondly, it suggests that people who engage in morally unacceptable conduct should forfeit 
their right to protection from the law.  This argument must be rejected in South Africa due to our 
constitutional dispensation which guarantees certain fundamental rights to all citizens regardless 
of moral considerations.  It is not possible to deprive individuals of their constitutional rights, as 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, purely on the basis that they have engaged in conduct which 
others may find morally reprehensible.  Thirdly, the approach is restrictive as it confines 
conditions demanding confidentiality to those which „bring humiliation or shame or disgrace to 
the sufferer‟.  Other conditions such as genetic disorders do not satisfy this description but 
communications relating to such disorders are highly confidential and deserving of protection.     
 The general acceptance of Wigmore‟s four-part test as the dominant test for determining 
whether certain communications should be subject to a common law privilege, is clearly 
problematic.  None of Wigmore‟s arguments against the recognition of privilege are valid in the 
case of genetic information.  His approach is too outdated to deal with developments in modern 
medicine and related technology.  The case for genetic information privilege has to follow a 
different path as it cannot be moulded to fit an inappropriate test. 
 Since Wigmore himself always maintained that the introduction of a medical privilege would 
not be possible under his test because it does not satisfy all of the criteria for recognition of a 
privilege, it is necessary to look at alternatives.  Any unquestioning acceptance of Wigmore‟s 
rejection of medical privilege would not augur well for a proposed genetic information privilege.  
It may be useful to consider the requirements proposed by Mueller and Kirkpatrick, not merely 
because Wigmore‟s test is not favourable to medical privilege, but because of the 
comprehensive, more objective nature of their requirements.  They also refer specifically to 
societal traditions and professional standards.  The ethical rules which medical professional are 
bound by will clearly be given due consideration.    
I would argue for a genetic information privilege on the basis of the constitutional right to 
privacy. Louisell argues that the right to be left alone is such an important aspect of human 
liberty that it can take precedence over the need for accuracy in adjudication.
127
  He observes that 
„privileges are a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed 
relationships, from the state‟s coercive or supervisory powers and from the nuisance of its 
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eavesdropping.‟128  He acknowledges the need for accuracy in the litigation process as well as 
the need to maintain confidentiality in certain relationships.
129
  
Three important uses would be served by the introduction of a genetic information privilege.  
First, a genetic information privilege would serve to prevent courts from compelling disclosure 
of genetic information, including genetic research information.  This is important because 
genetic research requires the participation of vulnerable research participants.  In order to avoid 
stigmatisation or discrimination, potential crucial subjects may decline involvement in research.  
This would serve only to hinder research in a rapidly expanding field which has the potential to 
revolutionise healthcare.  In the interests of ongoing research and protection of vulnerable 
participants it is imperative that research participants be guaranteed protection against disclosure 
of their personal genetic information.  Secondly, respect for private medical information may 
yield benefits for the improvement of health policies and healthcare systems.  Madala J, in NM v 
Smith,
130
 made the point in respect of HIV/AIDS policies but it should be equally applicable to 
genetic conditions.  Thirdly, the adverse impact of the disclosure of one person‟s genetic 
information on families and entire communities can be limited via a genetic information 
privilege.  Gostin describes the long reach of genetic information in the following passage: 
„It is thus possible to conceive of a genetic information system that contains a robust account of 
the past, present, and future health of each individual, ranging from genetic fetal abnormalities 
and neonate carrier states, to current and future genetic conditions at different points in one‟s life.  
Genetic data can even explain causes of morbidity and mortality after death; …such genetic 
explanations of morbidity and mortality provide an expansive understanding not only of the 
individual, but also of her family (ancestors as well as current and future generations) and 
possibly of whole populations.‟131 
Doctors are ethically bound, not only to treat as confidential those communications made 
verbally by their patients, but also information gained from tests.
132
  The latter category is 
especially relevant to human genetics where much of the information is gained through genetic 
testing.  The difficulty lies in the fact that genetic information passes through the hands of many 
individuals.  A doctor-patient privilege will serve to prevent only doctors from disclosing genetic 
information in judicial proceedings.  Other individuals who have knowledge of the patient‟s 
genetic information may be obliged to keep the information confidential but will not be 
                                                 
128
  Ibid. 
129
  Ibid 109. 
130
  Supra note 64 at 263E. 
131
  Op cit note 117 at 321. 
132
  Op cit note 11 at 823. 
  
150 
 
prohibited by law from disclosing it in judicial proceedings.  It follows that the introduction of a 
doctor-patient privilege will not solve the problem insofar as the disclosure of genetic 
information by other individuals is concerned.  The new position will simply be akin to the 
current one. 
   Not all communications between doctor and patient are deserving of protection from 
disclosure in judicial proceedings.  To argue otherwise would result in such communications 
being privileged purely on the basis of the doctor‟s profession.  This would amount to 
recognition of a professional privilege.  Some communications are more confidential than others 
because of the medical condition involved and therefore deserving of protection not merely on 
the basis of confidentiality but due to the sensitivity of the matter.  McHale points  out that the 
levels of confidentiality or sensitivity may differ due to, inter alia, the nature of the ailment, age 
of the patient, culture, and ethnicity.
133
  In Jansen Van Vuuren,
134
 the Appellate Division was 
fully aware of such factors and adopted an approach which was appropriate for dealing with HIV 
and AIDS.  There is no reason why a similar approach cannot be adopted with regard to other 
types of medical information where there are „special circumstances justifying the protection of 
confidentiality.‟   
It is acknowledged that powerful arguments are required to justify the existence of any 
privilege.
135
  The justification of a privilege is a daunting task, especially as the trend now 
appears to be moving towards the limitation rather than extension of privileges.  The following 
observations by Tapper tend to balance the scales so that new privileges do not appear 
impossible to justify: 
„It is also important not to exclude the possibility that the law is defective by failing to recognize 
legitimate claims to privilege, and not merely by protecting interests which do not deserve it.  The 
influence of public opinion should not be ignored.  The proper administration of justice…includes 
the notion of the rejection of relevant evidence because its reception would be unduly offensive to 
contemporary public opinion.  It follows that that which was the subject of privilege in one 
generation should not necessarily be privileged in the next, and vice versa.‟136   
 The creation of a genetic information privilege will not amount to an unreasonable or 
unjustifiable extension of the rules of privilege.  Statutory recognition will promote certainty and 
consistency in the application of the privilege. In other jurisdictions there are already other 
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privileges which have been established either at common law or by statute.  All American States 
have introduced a statutory psychotherapist privilege.
137
  Gostin observes that, unlike traditional 
medicine which aims to benefit the individual patient, genetic applications can benefit entire 
communities and ethnic groups.
138
  He argues that „there is considerable utility in using 
population-based data to promote community health.‟139  Here he refers to research which has 
identified a predisposition to breast and ovarian cancer in women of Eastern European Jewish 
descent as well as the discovery of the predominance of Tay-Sachs syndrome in Ashkenazi Jews 
and sickle cell trait in African Americans.  A similar view of the social utility of psychotherapy 
has resulted in the introduction of a psychotherapist-patient privilege in the United States of 
America.  The privilege was first recognised in Illinois in 1952 in the case of Binder v Ruvell.
140
  
In 1996 the United States Supreme Court introduced the psychotherapist patient privilege in 
Jaffee v Redmond.
141
  The court found that the overall mental health of citizens creates a net 
benefit to society which justifies the occasional loss of probative evidence.  
 Privileges may be based on the nature of the relationship within which the information has 
been communicated or on the nature of the information sought to be protected from disclosure.  
A genetic information privilege should be based on the nature of the information sought to be 
disclosed, and not on the nature of the relationship within which the confidential information was 
communicated.  This is important because genetic information may be found in the possession of 
various individuals, ranging from researchers to entire healthcare teams and administrative 
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personnel, not all of whom are bound by professional ethical rules.  A privilege that is dependent 
on the nature of a relationship would cover communications made to certain categories of 
persons only.  Since matters covered by a privilege can be proved by the evidence of persons 
falling outside of the protected categories, the purpose of a genetic information privilege will be 
defeated if it is based on a particular relationship. 
  A genetic privacy protection statute must also provide for exclusions to the privilege.  These 
would ordinarily apply to cases which concern the welfare of children and criminal cases.  In 
such cases the evidence should be heard in camera so as to prevent harm to the patient, family, 
community or population group.   
 
 
5.9 CONCLUSIONS 
It is evident that the call for the introduction of a new privilege will meet with resistance.  Much 
of this resistance may be attributed to Wigmore‟s test.  It has, however, been shown that 
Wigmore‟s test is no longer the ideal or superior test.  There are other approaches which are 
more current and therefore more suitable for the purpose of addressing new challenges to 
privacy.  The current approach to the development of privilege law is inappropriate for the 
protection of genetic information privacy.  The ad hoc development of the law relating to 
privilege is neither appropriate nor advisable for the protection of genetic information due to the 
sensitivity of genetic information and its wide-ranging implications.  Genetic privacy protection 
requires immediate attention so that the law can keep pace with the science of genetics.  A 
statutory judicial discretion to refuse to compel disclosure is also inadequate because it cannot 
guarantee consistency or certainty in the application of the discretion.  Even guiding principles 
may not be sufficient.  
 The constitutional right to privacy, high level of confidentiality of genetic information, social 
utility of genetic applications, and other special circumstances surrounding genetic information 
justify the introduction of a statutory genetic information privilege in South Africa. Such a 
statutory genetic information privilege should be based on the nature of the genetic information 
and vulnerability of individuals/populations but not on any professional relationship within 
which confidential communications are made.  In order to be totally effective the privilege must 
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cover documentary evidence in the form of genetic test results.  The privilege must also be 
subject to specific exceptions since the constitutional right to privacy is not absolute.  
As mentioned above, the possibility of a new privilege being introduced is remote.
142
  It is 
therefore important to explore alternative avenues for genetic privacy protection.  This is one of 
the reasons for the cross-jurisdictional review which is undertaken in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW: DEVELOPMENTS IN SELECTED FOREIGN 
JURISDICTIONS 
  
 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
The issue of genetic privacy affects the entire human species regardless of race, sex, or 
geographical location.  It has national, regional, and international significance due to 
globalisation, cross-border sharing of information, collaborative research initiatives, advances in 
information technology, and the proliferation of genetic databases.  Many countries are 
proactively attempting to address the legal and ethical issues posed by developments in the area 
of genetic testing and genetic research involving human participants. In this chapter the 
developments in five countries will be discussed.  These are the United Kingdom (UK), the 
United States of America (USA), Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands.   
 The UK and Australia are considered for the insight they can provide through the research 
that they have already undertaken into genetic privacy and the reform recommendations that they 
have proposed.  In the UK the Human Genetics Commission (HGC) has conducted two relevant 
inquiries into genetic information.  One dealt with the forensic use of genetic information
1
 and 
the other with the balancing of competing interests in the use of personal genetic data.
2
  The 
work of the HGC is ongoing and provides valuable insight into public attitudes and concerns 
relating to genetic information.  Due to the intensive public consultations that are undertaken by 
the HGC prior to compiling reports, its recommendations are based on actual public concerns 
and not just on perceptions of policymakers and legislators.  The influence of the European Data 
Protection Directive
3
 on the rest of the world, including South Africa, necessitates a discussion 
of this instrument.  It has been observed that, in addition to harmonising data protection 
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principles within Europe, the Directive „can also be credited with creating one of the world‟s 
leading paradigms for privacy protection, which has served as an inspiration to legal regimes 
outside Europe.‟4  The UK also has the world‟s largest forensic DNA database per head of the 
population as well as various other non-forensic human genetic databases, including the UK 
Biobank.  The forensic DNA database, although legally flawed in its operation, has influenced 
the development of forensic databases in other countries and for this reason it warrants attention 
in this chapter. 
 The Australian Law Reform Commission and the Australian Health Ethics Committee of the 
National Health and Medical Research Council undertook a joint inquiry into the protection of 
human genetic samples and information.
5
  The project has been referred to as „the most 
comprehensive consideration of the ethical, legal and social implications of the „New Genetics‟ 
ever undertaken‟.6  The report contains 144 recommendations for reform, most of which have 
since been accepted by the Australian government.   
Canadian developments are based largely on the work of the Canadian Biotechnology 
Advisory Committee and the application of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act (PIPEDA)
7
 to genetic information.  An analysis of the Canadian position is 
intended to demonstrate how general privacy legislation, such as PIPEDA, may be used to 
protect genetic privacy in the absence of other more suitable legal and regulatory instruments.  
The Netherlands has been included in this discussion because it differs from the other 
jurisdictions under review to the extent that it has legislation aimed at protecting genetic privacy 
together with a moratorium on the use of genetic information by insurance companies.  It 
therefore provides a unique alternative for consideration.  The American position, which is based 
on an anti-discrimination paradigm, is considered here because it helps to demonstrate why a 
privacy approach has been favoured over an anti-discrimination approach in this research.  
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6.2 CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW 
 
6.2.1 THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The UK has been and still is a key contributor to developments in the field of human genetics.  In 
1953 Watson and Crick discovered the double-helical structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
whilst working together at the University of Cambridge.  DNA fingerprinting was developed by 
Professor Sir Alec Jeffreys and his colleagues at the University of Leicester in 1984.  The UK also 
made a significant contribution to the Human Genome Project through the involvement of the 
Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute.  The UK continues to monitor developments in human genetics 
so as to respond to the consequent ethical, legal, and social challenges.  Much work has been 
done in this area by various bodies including the House of Commons and House of Lords Select 
Committees on Science and Technology, Genetics and Insurance Committee, Human Genetics 
Advisory Commission, Human Genetics Commission, Information Commissioner, the 
Department of Health, and the National Health Service.  
There is no written Constitution or national Bill of Rights in the UK.  The UK ratified the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
8
 in 1951.  The ECHR recognises privacy as a 
fundamental human right.
9
  The Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR)
10
 was signed and 
proclaimed in December 2000.
11
  It was the first formal European Union (EU) document to  
consolidate existing civil, political, social, and economic rights of EU citizens into one 
instrument but it was not a legally binding instrument.  It merely reflected a political 
commitment to the respect for certain fundamental rights. The Lisbon Treaty,
12
 which entered 
into force in December 2009, made the CFR legally binding.  This was achieved through article 
6(1) which provides that „The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which shall have the same legal value as 
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the Treaties.‟ The significance of article 6(1) lies in the fact that a treaty is a binding agreement 
between EU member countries.  According to Barnard this means that the CFR now forms part 
of the primary law of the EU and its provisions can be enforced by the national courts and by the 
European Court of Justice.
13
  
Article 7 of the CFR provides for the protection of privacy and article 21 of the CFR 
prohibits discrimination on „any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national 
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.‟  For the purposes of this 
discussion it is important to take note of the prohibition based on genetic features.  It is also 
important to note that even though the CFR has acquired legal status in the EU by virtue of the 
signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the protection that is afforded by the CFR is limited in the UK.  
This has been achieved by the inclusion of an opt-out Protocol
14
 in the Lisbon Treaty which 
provides that the CFR will not create additional enforceable rights over and above those already 
provided for in UK national legislation.  It has been suggested that the „Protocol adds a 
regrettable and unnecessary layer of complexity and confusion to an already complicated EU 
legal landscape in relation to fundamental rights.‟15  As discussed below, the application of the 
opt-out Protocol in practice remains uncertain.
16
 
 
 
(a) Genetic Databases 
 
(i)  Forensic DNA Databases 
In 1991 the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (Runciman Commission) was established in 
response to a string of miscarriages of justice.
17
  The Commission was tasked with reviewing the 
criminal justice system with the aim of inter alia preventing wrongful convictions. In 1995 the 
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NDNAD was established
18
 pursuant to a recommendation of the Runciman Commission.  The 
NDNAD is operated by the Forensic Science Service and is currently the world‟s largest forensic 
DNA database per head of the population.
19
   
 There is no specific statutory provision governing the operation of the NDNAD.  The 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994
20
  created a framework for DNA sample collection 
and profiling. It extended police powers even further by permitting speculative searching,
21
 
widening the category of non-intimate samples to include mouth swabs,
22
 and permitting the 
taking of non-intimate samples without consent from individuals arrested for any recordable 
offence.  The Act provided for the removal from the database of profiles of persons acquitted of 
a crime.  A number of cases followed, challenging the legality of identification  using DNA 
profiles which should have been removed from the database.   Two such cases are R v B
23
 and R 
v Weir,
24
 both of which have been discussed in chapter two.   
In 2001 The Criminal Justice and Police Act
25
  amended the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act
26
 to allow for the indefinite retention of DNA samples collected from individuals regardless 
of whether such individuals are acquitted.  The Criminal Justice Act
27
 was amended in 2003 to 
authorise the taking of samples in any arrest for a recordable offence even if the person is not 
charged with an offence.  Such samples can also be retained indefinitely.  This statutory 
provision was challenged in the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Marper v The 
United Kingdom.
28
  The applicants in this case argued that the retention of DNA samples and 
profiles of unconvicted persons is not proportionate to the aim of detecting and preventing crime. 
Whilst acknowledging the importance of DNA evidence in combating crime, the court found that 
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the retention of profiles of unconvicted persons violated their right to privacy and could not be 
justified. 
 On 18 May 2011 the findings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Marper
29
  
were echoed by the UK Supreme Court in R v Commissioner of Police.
30
  The appellants in this 
case had DNA samples taken from them upon arrest.  They were subsequently acquitted of all 
charges and they applied for judicial review of the retention of their data. In so doing they relied 
on the decision of the ECtHR in Marper.
31
  Their applications were dismissed by the lower court 
on the basis that there were no exceptional circumstances, within the meaning of the guidelines 
issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO Guidelines), which could justify 
destruction of their DNA samples.  On appeal, the majority in the UK Supreme Court accepted 
that „[i]t is common ground that, in the light of Marper ECtHR, the indefinite retention of the 
appellants‟ data is an interference with their rights to respect for private life protected by article 8 
of the ECHR, which for reasons given by the ECtHR, is not justified under article 8(2).‟32  The 
court accordingly granted a declaration that the present ACPO Guidelines are unlawful because 
they are incompatible with the ECHR.  In the majority judgment, Lord Dyson pointed out that 
„[i]f Parliament does not produce revised guidelines within a reasonable time, then the appellants 
will be able to seek judicial review of the continuing retention of their data under the unlawful 
ACPO guidelines and their claims will be likely to succeed.‟33  The majority also adopted the 
stance that since the scheme for retention of DNA is currently being reviewed in the course of 
deliberations on the Protection of Freedoms Bill,
34
 it is „neither just nor appropriate to make an 
order requiring a change to the legislative scheme within a specified period.‟35  
In Goggins & others v The United Kingdom,
36
 the government indicated its acceptance of the 
decision by the ECtHR in Marper.
37
  The government declared that it „is in the process of 
implementing the decision of the Court in Marper, which will be done by introducing new 
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legislation to ensure that the provisions governing the retention of such data are proportionate in 
light of the rights of the individuals under Article 8.‟38  The court accepted the government‟s 
undertaking but did indicate that it will revisit the applications if the legislation before 
Parliament is not enacted.
39
 
The Protection of Freedoms Bill
40
 was presented to Parliament on 11 February 2011. It 
introduces a new framework for police retention of DNA and fingerprint data in England and 
Wales.  The new framework is based on the Scottish model. In Marper the court observed that 
the Scottish model was „notably consistent with the Committee of Ministers‟ Recommendation 
R(91)1, which stresses the need for an approach which discriminates between different kinds of 
cases and for the application of strictly defined storage periods of data, even in more serious 
cases‟ unlike arrangements in force in the rest of the UK.‟41 The Bill went through the report 
stage and third reading in the House of Commons on 11 October 2011.  It is currently awaiting 
consideration by the House of Lords.   
The NDNAD in the UK has served as a model for forensic databases in other countries. A 
major difference though is that other countries do not permit the indefinite retention of DNA 
profiles.  Even though the UK is a pioneer in the field of forensic DNA databases, the legislative 
position is unsatisfactory.  This has been proven by the decision of the ECtHR in Marper
42
 as 
well as the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of the UK in Goggins.
43
  The position 
between the privacy rights of individuals and that of the State is unbalanced with the State being 
in a much more favourable position.  The role of the State in preventing and detecting crime is 
considered to be of paramount importance thus resulting in an unjustifiable limitation of the right 
to privacy.  Based on the comments made by the ECtHRin Marper,
44
 it is fair to conclude that 
the current regulatory framework has not succeeded in fostering a culture of respect for privacy 
rights.  A landmark review
45
 of the protection of human rights in Britain was recently concluded 
by the Equality and Human Rights Commission.  The review concluded that there are ten areas 
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where public authorities can improve the way they protect fundamental rights.
46
  These include 
the protection of the right to privacy.  
There is clearly a need for change especially after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty
47
 which 
accorded legal status to the CFR.
48
  The report notes that „…the long running debate about the 
effectiveness of the HRA, lack of leadership and insufficient guidance about human rights has 
encouraged uncertainty and criticism about the remit of the Act.  This led first the Labour 
Government, and now the Coalition Government, to consider whether it should be replaced by a 
Bill of Rights.‟49  Because of problems with the implementation of the HRA, in March 2011 the 
government established a Commission on a Bill of Rights to investigate the creation of a UK Bill 
of Rights.
50
  The Commission is expected to report by the end of 2012. 
 
(ii)  Genetic Research Databases 
The UK has received much media and academic attention as a result of its development of a 
population-based biobank.
51
  The UK Biobank is a large prospective research resource aimed at 
facilitating an understanding of the interaction between genetic, environmental, and lifestyle 
factors in the development of various diseases.
52
  It accordingly set out to collect lifestyle and 
environmental information, medical history, physical measurements, and biological samples 
from about 500 000 people aged 40-69.  The target number of volunteers has since been met.
53
 
The health of participants will be monitored over a long period by accessing their medical and 
health records with their consent. Biological samples will be stored for future use in biochemical 
and genetic analyses.  It is intended that this biobank resource will facilitate research which can 
aid in disease prevention, diagnosis, and treatment.  An Ethics and Governance Framework 
(EGF) has been put in place and continued funding of the project is conditional upon compliance 
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with this framework.
54
  The EGF operates as a core reference document against which all 
policies and activities of the UK Biobank are judged.  An Ethics and Governance Council (EGC) 
has also been established.  This is an independent body that advises the UK Biobank on the 
revision of the EGF, monitors and reports publicly on compliance with the EGF, and advises 
generally on the interests of research participants and the general public.
55
 
The UK Biobank is not governed by specific legislation but is subject to the existing 
legislative framework consisting of the Human Tissue Act,
56
 and the Data Protection Act.
57
  In 
2000 the House of Lords‟ Science and Technology Committee launched an inquiry into the 
factual position of non-forensic human genetic databases in the UK.  The aims of the inquiry 
were to:  
„(a) investigate how issues of privacy, ownership, distribution and anonymisation of 
individuals‟ genetic and related health information were dealt with in relation to currently 
available and planned use of human genetic databases; 
 (b) take stock of developments which might be expected not only in genetic and database 
technologies but also in knowledge about genetics and gene function – together with their 
consequences for medical practice;  and 
 (c) report, drawing attention to the areas where current practice and regulation seemed likely to 
need development, taking into account the opportunities and the challenges of changing 
technology and knowledge.‟58   
The committee concluded that the Data Protection Act
59
 adequately protects information 
contained in genetic databases and there is therefore no need for a new regulatory framework.
60
  
As discussed below, it is debatable whether this conclusion is still valid.
61
  Gibbons notes that 
„no purpose-designed legal framework or dedicated legal instrument applies to genetic databases 
in the UK.‟62  It appears that the committee‟s conclusion has not settled the issue.  A report 
commissioned by the Wellcome Trust and the EGC on public attitudes towards access to data 
contained in the UK Biobank reveals uncertainty about the adequacy of the DPA in relation to 
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biobanks.
63
  The first observation is that since the DPA applies only to data of living individuals 
it will obviously not apply to data of biobank participants after their death.  This is a major 
concern in the genetic arena because indiscriminate disclosure of data of deceased participants 
can have adverse consequences for surviving biological relatives who share the genetic 
characteristics of deceased relatives.  The second observation is that since the DPA applies to 
identifiable data it will not apply to biobank data which is usually de-identified before being 
passed on to researchers.  The ensuing research would therefore not be covered by the DPA.   
These are clearly concerns which must be addressed.  Based on these observations, the 
conclusions reached by the House of Lords‟ Science and Technology Committee64 need to be 
revisited.  
Genetic database governance strategies in the UK have been aptly summed up as „piecemeal, 
pragmatic, and largely reactive.‟65  Gibbons observes that „[t]he UK patchwork, with its lack of 
any specific, formal legislative framework and reliance on general-purpose instruments and 
informal techniques, suffers from several significant shortcomings.‟66  She identifies the key  
problems as „inconsistent legal standards, ambiguities, disadvantages associated with informality 
and gaps.‟67  These are the very same problems that have been identified in the discussion above.  
There is clearly scope for intervention and reform. 
 
 
(b)  Genetic discrimination 
 
 (i) Insurance  
The UK has a universal health care system so the threat of genetic discrimination in health 
insurance is not significant for a discussion on discrimination. This, together with the fact that 
life insurance is required for mortgages, has confined the debate surrounding genetics and 
insurance to life insurance.  No formal prohibition on the use of genetic information by insurers 
exists in the United Kingdom.  Instead, a system of voluntary regulation is in place.  In 1997 the 
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Association of British Insurers (ABI) issued a policy statement on the use of genetic test results 
for underwriting purposes.  The statement indicated that applicants would not be requested to 
undergo genetic testing when applying for life insurance.  Insurers agreed not to use genetic test 
results for life insurance policies below £100,000.  It has been pointed out that this action was 
prompted by a perceived threat of statutory regulation.
68
   In 1999 the ABI introduced a Code of 
Practice 
69
 which governs the use of predictive genetic test results by its members. Compliance 
with the code is mandatory for all members of the ABI.  The code has been revised in order to 
keep up with developments in the field of genetic testing and its impact on the insurance 
industry.  In 2001 the government and the ABI agreed on a five-year moratorium on the use of 
predictive genetic tests in insurance underwriting.  This moratorium has since been extended a 
few times.  The latest extension was announced in 2011 and is valid until 2017.
70
   
Currently the moratorium applies to life insurance policies valued under £500,000; critical 
illness policies under £300,000; and income protection policies which pay annual benefits under 
£30,000.  Insurers may not request results of genetic tests that are done for research purposes.
71
  
Furthermore, only results of those tests which have been approved by the Genetics and Insurance 
Committee (GAIC) may be considered in the underwriting of policies which are not subject to 
the moratorium.  The only test which has been approved for use by insurers thus far is the test for 
Huntington‟s Disease.  The GAIC was disbanded in 200972 and its oversight function was 
transferred to the Human Genetics Commission‟s Monitoring Group on Genetics and 
Insurance.
73
  This function entails monitoring compliance with the Code and the Concordat as 
well as identifying developments which may have implications for the use of predictive genetic 
test results by insurers.
74
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 In 2005 a Concordat and Moratorium between the government and the ABI was introduced
75
  
to address the concern that patients might be deterred from taking predictive genetic tests due to 
the fear that the results may be used by insurers to discriminate against them.  It creates a policy 
framework for cooperation that provides for the fair and transparent use of genetic information 
by insurers.
76
  It applies to predictive genetic tests only and is restricted to life, critical illness, 
and income protection insurance.
77
  The agreement is, however, a statement of intent only and 
not legally binding.     
Even though the system of voluntary regulation is working well, it is merely a temporary 
solution.
78
  It serves the purpose of giving the government and the insurance industry time to 
reflect on the matter before taking permanent steps.  The main disadvantage of the system is that 
it lacks certainty.  The obvious question to be asked is what will happen when the moratorium 
ends.  A specific concern relates to the possible retrospective use of genetic test results.
79
  In 
response to this concern, the House of Lords‟ Science and Technology Committee recommended 
that the government should negotiate with the ABI for the inclusion of a new clause in the ABI 
Code of Practice and Concordat to prevent insurers from requesting results of genetic tests which 
were taken during the moratorium period.  Another point to note is that the ABI is only a trade 
association and membership thereof is not compulsory.  Those insurers who are not members of 
the ABI are therefore not bound by the ABI Code of Practice or by the Concordat and 
Moratorium, thus creating a gap in protection for consumers.  It is clear that the matter is far 
from settled and the government of the UK needs to address public concerns in a more certain 
and binding manner.   
 
(ii) Employment 
There is no specific statute prohibiting genetic discrimination in employment in the UK even 
though Article 21 of the CFR prohibits discrimination on the basis of genetic features.  As briefly 
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mentioned above
80
 and discussed further below
81
 it is uncertain whether such a prohibition will 
be directly enforceable in the UK due to the opt-out Protocol in the Lisbon Treaty
82
 which 
provides that the CFR will not create additional enforceable rights over and above those already 
provided for in UK national legislation.  In February 2005 the government launched the 
Discrimination Law Review with the aim of developing a more streamlined legislative 
framework for dealing with discrimination.  At that stage much of the protective mechanisms 
were scattered amongst various pieces of legislation.
83
   
 As a result of the Discrimination Law Review, the government developed proposals for a 
Single Equality Act which would consolidate the individual pieces of legislation and update the 
provisions where necessary.  The government then invited public comment on the proposals. The 
HGC commented specifically with regard to genetic discrimination.  The HGC maintained their 
view
84
 that genetic discrimination should be dealt with separately from disability discrimination.  
The government agreed and stated that „[p]eople with a pre-symptomatic genetic predisposition 
do not have a mental or physical impairment which affects their normal day-to-day activities, 
and there is no certainty that they will go on to develop a health problem. Extending disability 
discrimination protection to cover people who are not disabled would change the very nature of 
disability discrimination law and risk being seen as a dilution of disabled people‟s rights.‟85  The 
view of the HGC was that the Single Equality Act provided „a clear opportunity to resolve the 
dilemma by treating genetic discrimination under a separate heading.‟86  This point has merit 
since the Equality Act deals with various grounds of discrimination and it would have been able 
to accommodate discrimination on the basis of genetic characteristics.   
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 Unfortunately the government did not agree that there was a need to legislate against genetic 
discrimination due to insufficient evidence of such discrimination in the UK.
87
  The UK 
government was of the view that genetic discrimination could be addressed by non-legislative 
means such as moratoria and industry codes.
88
   It is interesting to note the response of the HGC 
to these arguments.  First, the HGC pointed out that there was evidence of genetic discrimination 
although such evidence has not been collected systematically.
89
  Secondly, the HGC pointed out 
that only legislation may be able to provide individuals with the reassurance required in the 
insurance context.
90
 
 The Equality Act
91
 was passed in April 2010.  It has consolidated various pieces of anti-
discrimination legislation, including the Disability Discrimination Act,
92
 into a single Act.  It 
prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of age, disability, gender reassignment, 
marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual 
orientation.
93
  These are referred to in the Act as „protected characteristics‟.  The Act does not 
refer to genetic discrimination either under the disability provisions or on its own.  It is not yet 
clear how the Equality Act is going to be used to prevent genetic discrimination in the 
employment setting.  A job applicant may be able to resist disclosure of genetic information 
since section 60 limits the questions that may be asked regarding health status in the pre-
employment situation.  An employee may only be asked health-related questions which will 
assist the employer in determining whether „reasonable adjustments‟ need to be made to 
accommodate the employee in the work environment or to assist the employee in performing his 
or her job.  It is possible that job applicants and employees can rely on such provisions to keep 
their genetic information confidential. 
The Information Commissioner issued the Employment Practices Data Protection Code
94
 
under s 51 of the Data Protection Act 1998.  The aim of the Code is to assist employers in 
complying with the Data Protection Act and to promote good practice by employers.  The Code 
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does not impose new legal obligations.  It applies to job applicants, employees, agency staff, 
casual staff, and contract staff.  The Code covers inter alia the use of genetic testing in 
employment.  Employers are advised not to request workers to undergo genetic testing or to 
disclose results of previous genetic tests. Good Practice Recommendations relating to genetic 
information are set out in Part 4 of the Code, which provides as follows:   
(i) „Do not use genetic testing in an effort to obtain information that is predictive of a worker‟s 
future general health.  
(ii) Do not insist that a worker discloses the results of a previous genetic test. 
(iii) Only use genetic testing to obtain information where it is clear that a worker with a 
particular, detectable genetic condition is likely to pose a serious safety risk to others or 
where it is known that a specific working environment or practice might pose specific risks 
to workers with particular genetic variations. 
(iv) If a genetic test is used to obtain information for employment purposes ensure that it is 
valid and is subject to assured levels of accuracy and reliability.‟95 
It is important to bear in mind that the Code applies to the processing of data in terms of the 
Data Protection Act, 1998.  „Processing‟ includes the initial obtaining of personal information, 
the retention and use of it, access and disclosure, and final disposal.
96
  Employers generally may 
be able to access information in two ways: they may seek access to the results of previous 
genetic tests or they may require employees to undergo genetic testing as a condition of 
employment.  The Code would be applicable in the second scenario. It provides guidance to 
employers on how to „process‟ genetic information without breaching the provisions of the Data 
Protection Act.  The aims of the Code are laudable but it does nothing more than reiterate the 
intentions of the Data Protection Act.  The recommendations relating to the processing of genetic 
information merely ensure compliance with the requirements of the Data Protection Act insofar 
as it relates to the processing of sensitive information.  There is clearly a need for an alternative 
option to effectively deal with situations where employers may try other avenues to access 
genetic information of employees.  Unfortunately, in 2009 the House of Lords‟ Science and 
Technology Committee indicated that it did not consider it necessary to legislate against genetic 
discrimination in employment due to insufficient evidence of genetic discrimination.
97
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(iii) Genetic research  
There are various statutes, conventions, and directives which govern and regulate medical 
research in the UK.   These include the Data Protection Act 1998,
98
 National Health Service Act 
2006,
99
 Human Tissue Act 2004,
100
 Mental Capacity Act 2005,
101
 Health Service (Control of 
Patient Information) Regulations 2002,
102
 Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) 
Regulations 2004,
103
 European Union Clinical Trials Directive,
104
 Council of Europe Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,
105
 
European Convention on Human Rights,
106
 and Research Governance Framework for Health and 
Social Care 2005.
107
  Research governance is recognised as one of the core standards of health 
care in the UK.
108
   
 All research in the National Health Service (NHS) which involves human participants must 
be reviewed and approved by an ethics committee.  Various bodies are involved in ethics review. 
The nature of the research determines which body will conduct the review.  There are NHS 
Research Ethics Committees, a Social Care Research Ethics Committee, independent ethics 
committees which review phase I clinical trials of medicines that are conducted outside of the 
NHS, a Gene Therapy Advisory Committee which reviews research on gene and stem cell 
therapies, the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee which reviews studies involving 
their personnel, and University ethics committees.
109
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The EU Clinical Trials Directive
110
 aims to harmonise the rules governing clinical trials with 
human participants involving medicinal products.  Member States were required to adopt the 
necessary regulations and administrative provisions for purposes of compliance with the 
Directive before 1 May 2003 and to implement these before 1 May 2004.
111
  In the UK the 
directive was accordingly transposed into law by the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) 
Regulations 2004.
112
  The directive obliges Member States to establish and operate research 
ethics committees.  It provides further that no clinical research involving investigational 
medicinal products may commence without a favourable opinion from a research ethics 
committee.
113
  The incorporation of this requirement in the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical 
Trials) Regulations 2004 makes it legally binding.   
Research Ethics Committees no longer operate under separate policies in the four countries 
which make up the UK.  A harmonised edition of the policy on Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees has been issued by the Department of Health and came into effect 
on 1 September 2011.
114
  The position throughout the UK has been harmonised via this policy. 
The Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care
115
 contains general principles 
of good practice aimed at improving the quality of research in the UK.  It applies to all research 
that falls within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State for Health.  It sets out the 
responsibilities of the various roleplayers in research.   
 There are concerns that the regulatory and governance framework is too complex and 
cumbersome which has the effect of hampering rather than promoting research in the UK.
116
  As 
a result, in March 2010 the Department of Health (DOH) decided to review the regulation and 
governance of medical research in the UK. This was prompted by an earlier publication by the 
Academy of Medical Sciences (AMS) which drew attention to the need for such a review.
117
 The 
government commissioned the Academy of Medical Sciences to conduct such an independent 
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review with a focus on research involving human participants, their tissue, and data.  The aims of 
the review were to: 
„1. Review the regulatory and governance environment for medical research in the United 
Kingdom, with a particular focus on clinical trials. 
2. Identify key problems and their causes, including unnecessary process steps, delays, barriers, 
costs, complexity, reporting requirements and data collection. 
3. Make recommendations with respect to the regulatory and governance framework that will: 
increase the speed of decision-making; reduce complexity; and eliminate unnecessary 
bureaucracy and costs.‟118 
 The AMS released its report in January 2011.
119
 The report contains a number of 
recommendations aimed at streamlining the current system so as to enhance efficiency, reduce 
complexity, and eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy.  The recommendations include the urgent 
establishment of a new independent Health Research Agency as a single regulator of health 
research. It is envisaged that the Health Research Agency would work with all countries in the 
UK to develop an integrated system for the whole of the UK.
120
  The report also notes that a few 
of the submissions received highlighted the importance of specialist expertise on research ethics 
committees.  Reference was made to the existing specialist research ethics committees and the 
suggestion was put forward that this system should be extended to other areas which would 
benefit from specialist expertise.  It is encouraging to note that specific mention is made of 
genomics as an area in which developments need to be monitored so as to decide if and when a 
specialist research ethics committee may need to be established to review genomic research 
proposals.
121
  This is a practical and reasonable approach. 
 
 
(c) Privacy 
As mentioned above,
122
 there is no formal constitutional right to privacy in the UK.  There is no 
separate action for invasion of privacy either.
123
 Claims based on invasions of privacy have been 
dealt with under the umbrella of breach of confidence which requires the existence of a prior 
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agreement or relationship of confidence between the parties to an action.  Invasions of privacy, 
however, do not necessarily arise out of confidential relationships or agreements. This makes it 
impossible to use the breach of confidence action in cases based on invasions of privacy where 
no prior relationship of confidence can be established.  In Campbell v MGN Limited
124
 Lord 
Nicholls observed that the requirement of a confidential relationship had been found to be 
irrelevant by the UK courts in the case of Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 
2)
125
 and that this position had been accepted by the European Court of Human Rights in the case 
of Earl Spencer v United Kingdom.
126
  According to Lord Nicholls, the newly stated principle 
which no longer includes a requirement of a prior confidential relationship is firmly established 
in the UK.
127
 
Phillipson is not convinced that the new position as described by Lord Nicholls is being 
correctly implemented by the courts.
128
  He uses the case of A v B plc
129
  to illustrate this and 
concludes that „…while the court in A v B plc appeared to sweep away the requirement of an 
obligation of confidentiality based on a pre-existing relationship, or agreement of confidentiality, 
the reasoning employed to resolve the actual case in front of it displayed a continuing attachment 
to just such notions.‟130  In analysing similar decisions he observes that „[w]hile the decisions 
...open up the potential for the transformation of confidence by the values of privacy, in many 
cases the actual decisions made are…rooted firmly not  in such values, but in very traditional 
common law principles.‟131  As a possible solution Phillipson notes that if an obligation of 
confidentiality could be imposed on the basis of the private nature of information and not on the 
nature of the relationship, there would be room for claims of invasion of privacy within the 
action for breach of confidence.
132
   
Unfortunately the courts still appear to be forcing actions for invasion of privacy into the 
mould of the breach of confidence action.  As noted by Lord Phillips in the Douglas appeal case, 
„[t]he Government has made it clear that it does not intend to introduce legislation in relation to 
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this area of the law, but anticipates that the judges will develop the law appropriately, having 
regard to the requirements of the convention…The courts have not accepted this role with whole-
hearted enthusiasm.'
133
  Phillipson similarly notes a „deep ambivalence towards the reception of 
privacy into English law.‟134 It can only be concluded that the common law action for breach of 
confidence is not suited to dealing with privacy and that attempts to do so thus far have been 
unsatisfactory.  The position regarding the protection of the right to privacy is complicated 
further in the light of the Human Rights Act
135
 as discussed below.
136
  One overarching positive 
aspect of the UK position as noted by Lord Nicholls in the case of Campbell v MGN Limited
137
 is 
that the „protection of various aspects of privacy is a fast developing area of the law…‟  This 
bodes well for the protection of genetic privacy and for privacy in general. 
The law in the UK respects medical confidentiality.  The importance of medical privacy 
within the European Union was clearly stated in the case of Z v Finland.
138
  The court stated that 
„Respecting the confidentiality of health data is a vital principle in the legal systems of all the 
Contracting Parties to the Convention.  It is crucial not only to respect the sense of privacy of a 
patient but also to preserve his or her confidence in the medical profession and in the health 
services in general.‟139  In Campbell Lord Nicholls acknowledged the privacy interest attached to 
medical data including data which is not strictly in the form of medical records.
140
  In this 
particular case the medical data related to drug addiction for which Naomi Campbell, an 
internationally known fashion model, was receiving therapy. In an earlier judgment the Court of 
Appeal did not consider the information to be in the category of medical records
141
  but the 
House of Lords found otherwise.  The judgment of the House of Lords is progressive and 
indicates a willingness to depart from rigid applications of the law in the interest of advancing 
medical privacy.  Phillipson highlights the degree of importance to be attached to medical data 
by pointing out that it is considered to be sensitive personal data for the purposes of data 
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protection in the UK.
142
  That being the case, Phillipson rightly criticises the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeal
143
 and concludes that „For the Court thus to find that information that would be 
treated as of an especially private nature under a European Directive, and the Act of Parliament 
implementing it, is too trivial to merit protection at common law, seems incongruous, to say the 
very least.‟144   
The rapidly advancing field of privacy law in the UK, coupled with the progressive attitude 
of the House of Lords towards the protection of medical data, is very encouraging.  Claims for 
the protection of genetic data and genetic information privacy are likely to be thoroughly 
investigated by the courts if and when they are called upon to deal with the issue.  The system is 
not so rigid as to automatically preclude the recognition of genetic privacy in the absence of 
specific statutory intervention.  The various instruments which play a role in privacy protection 
are discussed below.  
(1) European Convention on Human Rights
145
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which was ratified by the UK in 1951, 
recognises privacy as a fundamental human right. Article 8 of the ECHR provides as follows: 
„1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.‟  
In view of the wording of Article 8(2), there has been much debate about whether the convention 
requires member states to apply Article 8 horizontally.  Lord Phillips, in the Douglas appeal 
case, pointed out that the matter had been settled by the European Court of Human Rights in the 
case of Von Hannover v Germany.
146
  In Von Hannover the European Court of Human Rights 
had stated that:   
„… although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such 
interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations 
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inherent in an effective respect for private or family life.  These obligations may involve the 
adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations 
of individuals between themselves…‟147 
Based on the above statement, the court in the Douglas appeal case was convinced that States 
are obliged to protect the right to private life against invasion by individuals as well.
148
 
 (2) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
149
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), which was signed and proclaimed in December 2000, 
acquired legal status via the Lisbon Treaty
150
 which entered into force in December 2009.  
Article 7 of the CFR provides that „Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and 
family life, home and communications.‟ Article 8 provides for the protection of personal data.  It 
states as follows: 
 „1.   Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
 2.   Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of 
the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the 
right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to 
have it rectified. 
 3.  Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.‟ 
Article 21 of the CFR prohibits inter alia discrimination based on genetic features.  The CFR 
is more comprehensive than the ECHR.  In addition to civil and political rights covered by the 
ECHR, the CFR also covers economic, social, cultural, and third generation rights.  It also deals 
with modern-day issues such as data protection.  The wider reaching and more encompassing 
nature of the CFR may be attributed to the fact that the CFR was drafted relatively recently as 
compared to the ECHR which was drafted in 1950.  The CFR is accordingly a more current 
document.  Two points must be noted insofar as the application of the CFR to the UK is 
concerned.  First, the Charter only applies to Member States when Member States act within the 
scope of EU law.
151
  Secondly, the status of the CFR in the UK is unclear due to an „opt-out‟ 
Protocol
152
 included in the Lisbon Treaty. The Protocol provides as follows: 
 „Article 1 
1.  The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Union, or any 
court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or 
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administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United Kingdom are 
inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms. 
2.  In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates 
justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or 
the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law. 
 
Article 2 
To the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, it shall only 
apply to Poland or the United Kingdom to the extent that the rights or principles that it contains 
are recognised in the law or practices of Poland or of the United Kingdom.‟ 
 
The Protocol has been and continues to be the subject of much debate.
153
  The controversy 
relates to the effect of the Protocol on the application of the CFR to the UK.  The question is 
whether the Protocol is an opt-out provision or merely a clarification of the Lisbon Treaty insofar 
as the application of the CFR is concerned.
154
  This question has yet to be answered.  It is likely 
that such answer will only come from the courts in litigation involving the relevant provisions. 
 (3) The European Union Data Protection Directive
155
  
The aim of the Directive is to protect the right to privacy in the processing of personal data 
whilst promoting the free flow of information within the European Union (EU).
156
  The Directive 
is binding on member States.
157
  Implementation of the Directive by member States is intended 
to harmonise their relevant laws, thereby facilitating the cross-border flow of data within the EU. 
The Directive also prohibits the transfer of data to countries outside the EU which do not provide 
an adequate level of protection.
158
  Provision is made for a prohibition on processing of sensitive 
data which includes personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or 
sex life.
159
  This is not, however, an unqualified prohibition.  The Directive authorises Member 
States to derogate from the prohibition when it is in the public interest to do so in areas such as 
public health, social protection, scientific research, and government statistics. In doing so, 
member States are obliged to provide adequate safeguards for the protection of the fundamental 
rights and the privacy of individuals.
160
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The Directive has recently come under scrutiny in the UK.  The adequacy of the Directive in 
the light of technological and other advancements has been questioned.  It has been observed by 
the Information Commissioner‟s Office that: „[t]here is a growing feeling that the EU Directive 
on data protection is becoming increasingly outdated and is more bureaucratic and burdensome 
than it needs to be.‟161  Based on this observation the Information Commissioner commissioned a 
review of EU data protection law in 2008.  A report was issued in 2009 indicating inter alia the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Directive.
162
  The report concludes that the Directive serves as a 
good foundation for data protection in the EU but that it needs to be updated.  The overall 
conclusion is stated as follows: 
„Overall, we found that as we move toward a globally networked society, the Directive as it 
stands will not suffice in the long term. While the widely applauded principles of the Directive 
will remain as a useful front-end, they will need to be supported by a harms-based back-end in 
order to cope with the growing challenge of globalisation and international data flows. However, 
it was also widely recognised that more value can still be extracted from current arrangements. A 
lot can be achieved by better implementation of the current rules, for instance by establishing 
consensus over the interpretation of several key concepts and a possible shift in emphasis in the 
interpretation of others. Abandoning the Directive as it currently stands is widely (although not 
unanimously) seen as the worst option, as it has served, and continues to serve, as a stimulus to 
taking data protection seriously.‟163 
The conclusion made in the report is understandable in view of the fact that the Directive 
came into force as long ago as 1995.  In the fast-paced science and technology arena this is a 
long period of time and it explains why the Directive may now be considered to be outdated.  
The European Commission also launched a review of the current data protection legal 
framework in May 2009.  This review was in keeping with the Commission‟s main policy 
objectives which have been stated as follows:   
„1. Modernise the EU legal system for the protection of personal data, in particular to meet the 
challenges resulting from globalisation and the use of new technologies. 
2. Strengthen individuals' rights, and at the same time reduce administrative formalities to 
ensure a free flow of personal data within the EU and beyond. 
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3. Improve the clarity and coherence of the EU rules for personal data protection and achieve a 
consistent and effective implementation and application of the fundamental right to the 
protection of personal data in all areas of the Union‟s activities.‟164 
The review entailed inter alia a comparative study on different approaches to new privacy 
challenges in the light of technological developments.
165
  The aim of the review was to consider 
whether the legal framework of the Directive is still adequate and if not, whether amendments 
should be considered.  This would serve as a basis for discussions with other EU institutions as 
well as the development of legislative and non-legislative data protection measures.
166
  The 
review concluded that the core principles of the Directive are still relevant and necessary.  A few 
areas were identified as being in need of development or reform.  For the purposes of the 
protection of genetic information, it is important to note the finding that the provision on 
sensitive data needs to be reconsidered „in the light of technological and other societal 
developments.‟167  It is indicated that the category of sensitive data may have to be expanded to 
include genetic data. If that happens, the necessary conditions for the processing of genetic data, 
as a subcategory of sensitive data, will have to be developed.
168
  Another issue which the 
Commission intends to revisit is that of making sanctions and remedies more effective.
169
  This 
includes considering imposing criminal sanctions in cases of serious data protection violations. 
 (4) Human Rights Act
170
  
The Human Rights Act came into effect on 2 October 2000. It incorporated most of the rights of 
the ECHR into domestic law. A qualified right to privacy is included in the Act as follows.  
„1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
 2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.‟171 
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Section 6 provides that the Act applies only to public authorities performing public acts.  
In view of this provision it is not clear whether the Act can be applied horizontally or not.  
This aspect of the Act has come under scrutiny by the courts
172
 and by academics.
173
  
Phillipson observes that the courts appear to have settled on an indirect horizontal effect 
according to which courts must apply the ECHR in private law cases involving existing 
causes of action.
174
 
 (5) Data Protection Act
175
 
The main piece of legislation dealing with the protection of personal information in the United 
Kingdom is the Data Protection Act, which was passed in July 1998 and came into force on 1 
March 2000. This Act implements the European Union Data Protection Directive.
176
  It creates 
eight data protection principles which aim to ensure that personal data is processed fairly, 
lawfully and with due respect for the rights of data subjects.
 177
 
The Act also created the office of the Information Commissioner
178
 who is responsible inter 
alia for promoting good practice in the handling of personal data and for enforcing compliance 
with the Act.  Section 2(e) of the Data Protection Act provides for medical information to be 
treated as sensitive personal data. Schedule 3 provides special conditions for the processing of 
sensitive personal data.  According to the information commissioner these are over and above 
those conditions specified in schedule 2.
179
  Further Schedule 3 conditions are set out in The 
Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order.
180
  These conditions enhance the 
protection that is afforded by the Act to sensitive personal data.  It may be concluded that if 
genetic information is to be classified as medical data in the UK, it will be treated as sensitive 
personal data and will benefit from the relevant provisions of the Data Protection Act.  In 
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practice the Data Protection Act has proven to be a challenging piece of legislation. The courts 
have criticised the Act as being „inelegant and cumbersome.‟181  It has also been referred to as „a 
notoriously unwieldy and confusing piece of legislation.‟182  In addition to these criticisms the 
Act may be criticised for containing a large number of exemptions which serve only to dilute the 
protection expected from such an Act.
183
 
 
 
(d) Privilege 
In English law communications are not automatically protected by virtue of their 
confidentiality.
184
  The consistent refusal to recognise a medical professional privilege on the 
basis of confidentiality is proof of this.  This position can be traced back to the Duchess of 
Kingston’s case in 1776185 and continues to this day.  It is thus apparent that any argument for 
the protection of genetic information from disclosure will meet the same fate if it is based on 
confidentiality.  McHale notes that at first glance there may appear to be an inconsistency in the 
approach of the courts to medical information and other types of confidential information.
186
  
She observes, however, that those confidential communications which have received protection 
from disclosure have received it on the basis of public policy and not because of any inherent 
confidentiality.
187
 This observation leads her to conclude that there is no inconsistency in the 
approach of the courts towards medical information and other confidential information.
188
   
 In the case of D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
189
  the court 
adopted the stance that public interest did not require that confidentiality per se had to be 
protected.  The court did accept that the protection of confidential information could be in the 
public interest.  This would obviously depend on the circumstances of each case.  Although there 
is no scope for the introduction of a medical privilege based on confidentiality, such information 
can be protected from disclosure if the courts find that it is in the public interest to do so.   It is 
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equally possible that courts may find the protection of genetic information from disclosure to be 
in the public interest.   
 English courts have attempted to find a compromise between unqualified privilege and 
compulsory disclosure of confidential communications.  This has resulted in a discretionary 
approach which „accords to the judge a wide discretion to permit a witness, whether a party to 
the proceedings or not, to refuse to disclose information where disclosure would be a breach of 
some ethical or social value, and non-disclosure would be unlikely to result in serious injustice in 
the particular case in which it is claimed.‟190 As observed by Pereis „[t]he traditional view 
espoused by the courts in England has favoured an extensive judicial discretion which enables a 
case-by-case evaluation of the propriety of disclosure, in competition with the ethical or social 
value which is transgressed by reception of the evidence.‟191  In 1967 the Law Reform 
Committee of England considered the issue and declined to introduce a statutory medical 
privilege.
192
  The discretionary approached was favoured for its ability to accommodate changing 
needs and priorities of the law. The committee took the view that there was no need for their 
intervention as the courts were handling the situation well enough.   
 The discretionary approach clearly has advantages and disadvantages.  The main advantage 
is that it is flexible in allowing the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether certain 
communications should be privileged or not.  It allows the courts to consider and weigh up the 
various interests that may be at stake. This is a useful approach when dealing with new 
technologies and scientific advances which have new public interest ramifications.  The 
flexibility of this approach is also a disadvantage as it does not create certainty.  It does not 
provide any guarantee as to the protection of confidential communications since there is no 
certainty as to how the discretion will be exercised.  In an area as new as human genetics, lack of 
certainty can prove detrimental to the uptake of clinical genetic testing by patients as well as to 
the voluntary participation in genetic research.  The benefits which were anticipated by the 
Human Genome Project and large-scale population studies such as the UK Biobank may be 
jeopardised if individuals do not have some assurance that they will not be compelled to disclose 
their genetic information in court.  A statutory judicial discretion may therefore prove more 
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suitable than the common-law judicial discretion since it creates more certainty and could 
provide the reassurance that is required in the area of genetic privacy protection.  Since genetic 
privacy is a relatively new concept, a statutory judicial discretion may be accompanied by 
pertinent guiding principles which can assist judicial officers in exercising the discretion.  This 
will promote uniformity and certainty  
 Since confidentiality has not been accepted as a basis for the introduction of a medical 
privilege, McHale investigates the introduction of a public policy exclusionary rule to protect the 
confidentiality of medical information.
193
  She refers to a statement by Lord Hailsham in D v 
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
194
 to the effect that the categories of 
public interest are constantly changing due to changing social conditions.  This statement holds 
promise for the protection of genetic privacy.  It conveys a positive attitude insofar as developing 
sciences and technologies are concerned.  In conclusion McHale states as follows:  
„It is perhaps questionable whether the most satisfactory solution to the problem is to let the 
courts evolve the public-policy rule over time and hope that perhaps one day an enlightened 
judiciary may extend it to protect medical confidentiality.  Even if the other judges were willing 
to follow Mann LJ‟s lead, it is doubtful if the public policy exclusionary rule is the best method 
of excluding medical information.  It lacks the precise definition that a specific statutory defined 
privilege may provide.  Any privilege should, I suggest, contain a considered response to the 
problem posed by the variable levels of confidentiality which exist in medical practice.‟195  
The concerns raised here by McHale have already been raised above in respect of judicial 
discretion. There is, however, no doubt that there is room for the protection of confidential 
genetic information from disclosure but the attitude of the courts towards such a claim has yet to 
be tested.  There are four obvious options: common-law judicial discretion, statutory judicial 
discretion, public policy exclusionary rule, and a statutory genetic information privilege.  The 
first three options have obvious flaws which may only be exacerbated by courts in the course of 
dealing with a new and rapidly advancing science.  In order to promote certainty it is advisable to 
introduce a statutory genetic information privilege.  This privilege may be a qualified one similar 
to the statutory journalistic privilege contained in section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act.
196
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6.2.2 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
In the United States of America (USA) most of the relevant legislation has been developed 
within an anti-discrimination paradigm.  Individual States have adopted divergent approaches to 
the protection of genetic information with emphasis on preventing improper use of information.   
At federal level the relevant statutes are the Health Information Portability and Accountability 
Act 1996 (HIPAA);
197
 the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 (ADA);
198
 and the Genetic 
Information Non-Discrimination Act 2008 (GINA).
199
  The positions in the various states cannot 
be dealt with comprehensively within the parameters of this chapter.  Due to this constraint as 
well as the fact that federal legislation provides a baseline level of protection, the federal position 
will receive attention in the discussion that follows. 
   GINA was signed into law on 21 May 2008. Its purpose is to „establish a national and 
uniform basic standard that is necessary to fully protect the public from discrimination and allay 
their concerns about the potential for discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to take 
advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new therapies.‟200  In pursuance of this 
objective it prohibits genetic discrimination in health insurance and employment.  It provides that 
the sections of the law relating to health coverage (Title I) would take effect twelve months after 
enactment
201
 and the sections relating to employment (Title II) would take effect eighteen 
months after enactment.
202
  GINA required regulations pertaining to both titles to be completed 
by May 2009. GINA defines genetic information as information about:  
„an individual‟s genetic tests (including genetic tests done as part of a research study);  
genetic tests of the individual‟s family members (defined as dependents and up to and including 
4th degree relatives);  
genetic tests of any fetus of an individual or family member who is a pregnant woman, and 
genetic tests of any embryo legally held by an individual or family member utilizing assisted 
reproductive technology;  
 the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members (family history);  
any request for, or receipt of, genetic services or participation in clinical research that includes 
genetic services (genetic testing, counseling, or education) by an individual or family member.‟203  
 GINA defines a genetic test as an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or 
metabolites that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.
204
  GINA does not apply 
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to life insurance, disability insurance and long-term care insurance. In the employment sphere 
GINA does not apply to employers with fewer than 15 employees. As federal legislation, it 
provides the minimum level of protection against genetic discrimination.  States may adopt more 
stringent laws.
205
  
 
 
(a) Genetic Databases 
(i) Forensic DNA Databases 
The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) was developed by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in 1990.  CODIS is a computer software program that operates databases of 
DNA profiles from convicted offenders, arrestees, detainees, unsolved crime scene evidence, and 
missing persons.  It is implemented as a three-tiered database consisting of DNA profiles at 
local, state and national levels. CODIS software thus enables local, state, and national law 
enforcement crime laboratories to share and compare DNA profiles electronically.  The Local 
DNA Index System (LDIS) which is installed at crime laboratories is operated at local level by 
police departments or sheriffs‟ offices.  DNA profiles originating at the local level can be 
transmitted to the state and national levels.  Each State has a designated laboratory that operates 
the State DNA Index System (SDIS). SDIS allows local laboratories within a particular State to 
compare DNA profiles.  The National DNA Index System (NDIS) is the highest level of the 
CODIS hierarchy and enables state laboratories to compare DNA profiles. The NDIS is 
maintained by the FBI.  
The DNA Identification Act of 1994
206
 authorised the director of the FBI to establish an 
index such as the NDIS and specified the following types of data for inclusion in such index: 
„(1)  DNA identification records of - 
 (A) persons convicted of crimes;  
 (B)   persons who have been charged in an indictment or information with a crime; and  
 (C)  other persons whose DNA samples are collected under applicable legal authorities, 
provided that DNA samples that are voluntarily submitted solely for elimination purposes 
shall not be included in the National DNA Index System; 
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 (2)  analyses of DNA samples recovered from crime scenes;  
 (3)  analyses of DNA samples recovered from unidentified human remains; and 
 (4)  analyses of DNA samples voluntarily contributed from relatives of missing persons.‟207  
The Act also contains privacy protection standards.
208
  It provides that „the results of DNA 
tests performed for a Federal law enforcement agency for law enforcement purposes may be 
disclosed only- 
„(A)  to criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identification purposes; 
 (B)  in judicial proceedings, if otherwise admissible pursuant to applicable statutes or rules; and 
 (C)  for criminal defense purposes, to a defendant, who shall have access to samples and 
analyses performed in connection with the case in which such defendant is charged.‟209  
The exception to the above is that de-identified test results may be disclosed for a population 
statistics database, for identification research and protocol development purposes, or for quality 
control purposes.
210
  The Act provides that a fine may be imposed upon any employee or official 
who intentionally discloses individually identifiable DNA information, which has been indexed 
in a database, to any other person or agency which is not authorised to receive such 
information.
211
  In a similar vein it provides that a fine or a period of imprisonment may be 
imposed upon the recipient of the information.‟212 
The DNA Identification Act
213
 does not, however, provide for the collection of DNA samples 
from individuals.  This gap was filled through the promulgation of the DNA Analysis Backlog 
Elimination Act 2000
214
 which authorises the collection of DNA samples from persons convicted 
of certain federal offences.
215
  All States subsequently passed legislation compelling all persons 
convicted of certain offences to provide DNA samples for inclusion in CODIS.  The DNA 
Fingerprint Act  2005
216
 amended the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act
217
 to authorise the 
collection of DNA samples from arrestees and detainees for inclusion in CODIS.     It authorised 
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the Attorney General or his delegate to collect DNA samples from arrestees and detainees.
218
 
The DNA Fingerprint Act
219
 also amended the DNA Identification Act
220
 to provide for the 
prompt expungement from CODIS of the DNA profiles of persons who are acquitted or against 
whom charges are dismissed.  This applies at national and state
221
 levels. Whether this approach 
is legally sound or not can only be determined in the context of a constitutional challenge to the 
Act.  The previous legislative approach of taking DNA samples from convicted persons passed 
constitutional muster in the case of Landry v Attorney General.
222
  The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court upheld a statute
223
 requiring those convicted of thirty three specified offences
224
 or an 
attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the specified offences, to submit to the taking of DNA 
samples and the storage of their profiles in a database.   
The DNA Fingerprint Act
225
 extended the reach of law enforcement authorities far beyond 
that permitted by any previous legislation.  To the extent that it permitted the taking of DNA 
samples from arrestees, it brought the American position in line with the unsatisfactory approach 
that existed in the United Kingdom prior to the Marper
226
 judgment. The only positive aspect of 
the American approach is that it allows for the expungement of profiles upon acquittal or upon 
the dismissal of charges.  
All States have laws compelling all convicted felons to provide DNA samples for inclusion 
in the national database.  In March 2011 Idaho became the last remaining state to amend its laws 
to make such a provision.  Previously Idaho required only those felons who were convicted of 
violent or sexual crimes to submit DNA samples for inclusion in its database.  The amendments 
to Idaho‟s legislation will come into effect on or after 1 July 2013.  Thirty eight States also 
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collect DNA samples from persons convicted of misdemeanors.
227
  Twenty five States collect 
DNA samples from persons arrested for certain offences such as murder, sex crimes, and 
burglary.
228
  
The laws governing the collection of DNA samples in the different States vary considerably 
in many respects including the criteria for inclusion in a database, retention periods for samples 
and profiles, and provisions on third party access to databases.  The adoption of the same 
approach by all fifty States towards the collection of DNA from convicted felons, goes a long 
way towards creating cohesion in the overall system but there are further divisive elements that 
must be borne in mind.  For example, at federal level felonies are divided into five classes which 
carry penalties ranging from imprisonment of more than one year to the death penalty
229
 whilst 
the position at state level varies with each state having its own statutory definition of a felony. 
Some definitions are aligned to the federal definition but others differ considerably.  An extreme 
example is that of the State of Louisiana which defines a felony as a crime which is punishable 
by death or imprisonment with hard labour.
230
  Issues such as these, although beyond the scope 
of this research, must be given due consideration in the future in order to create a cohesive DNA 
collection system in the USA.  
 
(ii) Genetic Research Databases 
The USA has a large number of human genetic research databases
231
 and biorepositories.
232
  The 
world‟s largest tissue and blood sample collection is based in the USA at the National Pathology 
Repository of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.
233
  It has been estimated that the 
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repository holds more than 90 million specimens dating back to 1864.
234
  Although the 
repository was officially closed on 15 September 2011, the specimens are being accommodated 
until the Institute of Medicine makes its recommendations on their future use.
235
  The 
recommendations are due in June 2012 and are expected to cover issues such as the potential use 
of specimens, which were originally collected for clinical use, in research.
236
  
Marshfield Clinic‟s Personalised Medicine Research Project which, like the UK Biobank, is 
used inter alia to study gene-environment interaction, is the largest population-based genetic 
research project in the USA.  It commenced in August 2002 and is expected to run for a period of 
twenty years.  The Personalised Medicine Research Database contains genetic, medical, 
environmental, background, and family information from twenty thousand participants.  The 
genetic information is derived from analysis of blood samples, medical information is derived 
from medical records; and environmental, background, and family information, is obtained 
through a questionnaire.  The purpose of the database is to provide a resource for studying 
„which genes cause disease, which genes predict reactions to drugs, and how environment and 
genes work together to cause disease.‟237  The ultimate aim is for medical practitioners to be able 
to use a patient‟s genetic profile to decide what treatment would work best for the particular 
individual.  This concept of personalised medicine holds much promise for improved healthcare 
as well as a reduction in healthcare costs.  It will save time in obtaining diagnoses and save costs 
by ensuring that the most effective medication is prescribed for the individual.   
Despite the large number of biobanks and research databases in the USA there is no federal 
legislation specifically governing research databases or biobank activity.  There are, however, 
three federal rules which govern research involving human participants and which may also be 
used to protect research data.  The Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information (HIPAA Privacy Rule),
238
 issued under the Administrative Simplification subtitle of 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
239
   provides national standards 
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for the protection of privacy of health information, including genetic information.  It regulates 
inter alia the use and disclosure of protected health information by covered entities for 
research.
240
  The rule is subject to two crucial limitations which may result in it being 
inapplicable to biobanks and genetic research databases.
241
 First, covered entities are limited to 
health care providers that conduct certain transactions in electronic form; healthcare 
clearinghouses; and health plans.
242
  Research databases and biobanks are not covered entities 
under the Privacy Rule.  This means that disclosure of information contained in the databases 
and biobanks does not have to comply with the standards of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  Secondly, 
the Privacy Rule only applies to identifiable data.  De-identified data contained in databases does 
not fall within the definition of protected health information under the Privacy Rule and is 
therefore not protected by it. 
The second relevant rule is the Department of Health and Human Services Regulations for 
Protection of Human Research Subjects (Common Rule)
243
 which requires researchers to obtain 
informed consent from research participants before collecting and storing their tissue for research 
purposes.  Only identifiable tissue specimens are subject to the Common Rule.  The main 
limitations of the Common Rule are that it only governs 18 federal departments and agencies
244
 
and it has not been adopted by all agencies that fund research. This implies that research that is 
not funded by any of the 18 departments or agencies does not have to comply with the Common 
Rule.   
As discussed in chapter two, the absence of a regulatory framework for research databases 
and biobanks is a challenge for genetic research which relies heavily on such resources.  The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule and the Common Rule leave regulatory gaps which must be filled due to a 
rapid proliferation of research databases, the ever-increasing demand for resources for genetic 
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research purposes; and the fact that the US is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD).  On 22 October 2009 the OECD Council adopted the 
Recommendation on Human Biobanks and Genetic Research Databases which „aims to provide 
guidance for the establishment, governance, management, operation, access, use and 
discontinuation of human biobanks and genetic research databases…‟245  Although the 
Recommendation is not a legally binding instrument „it represents an important political 
commitment on the part of the member countries.‟   
The Recommendation contains principles, best practices, and comprehensive guidelines, 
which also require filling of the gaps left by the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the Common Rule.  It 
provides that biobanks and research databases „should be established, governed, managed, 
operated, accessed, used and discontinued in accordance with applicable legal frameworks and 
ethical principles.‟246  As indicated above, the existing legal framework in the US is inadequate 
for these purposes.  The Recommendation also provides that operators and users of biobanks and 
databases should always „respect human rights and freedoms and secure the protection of 
participants‟ privacy and the confidentiality of data and information.247  Once again, due to gaps 
in the regulatory framework, these protections cannot be guaranteed in the USA.    
The guidelines take cognisance of the potential harm that may arise from genetic research.  
This is evident from the following statement: 
„Research pertaining to a large portion of a population, especially amongst those sharing common 
characteristics, may raise issues of potential discrimination and stigmatisation. For example, an 
association between a specific heritage and a particular disease may lead to discrimination from 
insurers or employers. The initiators and operators of the HBGRD [Human Biobanks and Genetic 
Research Databases] should take into consideration potential consequences not only for 
participants but also individuals, families and groups who may not have participated in the 
HBGRD. In addition, the HBGRD should make information publicly available about the 
possibility that research results generated from population-based human genetic data may have 
repercussions for individuals, participants, their family, groups to which they belong and the 
community as a whole. Examples of repercussions may include loss of dignity or community 
stigmatisation.‟248 
The guidelines should prove useful for the regulation of genetic research databases in any 
country.  It provides ample guidance on how to operate genetic research databases in a manner 
which protects human rights.  It also indicates where the gaps in protection lie.  This is a useful 
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instrument which, if implemented in the USA, can help to close the existing gaps in the 
protection of human genetic information.  
 
 
(b) Genetic Discrimination 
There are decided cases of genetic discrimination in the USA.
249
  Anti-discrimination legislation 
has been and continues to be used to prevent the misuse of genetic information at federal and 
state levels.  Even before the passage of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA)
250
 it was  observed that „[i]ronically, the most important law regulating the privacy and 
confidentiality of employee medical information is not a privacy law at all but an anti-
discrimination law.‟251  The laws at state level vary widely in terms of content and purpose. A 
review of such laws is therefore not particularly useful therefore only federal legislation will be 
considered.  
 
(i) Insurance  
The USA has federal laws prohibiting discrimination in health coverage based on genetic 
information.  Such laws are the HIPAA,
252
 GINA,
253
 and the HIPAA Administrative 
Simplification: Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (Privacy 
Rule).
254
  Since the provisions of these laws do not extend to life insurance, a comprehensive 
discussion of the relevant provisions would serve no useful purpose in the context of this 
research.  However, insofar as health coverage is concerned, two developments are interesting to 
note.  First, GINA
255
 requires that the definition of „health information‟ as contained in the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule
256
 be amended to clearly indicate that genetic information is health 
information under the Rule and to prohibit health plans from using or disclosing genetic 
information for underwriting purposes.  It must be borne in mind, however, that genetic 
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information will only be protected under the HIPAA Privacy Rule if it is individually identifiable 
and maintained by a covered entity or business associate of a HIPAA covered entity.
257
  The 
second point of interest is that GINA
258
 includes a research exception to allow health insurers or 
group health plans engaged in research to request (but not require) that an individual undergo a 
genetic test.  This aspect is discussed more fully below under the topic relating to research.
259
  
 
(ii) Employment 
It has been observed that „[u]nlike in most other countries, there is considerable anecdotal 
evidence of genetic discrimination by employers in the USA.‟260  Crosbie attributes this to the 
fact that the majority of Americans depend on their employers for health insurance.  The main 
legislative attempts by the USA to curb genetic discrimination by employers are accordingly 
discussed below. 
  (1)  The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
261
  
The ADA was promulgated in 1990.  It prohibits inter alia discrimination against disabled 
individuals in employment but applies only to employers who employ fifteen or more 
employees.
262
  It defines disability as „(a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (b) a record of such an 
impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment.‟263  Although the ADA264 does 
not contain specific provisions relating to genetic discrimination, it has been interpreted by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
265
 to include a prohibition of 
discrimination in cases where genetic information relating to illness causes an individual to be 
regarded as having a disability.
266
  This interpretation is based on part (c) of the abovementioned 
definition of „disability‟. 
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 The EEOC has acknowledged that the protection offered by the ADA against genetic 
discrimination is limited.
267
  The ADA prohibits pre-employment medical examinations and 
disability-related inquiries
268
 but it does not prohibit employers from requiring employees to 
disclose such information after commencing employment.  The application of the ADA to 
genetic disease will clearly prove challenging in a court of law for two reasons.  First, the 
definition of disability has to be found to include genetic disease.  It is important to note here that 
the stance of the EEOC has not been confirmed by courts in the USA.
269
  Secondly, the onus of 
proving discrimination is difficult to discharge due to its subjective nature.  Proving that an 
employee is being treated differently may not be difficult but the challenge lies in proving that 
such differential treatment is due to or because of a disability.  Such proof would require an 
examination of the employer‟s state of mind.  This is clearly an unsatisfactory situation which 
does not create certainty for disabled employees.  There is no guarantee that the ADA can be 
successfully used to protect employees who have or are predisposed to genetic disease. 
(2) The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 2008 (GINA)
270
  
GINA prohibits discrimination in employment based on genetic information.  The prohibition 
applies to employers, employment agencies, labour organizations, and joint labour-management 
committees, all of whom are referred to as „covered entities‟.271  The section relating to 
employment (Title II) came into effect on 21 November 2009.  GINA required the EEOC to 
issue regulations not later than one year after the date of enactment of Title II.  Such regulations 
were issued on 9 November 2010 and came into effect on 10 January 2011.  Unlike the ADA
272
 
which prohibits only pre-employment inquiries relating to disability, GINA applies to applicants 
as well as employees.  This means that the protections afforded by GINA are applicable in the 
pre-employment phase as well as during the period of employment. 
GINA protects the privacy of employees in two ways.  First, it prohibits the acquisition of 
employees‟ genetic information by employers and other covered entities except in certain limited 
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circumstances.
273
  It states that „it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
request, require, or purchase genetic information with respect to an employee or a family 
member of the employee.‟274  The acquisition of genetic information by employers will not 
amount to a contravention of GINA where - 
(a)   an employer acquires the information inadvertently; 
(b)   an employer acquires the information as part of  health or genetic services or a wellness 
programme with authorisation from the employee;  
(c)   an employer requests or requires family medical history from the employee to comply 
with requirements in terms of other laws;  
(d)   an employer acquires the information through the media;  
(e)   the information involved is to be used for genetic monitoring of the biological effects of 
toxic substances in the workplace; or  
(f)   an employer conducts DNA analysis for law enforcement purposes as a forensic 
laboratory or for purposes of human remains identification, for quality control or to detect 
sample contamination.
275
   
 Secondly, GINA provides for the protection of confidentiality of genetic information.
276
  It 
provides that genetic information about employees must be maintained on separate forms and in 
separate medical files and be treated as a confidential medical record of the employee.  
Employers are prohibited from disclosing genetic information of employees except - 
(a)  at the written request of the employee;  
(b)  to a researcher if the research is conducted in compliance with the regulations and 
protections provided for under part 46 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations;  
(c)  in response to a court order;  
(d)  to government officials who are investigating compliance with this law prohibiting genetic 
discrimination in employment;  
(e)  in connection with the employee‟s compliance with certain laws; or  
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(f)  to a Federal, State, or local public health agency with regard to certain prescribed health 
information.
277
 
 GINA also provides enforcement mechanisms and remedies for violations of Title II.
278
  
These are amplified in the Regulations.
279
  The preamble to the regulations notes that „in crafting 
GINA‟s enforcement and remedies section, Congress recognised the advisability of using the 
existing mechanisms in place for redress of other forms of employment discrimination.‟  The 
specific remedies provided for violations of Title II are compensatory and punitive damages, 
reasonable attorney‟s fees, and injunctive relief including reinstatement, hiring, back pay, and 
other equitable remedies.
280
 
It has been suggested that GINA be thought of as „a new layer in the scheme of overlapping 
protections provided by existing antidiscrimination laws.‟281  Even though the title of GINA 
suggests that it is primarily an anti-discrimination statute, it is an improvement on the ADA in a 
few crucial respects.  First, GINA is aimed directly at genetic information so there is no need for 
it to be liberally interpreted to include genetic information as is the case with the ADA.  
Secondly, it offers protection to applicants as well as employees insofar as the acquisition of 
employee‟s genetic information by employers is concerned, thereby closing a major gap in the 
protection afforded by the ADA. Finally, in attempting to prevent discrimination, GINA also 
protects privacy, thus taking it beyond the limits of a pure anti-discrimination statute.  GINA is 
complemented by a comprehensive set of regulations which implement Title II of the statute.  
The regulations assist in clarifying many aspects of GINA.   
Rothstein has suggested that GINA will be ineffective in protecting genetic 
privacy
282
because of its limited coverage and the fact that it does not differ markedly from 
existing laws, the shortcomings of which it was intended to address. Kim is of the opinion that 
the experience of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964
283
 „suggests that the traditional 
antidiscrimination model is unlikely to eliminate genetic discrimination in employment if 
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employers gain ready access to genetic information.‟284  This conclusion is reached after an 
examination of how the Civil Rights Act
285
 works in practice and the difficulty of proving 
intentional discrimination.
286
  Since GINA is a relatively new piece of legislation, its practical 
shortcomings are yet to be discovered.  It will be only through the actual implementation of the 
various provisions of the Act, that the gaps and flaws will be detected.  This should be closely 
monitored to remedy defects in the Act as well as to ensure that the Act keeps pace with the 
rapid developments in genetic science.  Despite these negative comments, it must be concluded 
that GINA, as the first and long-awaited federal statute to address genetic discrimination, holds 
promise for the protection of genetic privacy in the USA. 
 
(iii) Genetic Research   
Research involving human participants is governed by ethical guidelines and federal regulations.  
The ethical guidelines are the Belmont Report,
287
 Declaration of Helsinki,
288
 and the 
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects.
289
  The 
implications of these instruments for genetic research involving human participants has already 
been discussed comprehensively in chapter two.  The relevant federal regulations, which are 
discussed hereunder, are the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Regulations for 
Protection of Human Research Subjects,
290
  which are referred to as the „Common Rule‟; the 
Food and Drug Administration Regulations for the protection of Human Subjects,
291
 and the 
HIPAA Regulations
292
 which are referred to as the Privacy Rule.  The Office for Human 
Research Protections (OHRP) of the HHS is responsible for monitoring compliance with federal 
regulations for research which is conducted or supported by the HHS. 
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(1) Regulations for Protection of Human Research Subjects (Common Rule)
 293
  
The Common Rule applies to all research involving human subjects which is conducted, 
supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal department or any agency which has 
adopted the rule.
294
  It requires approval and ongoing review by an Institutional Review Board 
(IRB).
295
 A second crucial requirement
296
 is that of informed consent, which is founded on the 
principle of respect for persons as enshrined in the Belmont Report.  
The Common Rule sets out the basic elements of informed consent.
297
  The informed consent 
process entails three crucial aspects: 
(1)  disclosure of all information that is needed to make an informed decision;  
(2)  ensuring that the disclosed information is properly understood; and  
(3)  ensuring that the decision to participate is completely voluntary.   
Informed consent must be obtained prior to commencement of research in order to be legally 
valid.  The requirement of informed consent may be waived or altered by an IRB if it finds that: 
(a) the research involves public benefit or service programs and the research could not 
practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration;
298
  
(b) other general research involves no more than minimal risk to the participants;  the research 
could not practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration;  the rights and welfare 
of participants will not be adversely affected by the waiver or alteration; and the 
participants will be provided with additional information after participation.
299
 
An additional waiver of the general requirements for obtaining informed consent may apply to 
limited classes of research.
 300
  Such waiver currently applies to research in emergency settings 
provided that the research meets the requirements of the HHS Secretarial waiver.
301
 
 The Common Rule provides additional protection for certain vulnerable groups who 
participate in research.
302
  Such groups include pregnant women, human foetuses, neonates, 
prisoners, and children.  The additional protection offered by the Common Rule is clearly aimed 
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at preventing coercion as well as minimising the risks to vulnerable research participants.  The 
emphasis is on free and informed consent.  There is no scope within the rule for  the extension of 
additional protection to genetic research participants who do not fall into the established 
categories.   
 (2) Food and Drug Administration Regulations
303
 
The FDA regulations deal with informed consent
304
 and IRB review
305
 for research on products 
regulated by the FDA.  This includes articles subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, 
306
 food and colour additives, drugs for human use, medical devices for human use, 
biological products for human use, and electronic products.  The requirements for and elements 
of informed consent are almost identical to those in the Common Rule.  Compliance with the 
FDA regulations will be necessary in pharmacogenomic research. 
(3) Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (HIPAA Privacy 
Rule)
307
 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes a set of national standards for the protection of individually 
identifiable health information which is referred to as protected heath information (PHI).  It 
addresses the use and disclosure of PHI by healthcare providers, insurers, and others who 
transmit information electronically („covered entities‟).  It does not apply to research using 
human biological materials or to de-identified data and is only binding on covered entities. 
Although the rule does not apply to the regulation of human biological materials, it does apply to 
identifiable associated patient data.  The rule requires patient authorisation for the use and 
release of identifiable information.  This requirement is different and distinct from the informed 
consent requirement which exists in the Common Rule.  
 (4) Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
308
 
For the purpose of research protections, the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) has 
noted that „GINA‟s prohibitions apply to „genetic information‟ which is defined as including 
receipt of genetic services (genetic tests, genetic counseling, or genetic education) by an 
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individual or family member participating in clinical research.‟309  The OHRP has issued 
guidance on the implications of GINA for researchers and IRB‟s that are involved with human 
participant research which entails genetic testing or the collection of genetic information.  The 
emphasis of the guidance is on criteria for IRB approval of genetic research and the requirements 
for obtaining informed consent.  Researchers and IRBs are advised to consider - 
(i) „the provisions of GINA when assessing whether genetic research satisfies the criteria 
required for IRB approval of research, particularly whether the risks are minimized and 
reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits and whether there are adequate provisions in 
place to protect the privacy of subjects and maintain the confidentiality of their data;‟ and 
(ii) „whether and how the protections provided by GINA should be reflected in a consent  
document‟s description of risks and provisions for assuring the confidentiality of the data.‟310  
With regard to (i) above, the OHRP draws the attention of IRBs to the potential for 
discrimination in employment and insurance as a risk typically associated with genetic research.  
(5) Certificates of Confidentiality 
Any person who is involved in research in which sensitive information is gathered from human 
participants, may apply for a Certificate of Confidentiality.  Sensitive information includes inter 
alia genetic information and information that could be detrimental to a person‟s financial 
standing, employability, reputation within the community, or that might lead to social 
stigmatisation or discrimination.
311
  This certificate is issued by the National Institute of Health 
in terms of the Public Health Service Act.
312
  A researcher who obtains a Certificate of 
Confidentiality will be entitled to resist compelled disclosure of a participant‟s indentifying 
information in any federal, State, or local civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other 
proceedings.  The protection afforded by a Certificate of Confidentiality is permanent in the 
sense that it continues even after the death of research participants.  The certificate is a means of 
protecting the privacy of participants in an attempt to encourage public participation in research.  
  All of the regulations discussed above reflect a common acceptance of the need for free and 
informed consent of participants in the research process.  The existence of this common thread 
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can be traced back to the Belmont Report which is considered to be „the primary ethical 
framework for the protection of human research participants in the USA.‟313  The minimisation 
of potential risks to research participants is also a common factor in all of the regulations.  It is 
important to note that the Common Rule makes provision for additional protection to be afforded 
to vulnerable research participants although, in its current form, it is unable to extend such 
additional protection to genetic research participants.  The entire concept of vulnerability, as 
discussed in chapter three,  will have to be reconsidered if the Common Rule is to be extended to 
protect genetic research participants.  
 (6) Law Reform Initiatives 
The position pertaining to research protections in the USA is unduly complex, bureaucratic, 
fragmented and confusing.  The federal regulations discussed above do not automatically apply 
to research which is funded or conducted by State governments, non-governmental 
organisations, or industry.  The distinction between publicly funded and privately funded 
research defies understanding. There is no single oversight authority, which serves only to 
further complicate matters.  This results in the lack of uniformity in the definitions, approaches, 
and rules pertaining to research.  The current system makes it difficult to address new and 
developing areas of research such as genetic research.  The following statement by the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission is cause for concern as far as the future of genetic research is 
concerned: 
„Today‟s research protection system cannot react quickly to new developments. Efforts to 
develop rules for special situations, such as research on those who can no longer make decisions 
for themselves, have languished for decades in the face of bureaucratic hurdles, and there is no 
reason to believe that efforts to oversee other emerging research areas will be any more efficient. 
In addition, the current system leaves people vulnerable to new, virtually uncontrolled 
experimentation in emerging fields, such as some aspects of reproductive medicine and genetic 
research.  Indeed, some areas of research are not only uncontrolled, they are almost invisible. In 
an information age, poor management of research using medical records, human tissue, or 
personal interview data could lead to employment and insurance discrimination, social 
stigmatization, or even criminal prosecution. 
 
The privacy and confidentiality concerns raised by 
this research are real, but the federal response has often been illusory. There is almost no 
guidance and certainly no coordination on these topics. The time has come to have a single source 
of guidance for these emerging areas, one that would be better positioned to effect change across 
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all divisions of the government and private sector, as well as to facilitate development of 
specialized review bodies, as needed.‟
314
   
 It is, nevertheless, encouraging to note that the abovementioned concerns have not gone 
unnoticed.  On 22 July 2011 the HHS announced its intention to improve the rules protecting 
human research participants.
315
  The HHS, together with the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (OSTP), issued notice of the proposed rulemaking on 26 July 2011.
316
  The introductory 
paragraph in the notice explains the reasons behind the proposed changes as follows: 
„The current regulations governing human subjects research were developed years ago when 
research was predominantly conducted at universities, colleges, and medical institutions, and each 
study generally took place at only a single site. Although the regulations have been amended over 
the years, they have not kept pace with the evolving human research enterprise, the proliferation 
of multi-site clinical trials and observational studies, the expansion of health services research, 
research in the social and behavioral sciences, and research involving databases, the Internet, and 
biological specimen repositories, and the use of advanced technologies, such as genomics. 
Revisions to the current human subjects regulations are being considered because OSTP and HHS 
believe these changes would strengthen protections for research subjects.‟317 
 The changes being contemplated by the HHS are intended inter alia to improve the 
standards of protection for human participants involved in research and to enhance the 
effectiveness of oversight.
318
  In the notice the HHS takes cognisance of the report by the 
NBAC as well as the numerous recommendations made.
319
  The HHS identified the 
following issues for further deliberation: 
1. „Lack of alignment between the level of review and the level of risk; 
2. the inefficiencies of review by multiple IRBs for multi-site studies, which add   bureaucratic 
complexity to the review process and delay initiation of research projects without evidence 
that multiple reviews provide additional protections to participants; 
3. the extent and quality of the protections afforded by current informed consent requirements 
and practices; 
4. the increasing use of genetic information, existing (stored) biospecimens, medical records, 
and administrative claims data and the changing nature of associated risks and benefits of 
research participation; 
5. the monitoring and evaluation of the current system for protecting human participants; 
6. the inadequacy of the current regulatory system in adequately protecting all research 
participants; and  
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7. the complexity, inconsistency and lack of clarity in the multiple, differing regulatory 
requirements that can apply to a single research study, which results in unwarranted 
variability across institutions and their IRBs in how the requirements are interpreted and 
implemented.‟320 
In an attempt to address the abovementioned concerns, the HHS proposes the following: 
1.  „Refinement of the existing risk-based regulatory framework; 
2.  utilization of a single IRB review of record for domestic sites of multi-site studies; 
3.  improvement of consent forms and the consent process;  
4.  establishment of mandatory data security and information protection standards for all studies 
that involve identifiable or potentially identifiable data; 
5.  establishment of an improved, more systematic approach for the collection and analysis of 
data on unanticipated problems and adverse events; 
6.  extension of Federal regulatory protections to all research, regardless of funding source, 
conducted at institutions in the U.S. that receive some Federal funding from a Common Rule 
agency for research with human participants; and 
 7.  improvement in the harmonisation of regulations and related agency guidance.‟321 
The proposals put forward by the HHS should be welcomed by researchers, IRBs and 
research participants.  These changes, if approved and implemented, will modernise the current 
regulatory system and remove many obstacles to research.  The current system is clearly 
outdated, flawed, and disjointed and most of its positive attributes are overshadowed by its 
numerous negative aspects.  The issue of genetic research has not yet been addressed by the 
current regulatory system but the revision of the system is very likely to close this gap.  For these 
reasons the review being conducted by the HHS must be seen as a positive development and its 
benefits for genetic research should be assessed at a later date.  The promulgation of GINA and 
the commencement of the review of the current regulatory system relating to research, bode well 
for the future of genetic privacy in the USA. 
 
 
(c) Privacy 
The right to privacy in the USA is strongly associated with the right to be left alone.  This may 
be attributed to the seminal writing of Warren and Brandeis as far back as 1890
322
 where they 
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argued for recognition of a right to privacy and for remedies for invasion of such privacy.
323
 
Brandeis later defined the right to be let alone as „the most comprehensive of rights, and the right 
most valued by civilized men.‟324  Despite these strong sentiments expressed such a long time 
ago, the US still has no single, overarching privacy law.  Privacy legislation is adopted as and 
when the need arises in the different sectors.  There is no independent privacy oversight agency 
in the USA either. 
In addition to the notable absence of a single overarching privacy law, the U.S. Constitution  
does not contain an explicit right to privacy.  However, in the landmark decision of Griswold v 
Connecticut
325
 the U.S. Supreme Court recognised a constitutional right of privacy based on the 
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights.  Justice Douglas held that the „specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have „penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance.‟326  In support of their views, the majority relied on the 
Ninth Amendment which provides that „The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.‟  This approach to the 
recognition of a right to privacy is controversial.
327
  The right to information privacy was first 
recognised by the United States Supreme Court in 1977 in Whalen v Roe.
328
  The court noted that 
the Constitution protected two kinds of privacy interests; namely, the interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal information and the interest in making independent decisions.
329
 
The tort
330
 of invasion of privacy is well established under the common law of the USA. 
Prosser classifies privacy torts into four categories: 
(i) unreasonable intrusion upon an individual's seclusion or private affairs,  
(ii) appropriation of an individual's name or likeness; 
(iii) publication of embarrassing private facts, and  
(iv) painting an individual in a „false light‟ in the public eye.331  
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In addition to the common law, the following statutes may be used to protect medical, and 
possibly, genetic privacy: 
(1) Privacy Act of 1974
332
  
The Privacy Act protects records held by government agencies and prohibits disclosure except in 
specific circumstances.  On the other hand, the U.S has no similar privacy protection law for the 
private sector.  A sectoral approach is adopted in the private sector which has resulted in a 
patchwork of federal laws covering only certain categories of personal information.
333
  It follows 
therefore that the main weakness of the Privacy Act is its limited scope. 
(2) HIPAA Privacy Rule
334
 
The Privacy Rule was the first federal health privacy law.  It provides federal protection for 
individually identifiable health information and gives individuals specific rights in respect of 
such information.  It also specifies the conditions under which protected health information may 
be used and disclosed and provides civil and criminal penalties for violations of privacy.  The 
positive aspect of this rule is that it treats genetic information as health information and its 
protections therefore extend to genetic information.  The Privacy Rule does not replace state 
laws which may be more stringent but rather serves as a baseline level of protection. 
 (3) Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)
335
 
GINA is primarily an anti-discrimination statute but it also protects genetic privacy.  It has 
specific confidentiality and privacy provisions in both Titles.
336
  Under section 105 of Title I, 
GINA requires the amendment of the HIPAA Privacy Rule to prohibit the use or disclosure of 
genetic information by a covered entity for underwriting purposes.  The relevant confidentiality 
provisions relating to Title II have already been discussed above.
337
 
The only case dealing with genetic privacy that has come before the Courts in the USA is 
Norman-Bloodsaw v Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory.
338
  This was an appeal before the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The facts are briefly as follows:  
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Plaintiffs/Appellants („employees‟) were employed by the Defendant/Appellee („employer‟).  
They had provided the employer with blood and urine samples during their pre-placement 
examinations.  The employees alleged that the employer had, without their knowledge or 
consent, tested their blood and urine for intimate medical conditions such as syphilis, sickle cell 
trait, and pregnancy.  They claimed that such testing violated inter alia their right to privacy as 
guaranteed by the constitutions of the USA and California.  The District Court dismissed the 
claim but this was reversed on appeal.   
In the Appeal Court, Justice Reinhardt stated that „[o]ne can think of few subject areas more 
personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests than that of one‟s health or genetic make-
up.‟339  The Judge recognised the sensitivity around and the wider implications of carrying the 
sickle cell trait, which has genetic origins.  He accordingly concluded that „the conditions tested 
for were aspects of one‟s health in which one enjoys the highest expectations of privacy.‟340   
This judgment may be used to strengthen any argument in support of the recognition of a right to 
genetic privacy.  There is no single overarching law that governs data protection or privacy in the 
USA.  As mentioned above
341
  the Privacy Act applies only to federal government agencies.  It is 
to be expected that much will be left to self-regulation. 
 
 
(d) Privilege 
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not include rules on privilege.  Instead, this area of law is 
governed by the common law.  Rule 501, which deals with privilege in general, provides that a 
claim of privilege is governed by the common law unless the United States Constitution, a 
federal statute, or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.  To date the 
common law has not recognised a medical professional privilege.  The closest it has come to this 
has been the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee v Redmond.
342
  In this 
case the appellant sought discovery of notes made by a social worker in the course of counselling 
sessions held with the respondent.  The respondent refused to comply on the basis that the notes 
were protected from disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege.  The Supreme Court had 
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to decide whether such a privilege should be recognised or not.  The Supreme Court noted that 
„Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes federal courts to define new privileges by 
interpreting „common law principles…in the light of reason and experience.‟343  Guided by such 
authority,  the court began by reiterating the common law principles
344
 that „the public has a right 
to every man‟s evidence‟345 and that exceptions to this rule may be justified by a „public good 
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining 
the truth.‟346  Based on these guiding principles, the question which the court addressed was 
whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege „promotes sufficiently important interests to 
outweigh the need for probative evidence.‟347  The court was persuaded by reason and 
experience to recognise the privilege.‟348   
 It is important to note that the Supreme Court also expressly rejected the balancing test that 
had been implemented by the Court of Appeals in an earlier decision in Jaffee v Redmond.
349
  
The Court of Appeals had been willing to recognise a psychotherapist-patient privilege based on 
the facts of this case but it indicated that in future cases the privilege would not apply if the need 
for disclosure outweighed the privacy interests of the patient.  The reason given by the Supreme 
Court for rejecting this test was that „…it would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege by 
making it impossible for participants to predict whether their confidential conversations will be 
protected.‟350  Two important issues for consideration may be taken from the decision of the 
Supreme Court.  First, as already argued in chapter five, certainty that sensitive information will 
be protected is crucial for the enjoyment of certain rights.  A statutory privilege provides the 
certainty or precision which the common law sometimes lacks.  This certainty may be described 
as rigidity but even so it serves an important purpose in this context.  In a discussion of the future 
of privilege law after Jaffee,
351
 Poulin argues that „[p]rivilege law is peculiarly suited for 
statutory treatment; it embodies policy choices and details of application that are best addressed 
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by the legislature.‟352  As regards genetic information, the future of healthcare depends on the 
findings of genetic research.  Such research requires the participation of individuals who must be 
given the assurance that their personal information will be protected from disclosure in judicial 
proceedings.  This assurance will not be provided if the reasoning of the Court of Appeals
353
 is 
followed.   
 Secondly, the public interest that may be served and the public good that may be promoted 
by the recognition of certain privileges must not be overlooked.  With regard to mental health, 
the Supreme Court noted that „[t]he privilege also serves the public interest, since the mental 
health of the Nation‟s citizenry, no less than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent 
importance.‟354  In chapter five a similar argument has been made in respect of genetic 
information.  There the importance of promoting genetic research has been put forward as one of 
the arguments for the recognition of a genetic information privilege.  Genetic research will 
benefit the whole of humankind and it should therefore be in the public interest to promote such 
research.  As mentioned above, one of the ways to promote genetic research is to assure research 
participants that their genetic information will be adequately protected.  The Supreme Court‟s 
recognition of the need for certainty as well as the recognition of the importance of the public 
interest are therefore very encouraging. 
 Even after Jaffee there has been no judicial recognition of a general medical professional 
privilege at the federal level.  United States v. Bek
355
  is a fairly recent case in which the court 
once again confirmed that a physician-patient privilege is not recognised at federal level.  The 
defendant, Bek, was a medical practitioner who was convicted of illegally distributing controlled 
substances to his patients and committing health care fraud. On appeal he argued inter alia that 
the trial court‟s admission of patients‟ medical records was irregular since the records were 
protected by a physician-patient privilege.  The Appeal Court rejected this argument, reiterating 
that „federal common law has not historically recognised a privilege between patients and 
physicians.‟356  Bek acknowledged this state of the law but argued further that, based on the 
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decision in Jaffee v. Redmond,
357
 in which the U.S. Supreme Court had recognised a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Appeal Court should recognise a physician-patient 
privilege in this case.
358
  He also pointed out that Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
grants the federal courts authority to define new privileges.
359
  The Appeal Court declined to do 
so as it could find no circuit authority in support of a physician-patient privilege.  Furthermore, 
the court noted that even after the decision in Jaffee v Redmond
360
 they had expressly declined to 
recognise a physician-patient privilege.
361
  The court could accordingly find no reason to create 
such a privilege in the current case. 
  The Appeal Court also rejected Bek‟s argument that HIPAA362 created a protection 
mechanism that could be construed as a physician-patient privilege.  The court cited 
Northwestern Memorial Hospital v Ashcroft
363
 in support of their stance that „HIPAA did not 
give rise to a physician-patient or medical records privilege.‟  As regards HIPAA‟s requirement 
that covered entities should obtain patient authorisation before disclosing protected health 
information, the court pointed out that there are exceptions to the rule.  One of the exceptions is 
the disclosure of protected health information for law enforcement purposes
364 
when the 
information is subject to „a court order or court-ordered warrant, or a subpoena or summons 
issued by a judicial officer.‟  The court acknowledged that HIPAA does „create a procedure for 
obtaining authority to use medical records in litigation'
365 
 but found that in this case, none of the 
requirements regarding disclosure had been violated.
366
   
 The creation of a physician-patient privilege could provide protection for the genetic privacy 
of patients.  It is, however, quite clear from the cases
367
  that the federal courts have no intention 
of creating such a privilege.  In any event, a physician-patient privilege would provide only 
limited protection for genetic privacy.  What is needed to protect genetic privacy is more than a 
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mere physician-patient privilege because genetic information is not only generated or imparted in 
clinical settings.  A considerable amount of genetic information undoubtedly exists in the 
research arena.  When the time comes, a possible solution would be to persuade a federal court to 
extend the Jaffee v Redmond
368
 framework to genetic information.  This would require proof that 
the individual‟s need for genetic privacy outweighs the court‟s need to receive evidence of a 
genetic nature.  It may also prove useful to show that a genetic information privilege will serve a 
greater public interest by promoting genetic research, which in turn will yield great benefits for 
pharmacogenomics and healthcare.  On the contrary, the absence of a privilege will have 
negative consequences for society at large as well as future generations.  If, despite these 
arguments, the idea of a genetic information privilege is rejected, it appears that only Certificates 
of Confidentiality may be used to prevent disclosure of the information of research participants 
in judicial proceedings.  All other genetic information will have no protection from compelled 
disclosure in court.  The current position is undoubtedly unsatisfactory but the positive 
conclusion is that great potential exists for the recognition of a genetic information privilege in 
the USA. 
 
 
 
6.2.3 THE NETHERLANDS 
The Netherlands has certain important characteristics which make it suitable for this review.  
First it is a member state of the European Union, secondly it is a signatory to the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine,
369
 and thirdly it has data protection legislation which is also 
intended to apply to genetic privacy protection.  The Netherlands does not have genetics-specific 
legislation.  The various legal aspects of genetics are dealt with by existing general laws 
pertaining to such aspects.  A general data protection statute,
370
 supplemented by sectoral laws 
and industry codes, is in existence.  It deals with the processing of personal data, including data 
concerning „inherited characteristics‟.  This Act is important because the South African 
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Protection of Personal Information Bill
371
 is modelled along similar lines.  The Netherlands 
differs from the other jurisdictions under review to the extent that it has general legislation which 
protects genetic privacy together with a moratorium on the use of genetic information by 
insurance companies.  
 
 
(a) Genetic Databases 
 
(i) Forensic DNA Databases 
The Netherlands was the first country in the world to introduce specific forensic DNA legislation 
in 1994.
372
  The Dutch Criminal Code and the DNA Investigation in Criminal Proceedings Act 
1994
373
 provided inter alia that DNA testing could only be approved where it was urgently 
necessary to reveal the truth; DNA testing of crime scene samples, volunteers  and suspects of 
serious violent and sexual crimes was permitted; DNA testing was only permitted where the 
crime carried a penalty of eight years‟ imprisonment or more; DNA profiles could be retained in 
a database managed by the Netherlands Forensic Institute; the profile of an accused person who 
was subsequently acquitted or had the case against him/her discontinued had to be removed from 
the database; the maximum period of retention of profiles in respect of crime scene samples and 
reference samples  was 18 years and 30 years respectively.
374
 
The Criminal Code and DNA Investigation in Criminal Proceedings Act 1994 were amended 
in 2001
375
 to provide inter alia that DNA samples collected for forensic purposes may not be 
used for any other purpose; DNA testing may be approved where necessary for the investigation; 
all DNA profiles are stored in the database and compared to all other profiles on the database; 
only convicted persons‟ profiles are retained in the database; DNA profiles of crime scene stains, 
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persons convicted of crimes requiring 4-6 years imprisonment and persons convicted of crimes 
requiring more than 6 years imprisonment are 18, 20 and 30 years respectively.
376
 
In 2003 the law was amended even further to provide for DNA testing to be done on crime 
scene samples to determine externally visible properties/physical characteristics of unknown 
persons.
377
  This is useful where DNA of an unknown person is found at a crime scene and such 
DNA can be analysed with the aim of generating a physical profile of such person.  This route is 
followed only if all other attempts at identification fail.  The physical characteristics that may be 
investigated are limited to gender and ethnicity.  Testing for indicators of genetic predisposition 
to disease or behavioral traits is prohibited.  The hope is that such unknown person will turn out 
to be the perpetrator of the crime.  It has been observed that this approach is unique as the 
Netherlands is the only country which has legislation specifically permitting the analysis of 
physical characteristics on DNA samples.
378
  This approach is tempered by the fact that such 
results are not stored in any database but are simply used to assist the police in finding the 
suspect based on physical appearance.  Once the suspect is found a further DNA test is 
conducted to confirm that the crime scene sample does belong to the suspect. 
The DNA Testing (Convicted Persons) Act came into effect on 1 February 2005.
379
  Prior to 
the passing of this Act, DNA samples could only be taken from suspects.  This Act made it 
possible to take DNA samples of all persons convicted of crimes carrying a statutory period of 
imprisonment of four years or more.  The statutorily prescribed sentence rather than the sentence 
imposed by a judge is the determining factor here.  DNA samples may also be taken in the case 
of specific offences
380
 carrying a lower penalty.  The Act is applicable to adults and minors alike. 
Mouth swab samples are used for DNA testing.  Samples are be taken from offenders who are 
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sentenced to imprisonment, suspended sentences, community service, placement in a penal 
institution, placement in a psychiatric institution, and placement in a juvenile detention facility. 
Offenders who have only a fine imposed on them will not be subjected to DNA testing.  The 
DNA sample and the profile are retained in a database administered by the Netherlands Forensic 
Institute.  The period of retention depends on the offence and the statutory sentence.   In respect 
of offences carrying a maximum statutory sentence of six years or more, the period of retention 
for samples and profiles is thirty years.  For offences carrying a lower maximum sentence, the 
period of retention is twenty years.  
The Dutch parliament ratified the Prüm Treaty
381
 on 15 January 2008.  This treaty operates 
between the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, and Austria.  The aim 
of the treaty is to increase cross-border co-operation, particularly the mutual exchange of 
information amongst contracting states in three areas: terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal 
migration.  This requires each contracting state to permit automated searching of its national 
DNA database by all other contracting states.  The principal purpose of the Treaty is to improve 
the exchange of information between contracting States by affording reciprocal access to 
national databases containing DNA profiles,
382
 fingerprints
383
 and vehicle registration data
384
. 
Two significant concerns have been raised in relation to the cross-border sharing of information : 
first, the treaty has privacy implications for all European Union citizens, „primarily due to the 
absence of common legally binding data protection standards‟ and secondly, the absence of a 
harmonised approach to the collection and  retention of samples will result in the sharing of 
sensitive information of innocent people.
385
  Ratification of the Prüm Treaty by the Netherlands 
means that genetic information contained in databases in the Netherlands must be shared with 
other contracting States.  The provisions of chapter 2 of the Treaty on reciprocal access to 
information held by another State are based on the principle of availability.  This principle means 
that „throughout the Union, a law enforcement officer in one Member State who needs 
information in order to perform his duties can obtain this from another Member State, and that 
the law enforcement agency in the other Member State which holds this information will make it 
                                                 
381
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available for the stated purpose.‟386  The requested information must be provided if it is 
available.  In the light of the concerns mentioned above, this is not an ideal situation.   
There are two major concerns relating to the taking of DNA samples for forensic use.  The 
first concern relates to permissible DNA analysis for the purpose of determining ethnicity.  This 
paves the way for human rights abuse, stigmatization, racial tension, targeting of certain ethnic 
groups and communities in the investigation of crime.  This is bound to create problems in 
racially diverse countries.  The second concern is that minors are treated no differently from 
adults.  It is not clear how this fits in with the Riyadh Guidelines
387
 issued by the United Nations, 
of which the Netherlands is a member.  The Riyadh Guidelines are soft law and are not binding 
on international or national legislative bodies.  This does not detract from the fact that it is a 
crucial proposal for the protection of children‟s interests. A positive aspect of the Dutch position 
is that it does not permit the permanent or indefinite retention of samples and profiles.  
 
(ii) Genetic Research Databases 
There are many public and private biobanks and research databases in the Netherlands.
388
  There 
is, however, no specific legislation governing biobanks or research databases.  Guidance may be 
found in the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA)
389
 but this is not adequate for regulation of 
biobank or database activities. Biobanking is different from traditional medical research so it 
cannot be adequately governed by laws pertaining to medical research.  Specific policies and/or 
legislation are required to address issues such as informed consent, data sharing, and data 
security.  Ethics Review Committees require more guidance in order to do justice to the review 
process and ultimately, to those individuals whose data are included in a biobank or database.  
Due to the large number of databases in the Netherlands the lack of regulation is cause for 
concern.  Issues of consent, access to databases, ethics approval, sharing of data, returning of 
results to donors, and database governance need to be adequately addressed.  A recent study 
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commissioned by the European Commission found that consent,
390
 data sharing,
391
 returning of 
results to donors,
392
 access to database information,
393
 and ethics approval
394
  are not being 
approached in any consistent or uniform manner in the Netherlands.  This is clearly not a 
satisfactory situation. 
 
 
(b) Genetic Discrimination 
Discrimination on grounds of genetic heritage is not specifically prohibited in the Netherlands. 
The Dutch Constitution stipulates in general that „All persons in the Netherlands shall be treated 
equally in equal circumstances.  Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political 
opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted.'
395
 
 
(i) Insurance 
The Medical Examinations Act 1998
396
 prohibits the insurer from requiring medical tests that 
could indicate that the applicant may be suffering from a severe, incurable disease.  It provides 
that any testing for life insurance must not unreasonably infringe on a person‟s privacy.397  A 
„medical examination‟ must not include a test that entails a disproportionate risk for the subject 
when compared to the usefulness of the test for the requesting party.
398
  Based on this, the Act 
also prohibits the use of presymptomatic or susceptibility genetic testing for serious, untreatable 
disorders. Article 5 of the Act, which deals with medical examinations for insurance purposes, 
prohibits insurers from requesting information about previous genetic tests and from questioning 
relatives regarding family history unless the sum insured exceeds a specified monetary limit („the 
enquiry limit‟).  The said enquiry limit for life insurance was set 300,000 Dutch Guilders in 
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1998, to be adjusted every three years according to the cost of living index.
399
  This approach 
allows individuals to obtain a basic amount of life insurance. 
 
(ii) Employment 
The Medical Examinations Act 1998
400
 applies equally to genetic testing in the employment 
sphere.  Presymptomatic and predictive testing for serious, untreatable disorders are prohibited as 
this entails a disproportionate risk for the individual being tested as compared to the usefulness 
of the test for the employer.  Section 4 prohibits medical testing of employees except where it is 
necessary to ensure that the employee will not pose a risk to his own safety or that of others 
while performing his duties.  Section 5(2) provides that the necessary medical testing may be 
done only after all other recruitment procedures have been completed and the decision has been 
made to appoint the individual.  Medical testing of the prospective employee must be the last 
step in the recruitment process, where appointment is subject to medical fitness. 
 
(iii) Genetic Research  
The Medical Research involving Human Subjects Act (WMO)
401
 regulates medical research 
involving human participants in the Netherlands.  It regulates two types of medical research in 
the Netherlands; namely, research in which participants are subjected to interventions and 
research which requires participants to follow specific behavioural rules.
402
  It has been observed 
that the Netherlands was one of the first European countries to develop and implement research 
ethics committees.
403
  The WMO establishes two types of research ethics committees, which are 
responsible for reviewing medical research protocols.
404
  These committees are Medical 
Research Ethics Committes (METC) and the Central Committee on Research Involving Human 
Subjects (CCMO).  The WMO requires all research involving human subjects to be assessed in 
advance by an ethics committee.
405
  The type of research will determine which ethics committee 
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will review the research protocol.
406
  The WMO stipulates that a research ethics committee may 
only approve a research protocol if it is satisfied that - 
„(i)  the trial could reasonably lead to the advancement of medical science; 
 (ii)  the involvement of human participants is necessary to achieve the research objectives; 
 (iii)  the benefits outweigh the risks to participants; 
 (iv)  the methodology meets the requisite standard; 
 (v)  the trial is to be performed at suitable institutions and by or under the supervision of 
persons possessing relevant research expertise; 
 (vi)  monetary payments offered to participants would not unduly influence them to participate 
in the research; 
 (vii)  any payments to be received by the investigator and the institution at which the trial takes 
place are reasonably commensurate with the nature, scale and purpose of the clinical trial; 
 (viii) the potential benefits to participants; 
 (ix) suitable criteria for the recruitment of subjects; and 
 (x)  the trial satisfies all other criteria which may reasonably be set for it.‟407 
 In addition to ethics committee approval, the WMO requires consent for participation in 
research.
408
  This requirement is treated very seriously.  Failure to obtain the requisite consent 
results in a penalty of imprisonment up to one year or a fine.
409
  The penalty will be imposed 
regardless as to whether the contravention was intentional or not.  The WMO also requires 
insurance
410
 to cover losses due to death or injury.  It provides that „such insurance need not 
cover injury which is inevitable or almost inevitable, given the nature of the trial.‟411   
 The WMO covers all of the ethically challenging issues that arise in the course of research 
involving human participants.  Dute observes that the WMO has achieved its main objective 
which is to „protect research participants without unnecessarily hampering the progress of 
biomedical research.‟412  It is evident that the WMO has achieved this balance. Section 12 places 
a duty on researchers to ensure that the privacy of research participants is respected „as far as 
possible.‟  This is a positive factor for the protection of genetic privacy of genetic research 
participants.  The WMO also imposes special consent requirements in respect of minors and 
those participants who are incapable of giving informed consent.
413
  Although this is a good 
development for persons who fall into those categories, it does not accommodate other 
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vulnerable participants.  The only grounds of vulnerability that are accommodated are age and 
capacity to consent.  As argued in chapter three, this approach leaves a huge gap in protection for 
genetic research participants who may also be vulnerable albeit not for the traditional reasons.  
Although the WMO is a balanced piece of legislation, in its current form it is not entirely 
adequate for the purposes of the protection of genetic privacy.  
 
 
(c) Privacy 
The Constitution of the Netherlands contains an explicit right to privacy. Article 10 of the 
Constitution provides as follows: 
„(1)  Everyone shall have the right to respect for his privacy, without prejudice to restrictions laid 
down by, or pursuant to, Acts of Parliament.  
 (2)  Rules to protect privacy shall be laid down by Act of Parliament in connection with the 
recording and dissemination of personal data.  
 (3)  Rules concerning the rights of persons to be informed of data recorded concerning them, of 
the use that is made thereof, and to have such data corrected shall be laid down by Act of 
Parliament.‟ 
The Personal Data Protection Act of 2000
414
 (PDPA) implemented the European Directive 
(95/46/EC) on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
the Free Movement of such Data.
415
  Article 1 of the European Directive requires member States 
to protect the individual‟s right to privacy with respect to the processing of his/her personal data. 
The PDPA applies to the public and private sectors.  It provides a generic framework for the 
processing of personal data.  For this reason it has to be supplemented by sectoral legislation and 
codes of conduct.  The PDPA treats medical data as special personal data and includes genetic 
data within the category of medical data.
416
  It provides that personal data concerning „inherited 
characteristics‟ may only be processed with respect to the data subject from whom such data was 
obtained.
417
  The exceptions to the prohibition are „where a serious medical interest prevails, or 
where the processing is necessary for the purpose of scientific research or statistics.
418
 
Koops notes that „the policy focus has been on “the law in the books”, with a comprehensive 
Act containing open norms, supplemented by sectoral legislation with more specific norms and 
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stimulation of codes of conduct.‟419  Unfortunately he goes on to point out that in 2011 less than 
ten codes of conduct had been approved, all of which were in the private sector and did not 
contain much more than the PDPA itself.
420
  This clearly defeats the purpose of codes of conduct 
and doesn‟t take the implementation of the PDPA any further.  Koops acknowledges that great 
strides have been made since the 1980‟s to protect personal data but he is also mindful of the 
„considerable work (that) remains to be done to translate these open norms into workable, sector-
specific and context-specific rules and practices.‟421  
The PDPA establishes a Data Protection Commission to oversee the processing of personal 
data
422
 and to provide advice on draft legislation pertaining to the processing of personal data.
423
  
The Commission is authorised to impose specific sanctions against responsible parties for 
contraventions of the PDPA.
424
  Koops notes that the Commission‟s „...enforcement and 
sanctioning powers are felt to be rather limited.‟425  He also observes that „…its advice is not 
always influential: the legislator pays token attention to the supervisory authority‟s judgment and 
suggestions…‟426   
All of Koop‟s criticisms are very important to take note of.  They will serve as valuable 
lessons for South Africa since the South African Protection of Personal Information Bill
427
 is 
modelled to some extent on the Dutch PDPA.  South Africa has much to gain from the Dutch 
experience as far as the implementation of the legislation is concerned.  Shortcomings in the 
PDPA have now been identified and more will surface as the different sectors attempt to 
implement the PDPA through codes of conduct.  These developments will require ongoing 
monitoring if maximum benefit is to be gained from the Dutch experience. 
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(d) Privilege 
Medical confidentiality is accorded great importance in the Netherlands.  Physicians owe their 
patients a statutory duty of confidentiality in terms of the Medical Treatment Contracts Act of 
1997.  Article 457 of this Act requires physicians not to disclose patient information to third 
parties or to grant  access to the patient's records, unless required by law to do so.  Professional 
confidentiality is a two-pronged concept in the Netherlands.  It entails an oath of secrecy as well 
as a privilege of non-disclosure as found in Article 218 of the Dutch Penal Code.  It extends to 
employees of the physician as well, thereby ensuring maximum protection for the patient. 
 The approach of the Netherlands towards genetic information is not to introduce genetics-
specific legislation where the existing general legal framework is able to address genetic-related 
issues.  It is not unreasonable to suggest that since existing legislation already protects medical 
confidentiality, such protection should simply be extended to genetic information instead of 
trying to craft something new specifically aimed at genetic information.  After all, the PDPA
428
 
already treats genetic information as a subcategory of health information for the purpose of 
information processing.  Genetic information gained during the course of treatment by a 
physician can be handled just like other medical information for purposes of statutory 
confidentiality.  If so, this means that genetic information would be protected from disclosure in 
Dutch courts.  Unfortunately, since such a privilege would be based on a professional 
relationship and not on the nature of the information, it will be limited to genetic information 
gained in a clinical setting.  It will not be possible to extend such a privilege to genetic 
information gained in the course of medical research by researchers who are not physicians.   
The recognition of a specific genetic information privilege may, however, still be possible as the 
Dutch are not completely averse to recognising new privileges.  This recognition usually occurs 
through court cases.   The position is therefore promising. 
 
 
 
6.2.4 AUSTRALIA 
In 2003 the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and the Australian Health Ethics 
Committee (AHEC) of the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) undertook 
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a joint inquiry into the protection of human genetic samples and information.
429
  The project has 
been referred to as „the most comprehensive consideration of the ethical, legal and social 
implications of the „New Genetics‟ ever undertaken.‟430  Since the ALRC project covered all the 
legal, social, and ethical issues relating to genetic information, it is not necessary to repeat that 
process here.  The ALRC inquiry examined the current position, identified the gaps/flaws, and 
made recommendations for reform.  The focus here will be on the recommendations made by the 
ALRC.  The report contains 144 comprehensive and well-reasoned recommendations for reform 
(ALRC Report).
431
  On 9 December 2005 the Australian Government issued a formal response to 
the recommendations.  Many of the recommendations in the report were accepted by the 
government.  
 The ALRC recently completed an in-depth investigation into Australian privacy law and 
practice.
432
  This investigation focused on the effectiveness of the current Australian privacy 
framework.  It entailed a critical analysis of every aspect of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and other 
related legislation.  The investigation culminated in a report containing 295 recommendations for 
reform.
433
  Due to the large number of recommendations, the Australian government decided to 
respond in two stages.  The first stage dealt with 197 recommendations.  Some of the 
recommendations relating to health information privacy are relevant for this discussion. 
However, since no finality has been reached in respect of a number of the recommendations thus 
far,
434
 they will be briefly discussed where necessary to highlight possible improvements in the 
Australian privacy framework which may benefit genetic privacy protection. 
The Australian position is important to consider because it is a progressive one.  A Human 
Genetics Advisory Committee has been established for the purpose of advising the NHMRC on 
high-level technical and strategic issues in human genetics, and on the social, ethical and legal 
implications of human genetics and related technologies.
435
  This is a means of ensuring that 
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Australia keeps abreast of all developments in human genetics as well as the implications of such 
developments for healthcare, law, ethics, and policy.  In a rapidly evolving and highly 
specialised field like human genetics, this is a useful and necessary mechanism which will enable 
government to be proactive in its handling of emerging issues. 
 
 
(a) Genetic Databases 
 
(i) Forensic DNA Databases 
The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) governs the operation of forensic DNA databases in Australia.
436
   
Australia has a national forensic DNA database called the National Criminal Investigation DNA 
Database („NCIDD‟).  This database is operated by the Crim Trac Agency which is an executive 
agency of the Commonwealth government.  The Australian Federal Police also have a DNA 
database for law enforcement purposes.  The Crimes Act 1914 authorises the inclusion of crime 
scene, serious offenders, suspects, missing persons, volunteers, and statistical indexes in a 
national forensic DNA database. 
437
  Part 1D provides that intimate and non-intimate DNA 
samples may be taken from suspects, volunteers, and convicted persons.
438
  The Crimes Act 
1914 prohibits the conducting of a forensic procedure (taking of an intimate or non-intimate 
sample) on persons under the age of ten.
 439
  It provides for imprisonment to be imposed for 
contraventions of its provisions.   
Part 1D of the Crimes Act governs the storage, use, disclosure, and removal of data held in a 
forensic DNA database.  The following are offences under the Act, each of which is punishable 
by a penalty of imprisonment for a period of two years: 
(i) Accessing of data stored in a forensic DNA database system except for specified purposes.
440
  
(ii) Reckless matching of DNA profiles within the same index or with profiles in another forensic 
database index, which is not permitted under the Act.
441
 
(iii) Reckless disclosure of data held in a forensic DNA database.
442
  
                                                 
436
   Australia does have state and territory legislation relating to forensic DNA databases but a discussion of all is 
not possible within the limited parameters of this research. 
437
  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) , s 23YDAC. 
438
  Div 6, ss 23XWE and 23XWQ(5). 
439
  Ibid, s 23YQA. 
440
  Ibid s 23YDAE. 
441
  Ibid s 23YDAF. 
442
  Ibid s 23YO. 
  
222 
 
(iv) Reckless retention of identifying information obtained from forensic material in a forensic 
database after the forensic material is required to be destroyed.
443
 
Section 23YD of the Act provides that forensic material taken from a suspect
444
 must be 
destroyed immediately if - 
(i) „an interim order for the carrying out of a forensic procedure is disallowed;  
(ii) a period of 12 months has elapsed since the forensic material was taken and proceedings in 
respect of a relevant offence have not been instituted against the suspect or have been 
discontinued;  
(iii) the suspect has been convicted but no conviction has been recorded; or 
(iv)   the suspect is acquitted and no appeal has been lodged against the acquittal or the acquittal 
is confirmed on appeal or the appeal is withdrawn.‟  
The ALRC considered the possibility of DNA profiles also being protected by the Privacy 
Act 1988.
445
  The report notes that DNA profile information can be combined with information 
held by a DNA forensic laboratory to identify individuals from whom such profiles were 
obtained.  This information then becomes identifiable information and will fall within the 
definition of „personal information‟ under the Privacy Act 1988.  Personal information is subject 
to the Information Privacy Principles and National Privacy Principles of the Privacy Act as 
discussed below.
446
  
The ALRC report contains a discussion of both negative and positive aspects of database 
regulation.
447
  All of the abovementioned sections are positive aspects of the regulation of 
forensic DNA databases in Australia.  For the purposes of the discussion here, it is encouraging 
to note that there is formal regulation of forensic DNA databases which reduces the potential for 
inappropriate use, disclosure, and storage of DNA data in forensic databases. 
 
(ii) Genetic Research Databases 
Genetic research databases are regulated by a myriad of legislation, policies, and guidelines at 
State, territory, and federal level.  The instruments that are relevant at federal level are the 
Privacy Act 1988 and the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans 
2007 (issued by the NHMRC).  
                                                 
443
  Ibid s 23YDAG. 
444
  Ibid s 23WA defines a suspect to include „A person who is suspected of having committed an offence;  a person 
charged with an indictable offence; or a person who has been summoned to appear before court in respect of an 
indictable offence.‟ 
445
  Supra note 430 at 1073. 
446
  At 232 below. 
447
  Supra note 430 at 1071 –1089. 
  
223 
 
  (1) Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
The definition of a record under the Privacy Act includes a database.  The Act applies to 
identifiable information only. Personal information is defined as „information or an opinion 
(including information or an opinion forming part of a database), whether true or not, and 
whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can 
reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion.‟  This implies that de-identified 
genetic data will not be protected by the Privacy Act.  Identifiable data will be protected under 
the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) and the National Privacy Principles (NPPs).  The basic 
difference between IPPs and NPPs is that the former apply to government agencies whilst the 
latter applies to the private sector.  Both sets of principles deal with the collection, use, 
disclosure, and storage of personal information.  With regard to storage of personal information, 
both provide that reasonable security safeguards must be implemented to prevent unauthorised 
access, use, modification, disclosure, and misuse.  Both sets of principles also impose limits on 
use and disclosure of personal information contained in records.   One of the glaring loopholes in 
the Privacy Act is the provision that the NPPs apply only to collections created after the date of 
commencement of the section, which is 21 December 2001.
448
   
 (2) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (2007) 
The ALRC recommended that the NHMRC should amend the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Research Involving Humans 1999 to provide ethical guidance on the establishment, 
governance and operation of human genetic research databases.
449
  The 2007 National Statement 
accordingly deals with „databanks,‟ which is deemed to include databases.  It includes an entire 
chapter dealing with databanks
450
 in general whilst acknowledging that genetics is one of the 
areas that most commonly uses databanks.
451
  The National Statement provides that the privacy 
of participants must be safeguarded.
452
  It also recognises that the uses of certain data may be 
harmful to participants and therefore requires those who exercise control over data to limit or 
prohibit access to data.
453
  This is a very important issue in respect of genetic databases which 
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contain information which may be used to discriminate against individuals in various areas such 
as insurance and employment.  Such discrimination may extend beyond individuals to families, 
communities, ethnic groups, and even race groups. 
The ALRC also recommended that the NHMRC should establish and administer a public 
register of human genetic research databases.  It was further recommended that conditions of 
registration should be established and that no genetic research using information from a database 
should be allowed under the National Statement unless such database is registered.  This 
recommendation was accepted in principle by the NHMRC.  The National Statement does 
require researchers who are planning a databank to clearly indicate how the collection, storage, 
use, and disclosure of data will comply with its provisions.
454
 
In addition to the abovementioned instruments, the different states and territories have their 
own pieces of legislation which will apply in circumstances where the application of the Privacy 
Act is excluded.  There is often confusion about which legislation covers certain research.
455
  
Databases that are maintained by institutions which are considered by the Privacy Act to be 
„state or territory authorities‟,456 are governed by state or territory legislation.  Unfortunately not 
all states have the relevant legislation so some research databases are not subject to any privacy 
legislation.
457
  The ALRC cited the Menzies Centre for Population Research database within the 
University of Tasmania, as an example of a database that is not subject to any privacy legislation 
simply because Tasmania does not have such legislation.
458
  This is a major gap in protection as 
it creates potential for misuse of research data. 
The three major gaps in protection relate to de-identified genetic data, databases that were 
created prior to 21 December 2001, and databases that exist in states or territories which do not 
have the necessary legislation for privacy protection.  The inadequacy of the regulatory 
framework led the ALRC to recommend that new regulation is necessary.
459
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(b) Genetic Discrimination 
Australian law recognises direct
460
 and indirect discrimination.
461
  In both cases there is no need 
to prove intention to discriminate on the part of the person who is accused of discrimination.  
The ALRC noted that indirect discrimination is sometimes referred to as „adverse impact 
discrimination because it focuses on the effect of the discriminator‟s action rather than on the 
attributes of the person towards whom the action is directed…‟462  Based on the conclusion of 
the ALRC that there is no need for specific legislation to deal with genetic discrimination, the 
government agreed that potential misuses of genetic information should be dealt with by the 
existing Disability Discrimination Act 1992.
463
  This approach has merit insofar as the 
prevention of discrimination is concerned because the Disability Discrimination Act does 
prohibit discrimination based on genetic predisposition to disability
464
  but it does not address the 
need for protection of genetic privacy.  The protection of genetic privacy requires the restriction 
of access to genetic information rather than restrictions on the use of genetic information.  
Genetic privacy protection may therefore be considered to be proactive as opposed to the anti-
discrimination approach which is reactive.  The approach of the ALRC and the Australian 
government is therefore not satisfactory in the context of genetic privacy. 
 
(i) Insurance 
There is no specific legislation aimed at genetic testing in the insurance sphere.  The potential 
impact of genetic testing on health insurance is of no relevance in Australia due to the system of 
universal health insurance.  The National Health Act 1953 prohibits the discriminatory use of 
genetic information in private health insurance.
465
  This discussion accordingly focuses on life 
insurance.  The terms of reference of the ALRC investigation included the use of human genetic 
information in insurance as one of the areas requiring investigation.  The report notes that 
concern about the use of genetic information by insurers was one of the factors giving rise to the 
inquiry.
466
  In respect of insurance and genetic privacy the ALRC recommended that „Insurers 
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should review their consent forms, including medical authority forms, to ensure that they contain 
sufficient information about the collection, use and disclosure of genetic information to allow 
applicants to make an informed decision about whether to proceed with their application and 
consent to the collection of the information.‟467 
 The Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA)
468
 has issued a genetic testing 
policy which applies to its members.  This code, which was previously a voluntary industry code, 
has now become a mandatory standard for IFSA members.  The Code provides inter alia as 
follows: 
„(i) Insurers will not require applicants to undergo any genetic test. 
 (ii)  Insurers may request disclosure of all existing genetic test results for the purposes of 
assessing risk. 
 (iii)  Insurers will not offer insurance at lower rates based on the results of genetic tests. 
 (iv) When assessing the overall risk associated with a particular genotype, insurers will 
consider the existence of possible medical intervention and/or treatment. 
 (v)  Insurers will ensure that results of existing genetic tests are only obtained with the written 
consent of the applicant. 
 (vi) The results of genetic tests will not be used in the assessment of insurance applications of 
relatives of the tested individual. 
 (vii) Insurers will ensure that strict standards of confidentiality apply to the handling and 
storage of the results of genetic tests. 
 (viii) Insurers will limit access to genetic test results to those who are involved in the 
underwriting assessment and other experts. 
 (ix) All underwriting decisions involving a genetic test should be thoroughly documented so 
that adequate information can be provided to the applicant on request.  
 (x)  Insurers will provide reasons for their decisions relating to an application for 
insurance.‟
469
 
 The Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000, which came into effect on 21 December 
2001, extended the application of the Privacy Act 1998 to private sector organisations. Since 
then private sector insurers are bound by the National Privacy Principles (NPPs) contained in the 
Privacy Act 1998.  These NPPs regulate the use, storage, and disclosure of an insured 
individual‟s personal information.  Insurers have the option to develop their own privacy codes 
which must be approved by the Privacy Commissioner.
470
  Such approved privacy codes must 
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provide the same level of protection that is afforded by the NPPs.  In the absence of an approved 
privacy code, the NPPs will automatically apply.
471
 
 
(ii) Employment 
Australia does not have legislation specifically prohibiting employers from requiring employees 
to undergo genetic testing or to disclose results of previous genetic tests.  In the course of its 
inquiry,
472
 the ALRC did not find substantial evidence of „broad-based and systematic 
collection‟ of genetic information by employers.473  The ALRC nevertheless noted that „federal 
anti-discrimination laws generally target the unlawful use of information, but it is also important 
to ensure that the information itself is protected by ensuring that genetic information is collected, 
used, stored and disclosed by employers only in appropriate ways.‟474  The Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) prohibits discrimination based inter alia on genetic predisposition 
to disability
475
 but does not prohibit access to employees‟ genetic information.  There is, 
however, nothing to suggest that such a right of access does exist. This point is made with the 
aim of supporting the observations of the ALRC. 
 The Privacy Act 1988 regulates the collection, use, storage, and disclosure of employees‟ 
personal information.  The Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) apply to public sector 
employers.  Since 21 December 2001 the National Privacy Principles (NPPs) apply to private 
sector employers unless they exercise the option of developing their own privacy code which has 
to be approved by the Privacy Commissioner.
476
 
 
(iii) Genetic Research 
Research involving human participants is well regulated in Australia by practice codes and 
legislation.  The adequacy of these instruments in relation to genetic research is, however, 
questionable.  There are major gaps in respect of enforceability and scope of application of 
practice codes.  It is encouraging to note the acknowledgement of different types of harm in one 
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of the Codes, as discussed below.
477
  This express acknowledgement bodes well for the extension 
of the concept of vulnerability as discussed in chapter three.  The codes and legislation, together 
with their respective flaws, positive attributes, and implications for genetic research, are 
discussed below. 
 (1) The Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (2007) 
The Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research was developed by the National 
Health and Medical Research Council, the Australian Research Council and Universities 
Australia.
478
  It replaced the Joint NHMRC/AVCC Statement and Guidelines on Research 
Practice (1997).  The Code is divided into two parts:  Part A covers principles and practices 
which are intended to encourage responsible research conduct and part B provides a framework 
for resolving allegations of research misconduct as well as breaches of the Code.  The Code 
requires researchers to comply with ethical principles of integrity, respect for persons, justice, 
and beneficence.  Researchers are also required to obtain written approval from appropriate 
ethics committees, safety, and other regulatory bodies.
479
  The emphasis of the Code is on 
responsible research.  There are two obvious gaps in the protection offered by the Code.  First, it 
does not deal specifically with human genetic research and secondly, compliance with the Code 
is required for receipt of National Health and Medical Research Council and Australian Research 
Council funding.
480
  All other researchers and research institutions are merely encouraged to 
comply with the guidelines in the Code. 
(2) National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (2007) 
The aim of the National Statement is to promote ethics in research.  The introduction to the Code 
states that „The conduct of research in Australia is characterised by high ethical and scientific 
standards, and the dangers to participants have been few. The continued promotion of ethically 
good human research – the purpose of this National Statement – will help to maintain these 
standards.‟481  An entire chapter of the National Statement is devoted to human genetic 
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research.
482
  The National Statement covers two aspects which are important for the purposes of 
this discussion.  First, it requires researchers to protect the privacy of research participants and 
the confidentiality of genetic data because of the potential for genetic information to be used to 
stigmatise people or to unfairly discriminate against them.  Specific reference is made to the 
areas of insurance and employment.
483
  Researchers are required to inform research participants 
of such potential risks.  Secondly, researchers are required not to transfer genetic data to any 
other researcher who is not involved in the particular research project except in specified 
circumstances.
484
   This is meant to ensure that the privacy of participants remains protected. 
The National Statement acknowledges the importance of a proper risk-benefit analysis in any 
research involving human participants.
485
  In so doing it takes cognisance of the following types 
of harm:  
 (i) „Psychological harms: including feelings of worthlessness, distress, guilt, anger or fear 
related, for example, to disclosure of sensitive or embarrassing information, or learning 
about a genetic possibility of developing an untreatable disease;   
 (ii) devaluation of personal worth: including being humiliated, manipulated or in other ways 
treated disrespectfully or unjustly; 
 (iii) social harms: including damage to social networks or relationships with others; 
discrimination in access to benefits, services, employment or insurance; social 
stigmatisation; and findings of previously unknown paternity status;  
 (iv) economic harms: including the imposition of direct or indirect costs on participants.‟486  
The recognition of these types of harm is very important for genetic research even though the 
Code does not specifically mention this. 
The National Statement provides that genetic research involving human participants must be 
reviewed and approved by a Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC).  In the course of 
conducting ethical assessments of research proposals, HRECs will consider the safeguards that 
researchers intend to put in place to protect the privacy of research participants.  Unfortunately 
the guidelines are only enforceable against researchers who are funded by the NHMRC. 
Compliance by other organisations is purely voluntary, thus leaving a gap in protection. 
(3) Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
The Privacy Act contains Information Privacy Principles (IPPs)
487
 and National Privacy 
principles (NPPs)
488
 which regulate the collection, use, storage, and disclosure of personal 
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information by public sector bodies and private sector organisations respectively.  In an attempt 
not to unduly hamper medical research by insistence on compliance with the IPPs, the Privacy 
Act provides for deviation from the IPPs in the research context.
489
  To meet this objective, s 95 
of the Privacy Act authorises the NHMRC, subject to approval by the Privacy Commissioner, to 
issue guidelines for the conduct of health research which would otherwise be in breach of the 
IPPs.  Compliance with the guidelines is sufficient to prove that particular research is not being 
conducted in breach of the IPPs.  The approval of guidelines is not an automatic or „rubber-
stamping‟ function performed by the Privacy Commissioner.  It requires the Commissioner to 
conduct a balancing exercise.  To this end the Privacy Act provides that „the Commissioner shall 
not approve the issue of guidelines unless he or she is satisfied that the public interest in the 
promotion of research of the kind to which the guidelines relate outweighs to a substantial degree 
the public interest in maintaining adherence to the Information Privacy Principles.‟490  In what 
may be considered a gesture of fairness in the whole process, the Act provides that „where the 
Commissioner refuses to approve the issue of guidelines an application may be made to the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of the Commissioner's decision.‟ 
The NHMRC, with the approval of the Federal Privacy Commissioner, issued guidelines 
under s95 of the Privacy Act in March 2000.
491
  These guidelines are meant to be read in 
conjunction with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans.  It 
includes guidelines on the protection of privacy in the conduct of medical research; procedures to 
be followed by researchers; a prerequisite of approval by a Health Research Ethics Committee 
(HREC); guidance for HREC‟s in assessing research proposals which are in breach of IPPs; 
reporting requirements; and complaints mechanisms.  
In a similar manner the Privacy Act also authorises deviations from the NPPs.
492
  Section 
95A allows the Privacy Commissioner to approve guidelines regulating the use and disclosure of 
health information for the purposes of research, or the compilation or analysis of statistics, 
relevant to public health or public safety without obtaining consent of the individuals to whom 
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such information relates.
493
  The Commissioner may give such approval only if satisfied that the 
public interest in the use and disclosure of health information outweighs the public interest in 
maintaining the level of privacy protection afforded by the NPPs.  
The Act also allows the commissioner to revoke approval if circumstances change such that 
he or she is no longer satisfied that guidelines are continuing to satisfy the necessary 
requirements for approval.
494
  The power of the Commissioner to refuse approval or to revoke 
approval is subject to review.  The Act clearly provides that „application may be made to the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of a decision of the Commissioner to refuse to 
approve guidelines or to revoke an approval of guidelines.‟495  The NHMRC issued guidelines 
under s 95A of the Privacy Act in December 2001.  The content of the guidelines is similar to 
that issued under s95 of the Privacy Act.  
Section 95AA of the Privacy Act 1988 allows the Privacy Commissioner to approve, for the 
purpose of the NPPs, guidelines that relate to the use and disclosure of genetic information for 
the purposes of lessening or preventing a serious threat to the life, health or safety (whether or 
not the threat is imminent) of an individual who is a genetic relative of the individual to whom 
the genetic information relates.  As is the case in respect of sections 95 and 95A, the decision of 
the Commissioner to refuse approval may be reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
Pursuant to s95AA, in October 2009 the NHMRC issued guidelines entitled „Use and Disclosure 
of Genetic Information to a Patient‟s Genetic Relatives under Section 95AA of the Privacy Act 
1988 (Cth).‟  These guidelines came into effect on 15 December 2009 and their purpose is to 
specify the requirements that must be met by health practitioners in the private sector  when 
disclosing patients‟ genetic information without  their consent.  These Guidelines do not apply to 
clinical genetics services or other medical practices in the public health sector since the NPPs do 
not apply to the public sector.  Furthermore, the guidelines only apply to genetic information 
collected on or after 21 December 2001; they only apply to genetic information about living 
persons; and they do not apply to the use of genetic information in human research.  All of these 
exclusions are loopholes in the guidelines which, in the context of genetic privacy, may be 
considered to be serious flaws. 
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(c) Privacy 
The Australian Federal Constitution does not contain specific provisions relating to privacy. 
Until recently there was no recognition of a general tort of invasion of privacy either.  Privacy 
rights were pursued through actions for breach of confidence.  It has been observed that „as a 
result of the severe limits in Australia‟s constitution, common law rights, and international 
obligations in relation to protection of privacy, Australian law‟s protection of privacy has 
principally involved legislation, or attempts to legislate.‟496  Certain sectors and activities are 
accordingly governed by specific privacy statutes.  
The Privacy Act 1988 is the main piece of federal legislation governing privacy in Australia.  
It regulates the handling of personal information in the public and private sectors.  The 
Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) apply to the federal public sector whilst the National 
Privacy Principles (NPPs) apply to the private sector.  Due to the constitutional framework that 
applies in Australia, the Privacy Act does not regulate the handling of personal information by 
state governments.  The Privacy Act defines health information to include „genetic information 
about an individual in a form that is, or could be, predictive of the health of the individual or a 
genetic relative of the individual. 
497
  The definition of sensitive information includes „genetic 
information about an individual that is not otherwise health information.‟  All of this means that 
genetic information is protected under the Privacy Act.  The NPPs offer additional protection to 
genetic information which falls within the definition of „sensitive information‟.498  
Two points are important to note in respect of the application of the Privacy Act to genetic 
information.  First, genetic information is not defined in the Privacy Act.  This is likely to pose 
interpretation and application problems due to the fact that various definitions of „genetic 
information‟ are possible.  Secondly, genetic information is dealt with just like other personal 
information.  There are no separate provisions addressing privacy concerns which may be unique 
to genetic information.  The inclusion of genetic information within the Privacy Act is a positive 
step but whether it is enough has yet to be decided.   
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One of the recommendations made by the ALRC in its report on privacy
499
  is that the 
Privacy Act should be redrafted and restructured to achieve significantly greater consistency, 
clarity and simplicity.
500
  The ALRC also recommended a rationalisation of the current NPPs and 
IPPs that would result in these principles being replaced by one set of principles regulating the 
handling of personal information.
501
  The proposed new principles are referred to as Uniform 
Privacy Principles (UPPs).  The Government agreed that the Privacy Act should be redrafted as 
recommended and that the current principles should be replaced by one set which should be 
referred to as Australian Privacy Principles (APPs) instead of UPPs.  In June 2010 the 
Government released an exposure draft of the new APPs for comment.  The APPs have not yet 
been finalised.    
The ALRC recommended that those elements of the privacy principles that deal specifically 
with the handling of health information should be set out in new health-specific privacy 
regulations.
502
 The Government rejected this proposal on the basis that it would create a „multi-
layered regulation of privacy‟ which could cause confusion. The proposal was not rejected in its 
entirety, though, as the Government agreed to address it in the Privacy Act itself.
503
   
A very important recommendation is that relating to the protection of a right to personal 
privacy.  The ALRC recommends that federal legislation should provide – 
(a) for a statutory cause of action for a serious invasion of privacy including, but not limited to, 
the disclosure of sensitive facts relating to an individual‟s private life;504 
(b)    that, for the purpose of establishing liability, a claimant must show that he or she had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and that the act complained of is highly offensive to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities;
505
 
 (c)  that a claimant will not be required to furnish proof of damage and that only intentional or 
reckless acts will be actionable;
506
 and  
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(d)  an exhaustive list of defences.
507
 
 The ALRC also recommends that a court dealing with a statutory claim for serious invasion 
of privacy should be empowered by the federal legislation to choose the most appropriate 
remedy regardless of existing constraints
508
 and that federal legislation should abolish any 
common law action for invasion of privacy upon enactment of a statutory cause of action.  The 
majority of the recommendations are progressive.  However, the restricted application of the 
proposed statutory cause of action to „serious invasions of privacy‟ is cause for concern as it 
constitutes a serious limitation on the protection of a right to personal privacy.  This concern 
cannot be alleviated by the proposed provision of a non-exhaustive list of the types of invasion 
that may fall within the statutory cause of action.  It is difficult to fathom on what basis the 
ALRC draws a distinction between serious invasions of privacy and other invasions of privacy, 
all of which affect the right to personal privacy.  Such a recommendation by the ALRC is not in 
keeping with the progressive tone that has been set by the rest of the report.  These 
recommendations will be dealt with by the government in the second stage of its response.  
 
 
(d) Privilege 
The Australian common law does not recognise medical privilege.  Statutory medical privilege 
does exist in three Australian jurisdictions; namely, Victoria, Tasmania, and the Northern 
Territory.  Such privileges are limited in scope and only apply in civil litigation.  It must also be 
noted that the privilege only applies in respect of information gained by medical professionals 
with a view to diagnosis and treatment of a patient.
509
  It may be argued that if clinical genetic 
research by a medical professional is coupled with treatment of a patient, the information gained 
during such research should be privileged.  Other genetic research will, however, not be subject 
to a privilege. In such a case a party to legal proceedings will have to rely on the court's general 
discretion to exclude certain evidence.  The fact that three Australian jurisdictions recognise a 
medical professional privilege bodes well for the potential recognition of other privileges.  There 
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is a lack of rigidity in the Australian approach, which is a positive sign for the future protection 
of genetic privacy. 
 
 
6.2.5 CANADA 
Canadian developments are based largely on the work of the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory 
Committee (CBAC)
510
 and the application of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act (PIPEDA)
511
 to genetic information.  An analysis of the Canadian position is 
intended to demonstrate how general legislation may be used to protect genetic privacy.  The 
CBAC noted the following in respect of genetic information protection in Canada: 
 „…apart from legislation dealing with DNA in criminal investigations, most provisions relevant 
to genetic privacy and discrimination are not found in laws dealing specifically with genetic 
issues. Instead, they appear in more general legislation – constitutional laws, laws governing 
professional confidentiality, data protection (privacy) and human rights laws among them.  Many 
of these general laws were drafted without genetics in mind. Nonetheless, they provide a 
substantial, if incomplete, legal framework for handling personal genetic information.‟512 
 
 
(a) Genetic Databases 
Canada has a national DNA databank which is used for law enforcement purposes.  The 
operation of this databank is governed by legislation.
513
  Canada also has a large number of 
research biobanks.
514
  A considerable amount of biobank activity is taking place in Canada for 
the purpose of genetic research but the exact number is unknown due to the fact that there is no 
formal process of registration for such biobanks.
515
  The regulation of research databases is 
complex.  As discussed further below,
516
  the rigid distinction between public and private sector 
entities results in  loopholes which can allow hybrid research databases to remain unregulated.  
For the purpose of the protection of genetic privacy, this is an issue that must be addressed. 
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(i) Forensic DNA Databases 
DNA evidence has been used in criminal prosecutions in Canada since 1988.  The admissibility 
of such evidence was, however, called into question by the courts in cases where DNA samples 
had been obtained without the consent of the accused.
517
  The unauthorised collection of 
biological samples was seen as an interference with an accused‟s right to bodily integrity.  In 
order to alleviate the difficulties being experienced, the Criminal Code
518
 was amended in 1995 
and the DNA Identification Act
519
 was passed in 1998.  These created a legislative framework 
for the collection and use of DNA evidence.  The DNA Identification Act came into force in 
2000. 
The DNA Identification Act
520
 authorised the establishment of the National DNA Data bank 
to be maintained by the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.  The purpose of 
the databank is to assist law enforcement agencies in solving crimes.  The databank consists of a 
Crime Scene Index (CSI) and a Convicted Offenders Index (COI).  The CSI contains DNA 
profiles derived from bodily substances that are found: 
(a)  at any place where a designated offence was committed; 
(b)  on or within the body of the victim of a designated offence; 
(c)  on anything worn or carried by the victim at the time when a designated offence was 
committed; or 
(d)  on or within the body of any person or thing or at any place associated with the commission 
of a designated offence.
521
 
DNA samples may only be taken if authorised under a warrant issued by a court.  In deciding 
whether to issue a warrant, the judge must consider the nature of the designated offence, the 
circumstances of its commission, and whether a properly trained person is available to take the 
DNA sample.
522
  The judge must also be satisfied that issuing the warrant would be in the best 
interests of the administration of justice.
523
 
                                                 
517
  In R. v. Borden, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145 and R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, the Supreme Court ruled DNA 
evidence inadmissible because bodily substances had been seized by police who had neither the consent of the 
accused nor any prior judicial authorization.  The taking of bodily substances could not be justified as a search 
incidental to an arrest and violated the accused‟s rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter. 
518
  Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985. 
519
  DNA Identification Act  S.C 1998. 
520
  Ibid. 
521
  Ibid s 5(3). 
522
  Section 487.05(2) of  the Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985. 
523
  Ibid s 487.05(1)(d). 
  
237 
 
The COI consists of DNA profiles derived from bodily substances.  DNA samples may be 
taken from offenders who were convicted before the DNA Identification Act came into effect.
524
 
A warrant is also required for the taking of a DNA sample from a suspect.
525
  These samples 
must, however, be destroyed if the results of the DNA analysis establish that the bodily 
substance did not come from the suspect.  Any profile derived from DNA analysis must be 
permanently deleted and may not be stored in any database.
526
  The DNA sample must also be 
destroyed.
527
 
Section 9 of the DNA Identification Act provides that information in the Convicted 
Offenders Index will be retained indefinitely.  This section does, however, provide for permanent 
removal of access to this information in specified cases.  It provides that where the conviction is 
quashed, access is removed immediately.  In the case of an unconditional discharge, access is 
removed one year after the discharge, unless the person is convicted of another offence during 
that year.  With a conditional discharge the rule is similar except that the time period is three 
years.  Section 10(7) provides for the destruction of bodily samples in cases where the conviction 
is quashed or there has been a discharge.  Where the conviction is quashed the sample is 
destroyed immediately. In the case of an unconditional discharge, the sample is destroyed one 
year after the person is discharged, unless the person is convicted of another offence during that 
year.  With a conditional discharge the time period is three years.  
The DNA Identification Act makes a concerted effort to protect the privacy of individuals 
from whom DNA samples are taken.  The Act recognises that - 
„(a) the protection of society and the administration of justice are well served by the early 
detection, arrest and conviction of offenders, which can be facilitated by the use of DNA 
profiles; and 
   (b)  to protect the privacy of individuals with respect to personal information about themselves, 
safeguards must be placed on: 
 (i)  the use and communication of, and access to, DNA profiles and other information 
contained in the national DNA data bank, and 
(ii)  the use of, and access to, bodily substances that are transmitted to the Commissioner 
for the purposes of this Act.‟528 
As regards the sharing of information with foreign law enforcement agencies, the DNA 
Identification Act provides that such sharing is only authorised  if the Government of Canada or 
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one of its institutions has entered into an agreement or arrangement, in accordance with 
paragraph 8(2)( f) of the Privacy Act,
529
 with that government, international organisation or 
institution, as the case may be.  The sharing of information is only permitted for the purposes of 
the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offence.
530
 
Section 11 of the Act imposes penalties for the use of biological samples or the 
communication of DNA analysis results, other than in accordance with the requirements of the 
Act. Pursuant to the passage of the DNA Identification Act and the accompanying DNA 
Identification Regulations, a DNA Data Bank Advisory Committee was established to monitor 
the operation of the data bank.  This committee has an oversight role.  It includes the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada and representatives of the police, legal, scientific, and academic 
communities among its members.  It is mandated to report and advise the Commissioner on all 
matters related to the effective and efficient operation of the databank and to assist in preventing 
potential misuse of DNA information.  The setting up of such a Committee was recommended by 
the Standing Senate Committee on Legal Constitutional Affairs in its Sixteenth Report dated 
December 1998, wherein the need for an independent advisory committee was deemed necessary 
to review and advise on the implementation and ongoing administration of the National DNA 
Data Bank.‟531 
It is evident from the above discussion that the DNA Identification Act has many safeguards 
which ensure that the Canadian National DNA Data Bank is appropriately regulated with privacy 
interests in mind.  In order to protect privacy the Act ensures inter alia that judicial authorisation 
is obtained for the taking of DNA samples, samples are only used for forensic DNA analysis, 
samples are used for identification purposes only, the retention of samples is only for the purpose 
of renewed profiling using new technologies, an oversight committee is formed, and only 
profiles as opposed to samples are shared with other governments.  The court in R v Rodgers
532
 
found that „the data bank provisions strike an appropriate balance between the public interest in 
the effective identification of persons convicted of serious offences and the rights of individuals 
to physical integrity and privacy.‟ 
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(ii) Genetic Research Databases 
In August 2010 Canada‟s three federal research agencies, the Canadian Institutes of Health 
Research (CIHR), the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), 
and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), issued the 
second edition of the Tri-Council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving 
Humans (TCPS)
 
.
533
  This is a joint policy of the three agencies.  In order to receive funding from 
these agencies, researchers must agree to comply with the TCPS.  Chapter 13 of the TCPS deals 
exclusively with human genetic research.  Article 13.7 of the TCPS provides as follows: 
„(a) Researchers who propose research involving the collection and banking of genetic material 
shall indicate in their research proposal, and in the information they provide to prospective 
participants, how they plan to address the associated ethical issues, including 
confidentiality, privacy, storage, use of the data and results, possibility of 
commercialization of research findings, and withdrawal by participants, as well as future 
contact of participants, families, communities and groups.  
  (b)  Researchers who propose research involving the secondary use of previously collected and 
banked genetic material shall, likewise, indicate in their research proposal how they plan to 
address associated ethical issues.‟ 
 The TCPS defines a biobank as „a collection of human biological materials.  It may also 
include associated information about individuals from whom biological materials were 
collected.‟  This clearly covers research databases and is not limited to collections of biological 
material.  Article 12.5 provides that: 
„[i]nstitutions and researchers that maintain biobanks - 
(a) shall ensure that they have or use appropriate facilities, equipment, policies and procedures to 
store human biological materials safely, and in accordance with applicable standards; and 
 (b)  shall establish appropriate physical, administrative and technical safeguards to protect human 
biological materials and any information about participants from unauthorised handling.‟ 
The abovementioned guidelines are only applicable to research that is funded by the three 
federal agencies.  Private biobanks which fall within the scope of PIPEDA
534
 will be bound by 
the PIPEDA requirements for storage and disclosure of personal health information, which may 
include genetic information.  The challenge lies in respect of those biobanks which cannot be 
classified as purely public or private, more particularly those which are public-private 
partnerships.  It has been observed that „the frequent, watertight dichotomy between public 
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sector or private sector privacy legislation fails to recognise current hybrid biobank structures, 
which often serve as resources for future, unspecified research which may or may not include 
commercial support or use.  Constitutional divisions between trade and commerce (federal 
jurisdiction) and healthcare and civil rights (provincial jurisdiction) also complicate the modern, 
mixed picture.‟535  Sheremeta  concludes that „the existing legislative framework is complex and 
may compel consideration of biobank-specific legislation that could address the complex privacy 
issues.‟536  This may be the only solution and even though Canada has not adopted genetic-
specific legislation it has clearly recognised that genetic information needs to be dealt with 
differently in certain circumstances.  The TCPS, which includes a separate chapter on genetic 
research, is an example of this approach.  There is clearly a major gap in the regulatory 
framework which has to be closed and it appears that the only way to achieve this in such a 
complex system is through specific legislation. 
 
 
(b) Genetic Discrimination 
Canada does not have specific legislation dealing with genetic discrimination by insurers or 
employers. It has been noted that the Canadian position „contrast(s) starkly with leading norms in 
Europe, the U.S. and the international community, where a growing number of jurisdictions 
provide explicit and often stringent statutory protection of genetic and health privacy.  Canadians 
would seem to enjoy less clear, less rigorous and likely, fewer protections of genetic privacy than 
do many citizens of Europe and the U.S.‟537    
 
(i) Insurance 
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)
538
 is a federal 
statute which regulates how private-sector organisations collect, use and disclose personal 
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information in the course of commercial business.  As of 1 January 2004, PIPEDA applies to 
commercial activities of life and health insurers in those provinces which have not adopted 
„substantially similar‟ legislation.  PIPEDA accordingly applies throughout Canada with the 
exception of Québec, Alberta, and British Columbia.  It has been observed by the insurance 
industry that „the requirements in the legislation are similar to the industry guidelines that life  
and health insurers had been following since 1980, and complement long-standing industry 
practices.‟539 
PIPEDA draws a distinction between personal information and personal health information. 
Personal information is defined as „information about an identifiable person but does not include 
the name, title or business address or telephone number of an employee of an organization.‟ 
Personal health information is defined as: 
„(a) information concerning the physical or mental health of the individual;  
 (b) information concerning any health service provided to an individual;  
 (c) information concerning the donation by the individual of any body part or any bodily 
substance of the individual or information derived from the testing or examination of a 
body part or bodily substance of the individual;  
 (d) information that is collected in the course of providing health services to the  
individual; or 
 (e)  information that is collected incidentally to the provision of health services to the 
individual.‟540 
PIPEDA does not specifically refer to genetic information.  It is nevertheless possible to interpret 
the definition of „personal health information‟ to include genetic information.  In this way it 
would be possible to extend the protection offered by PIPEDA to cover genetic information. 
The policy in the insurance industry is that insurers will not request genetic testing as a 
prerequisite for insurance.  Insurers believe that they are, however, entitled to results of genetic 
tests that were conducted prior to an application for insurance.  In 2000 the Canadian Life and 
Health Insurance Association (CLHIA) issued a position statement on genetic testing, which was 
last updated in April 2010.
541
  The pertinent points made in the policy are as follows: 
„(i) Information derived from genetic tests is medical information that is potentially relevant to 
risk classification.
542
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 (ii) No genetic information will be used in risk assessment unless its actuarial relevance has 
been scientifically proven.
543
 
 (iii) Genetic information will be treated with utmost confidence and will not be disclosed to any 
other party except with the consent of the applicant or as required by law.
544
 
 (iv) Genetic information will be used only for risk assessment purposes.
545
 
 (v) Genetic information will only be collected with the consent of the applicant for 
insurance.‟546 
The CLHIA has also issued a Consumer Code of Ethics in terms of which all CLHIA 
members agree „to respect the privacy of individuals by using personal information only for the 
purposes authorised and not revealing it to any unauthorised person.‟547  The Genetic Testing 
Position Statement indicates that „personal information‟ includes genetic information.  The 
CLHIA is, however, merely a voluntary trade association even though its membership accounts 
for 99 percent of the life and health insurance in force in Canada.  It can accordingly not 
guarantee genetic privacy protection.  The current position is flexible but not ideal.  
 
(ii) Employment 
There is no legislation which specifically protects genetic information privacy in the employment 
sphere.  The Privacy Act
548
 regulates the collection, disclosure, storage, and protection of 
information by federal government agencies.  The definition of „personal information‟ under the 
Act includes the medical history of identifiable individuals.
549
  This could possibly be interpreted 
to include the results of genetic tests that have been  undergone by employees of federal 
government agencies. PIPEDA plays the same role in the private sector.  It protects „personal 
information about employees of an organisation that collects, uses, or discloses the information 
in connection with the operation of a federal work, undertaking, or business.  It is unlikely that 
PIPEDA will protect genetic information of employees because it applies to „personal 
information‟ and not to „personal health information‟ of employees.  As discussed above,550 it is 
only the definition of „personal health information‟ that may be interpreted to include genetic 
information.  Such interpretation is not possible with the definition of „personal information‟.  
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This means that genetic information of private sector employees will not be protected by 
PIPEDA.  
 
(iii) Genetic Research 
The TCPS
551
 provides that research involving living human participants requires ethics review 
and approval by a Research Ethics Board (REB) before the research commences.  It also requires 
such approval for research involving human biological materials, derived from living and 
deceased individuals.  Human biological materials include tissues, organs, blood, plasma, serum, 
DNA, RNA, proteins, cells, skin, hair, nail clippings, urine, saliva and other body fluids.  This 
clearly encompasses genetic research. 
Chapter 13 of the TCPS
552
 deals exclusively with genetic research.  The introductory section 
explains why genetic research demands a slightly different approach.  It states as follows: 
„Research may help us better understand the human genome, and genetic contributions to health 
and disease. It may lead to new approaches to preventing and treating disease. Individuals may 
benefit from learning about their genetic predispositions, if intervention strategies are available to 
prevent or minimize disease onset and mitigate symptoms, or to otherwise promote health. 
Genetic research also has the potential, however, to stigmatize individuals, communities or 
groups, who may experience discrimination or other harms because of their genetic status, or may 
be treated unfairly or inequitably.‟553 
It is also emphasized that chapter 13 „does not reiterate guidance set out in earlier chapters. 
Rather it focuses on issues that arise specifically in the context of human genetic research and 
provides guidance for managing information revealed through genetic research, provision of 
genetic counselling, participation of families, communities and groups in genetic research, 
banking of human biological materials, and research involving gene transfer.‟554  Researchers are 
expected to include in the research proposal a plan for managing information that may be 
revealed in the course of genetic research; submit the plan to the Research Ethics Board; and 
advise prospective participants of the plan.
555
  The aim of this chapter is clearly to prevent the 
potentially harmful consequences of the disclosure of genetic information. 
In addition to the genetic-specific requirements contained in chapter 13, researchers are 
expected to abide by all the other relevant provisions in the TCPS. Article 13.1 states that 
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„[g]uidance regarding a proportionate approach to research ethics review, consent, privacy, 
confidentiality, research with human biological materials and other ethical guidance described in 
earlier chapters of this Policy apply equally to human genetic research.‟  Researchers are also 
expected to comply with applicable legal and regulatory requirements.  What is applicable will 
depend on the jurisdiction within which the research is being conducted and on the source of 
funding.  This is due to the Canadian constitutional dispensation as well as the distinction that is 
drawn between the private and public sectors.  In the event of a conflict between the TCPS and 
the law, researchers should comply with the law.  Privacy rights must, however, be respected at 
all times in accordance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  As far as private 
sector research is concerned, researchers may have to comply with PIPEDA or similar provincial 
legislation in order to ensure that the rights of research participants are protected.   
 
 
(c) Privacy 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
556
 does not include a specific right to privacy. 
Section 7 of the Charter provides a right to liberty and security of the person whilst section 8 
provides a right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures.  The courts have interpreted 
the rights under sections 7
557
 and 8
558
  of the Charter as protecting citizens against unreasonable 
invasions of privacy by government agencies.  The court in R. v O’ Connor made it clear, 
however, that the right to privacy is not absolute and „must be balanced against legitimate 
societal needs.‟559  It is not certain whether the courts will extend the interpretation to protect 
genetic privacy.  The approach of the Canadian Supreme Court in the following cases has been 
positive.  In R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd. the Supreme Court stated that the rights guaranteed in the 
Charter „must be interpreted generously and not in a narrow or legalistic fashion.‟560  In Hunter v 
Southam Inc. Dickson J stated that the function of the Charter is „to provide…for the unremitting 
protection of individual rights and liberties.‟561  These sentiments were reiterated by the Supreme 
Court in R v Dyment.
562
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The Supreme Court of Canada has clearly acknowledged a right to privacy stemming from 
other rights in the Charter.  In Hunter v Southam Inc. Dickson J stated that the purpose of s 8 
„is…to protect individuals from unjustified intrusions upon their privacy.‟563  The rights in the 
Charter are only enforceable against the government and have no horizontal application.  This 
will prove to be a limiting factor in the protection of genetic privacy since a considerable amount 
of genetic information is handled in the private sector.  What is important to note here, though, is 
that it may be possible to protect genetic privacy on the basis of the existing rights in the Charter.  
This lies in the hands of the Canadian courts. 
Canada has two federal privacy statutes;  namely, the Privacy Act
564
 and PIPEDA.
565
  The 
Privacy Act regulates the collection, disclosure, storage, and protection of personal information 
in the federal public sector whilst PIPEDA addresses the same issues in the private sector. 
Neither of these statutes refers specifically to genetic information.  In order to enjoy the 
protection afforded by these statutes in their current form, it will be necessary to show that 
genetic information is encompassed within the definitions of the information which is subject to 
their protection.  The definition of „personal information‟ under the Privacy Act includes the 
medical history of identifiable individuals.
566
  This could possibly be interpreted to include 
genetic information. PIPEDA deals with personal and personal health information.  The 
definition of „personal health information‟ includes „information derived from the testing or 
examination of a body part or bodily substance of the individual.‟  This can undoubtedly cover 
genetic information since DNA is derived from bodily substances.   
Both statutes are overseen by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada who receives complaints, 
conducts investigations and issues findings.  The Commissioner can make recommendations, 
which are non-binding, but is not authorised to issue orders or impose penalties.  The 
Commissioner is expected to conduct periodic audits of both federal institutions and private 
organisations for the purpose of determining their compliance with the respective statutes.  
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(d) Privilege 
Two of the foundational rules of litigation are that parties must disclose all relevant documents 
and witnesses must answer all questions put to them.  There are, however, exceptions to these 
rules in the form of legal privilege.  Canadian law recognises three legal privileges; namely, 
solicitor-client privilege; litigation privilege; and settlement privilege.  In addition to these 
privileges the courts are willing to recognise  other claims of privilege which satisfy Wigmore‟s 
four-part test as discussed in chapter five.  The test requires that:  
(i)  the communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;  
(ii)  this element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of 
the relationship between the parties;  
(iii)  the relationship must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be „sedulously 
fostered‟; and  
(iv)  the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be 
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.  
The decision of the Supreme Court in M. (A.) v. Ryan
567
 is important for any discussion on the 
recognition of new claims of privilege in Canada.  This case dealt with a psychiatrist‟s claim that 
the contents of a patient‟s file were protected from disclosure by a privilege.  Since there is no  
blanket privilege for communications between patient and physician, the court applied  the 
Wigmore test to the facts of the case.  It found that the first three requirements were satisfied. In 
respect of the fourth requirement, the court pointed out that the common law must develop in a 
way that reflects Charter values, including the interest in privacy.  The court found that there was 
a compelling interest in protecting the communications at issue from disclosure but indicated that 
such compelling interest had to be balanced against the interest in the correct disposal of 
litigation.  This, according to the court, would not have to result in any one of the interests at 
stake being subordinated to the other if the idea of a „partial privilege‟ is accepted.  The court 
noted that „disclosure of a limited number of documents, editing by the court to remove non-
essential material, and the imposition of conditions on who may see and copy the documents are 
techniques which may be used to ensure the highest degree of confidentiality and the least 
damage to the protected relationship, while guarding against the injustice of cloaking the truth.‟  
                                                 
567
  [1997] 1 SCR 157. 
  
247 
 
McLachlin J, on behalf of the majority, concluded that a judge may afford a privilege to 
psychiatrist-patient records in appropriate circumstances. 
The reasoning by the majority in this case is important for the protection of genetic 
information.  The concept of a partial privilege indicates progressive thinking based on 
constitutional values.  The following comments by the majority are important for the purpose of 
assessing the Supreme Court‟s attitude towards the recognition of new heads of privilege: 
(i) „While the circumstances giving rise to a privilege were once thought to be fixed by 
categories defined in previous centuries…it is now accepted that the common law permits 
privilege in new situations where reason, experience and application of the principles that 
underlie the traditional privileges so dictate.‟568 
(ii) „…the law of privilege may evolve to reflect the social and legal realities of our time, 
including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.‟569 
(iii) „…the common law must develop in a way that reflects emerging Charter values.  It 
follows that the factors balanced under the fourth part of the test for privilege should be 
updated to reflect  relevant Charter values.  One such value is the interest affirmed by s.8 of 
the Charter of each person in privacy.‟570 
The attitude of the Supreme Court is positive even though Canada does not recognise a general 
physician-patient privilege.  The courts have not yet dealt with a claim of privilege based on 
confidential genetic information.  Recognition of a genetic information privilege will depend on 
the nature of the relationship within which genetic information is imparted as well as whether the 
court will find the interest in preserving confidentiality to be compelling.  If the court finds that 
the first three requirements of the Wigmore test are satisfied and that there is a compelling 
interest in protecting the confidentiality of genetic information, it may extend at least a partial 
privilege to genetic information.  This will be a great step towards the protection of genetic 
privacy in Canada. 
 
 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
The cross-jurisdictional review has focused on legal, ethical, and policy developments in the UK, 
USA, Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands.  It is established that although the approaches in 
the jurisdictions under review vary in form and scope, there is a common underlying attempt to 
allay fears of genetic discrimination in the interest of a greater good, which is that of promoting 
                                                 
568
  Ibid para 20. 
569
  Supra note 567 para 21. 
570
  Ibid para 30. 
  
248 
 
the science of genetics for the benefit of future generations.  The importance of genetic research 
is acknowledged in all jurisdictions although none require additional protection for those human 
participants who do not fall into the traditional categories of vulnerable groups.  This is a 
common gap that has been identified.   
 In addition, the following conclusions have been reached: 
(1) There are two basic approaches to the protection of genetic information; namely, the privacy 
approach and the anti-discrimination approach.  The anti-discrimination approach, which 
protects individuals against potentially harmful uses of genetic information, tends to be 
frequently used.  This must be attributed to attempts to allay fears of genetic discrimination. 
(2) The privacy model, which represents a paradigm shift from a reactive to a proactive model of 
genetic information protection, has not yet been fully explored in other jurisdictions.   
(3) Even though the anti-discrimination approach has merit, it is inadequate as it does not curb 
the indiscriminate flow of highly sensitive information. In order to provide maximum protection, 
anti-discrimination legislation must therefore be complemented by privacy protection 
mechanisms. 
(4) Genetic research databases are not adequately regulated. Self-regulation is often the norm. 
(5) There is no common approach to the use of genetic information by insurers. 
(6) Human genetic research participants are not adequately protected against potential 
discrimination and stigmatisation.  This inadequacy is most noticeable in private sector research. 
(7) The concept of a genetic information privilege has not yet been investigated.  There appears 
to be little scope for the recognition of such a privilege. 
 The cross-jurisdictional review has revealed merits, flaws, and gaps in the approaches 
adopted by the various jurisdictions. No jurisdiction has yet developed optimal protection for 
genetic information.  The current approaches focus mainly on the prevention of discrimination 
and may therefore be described as one-dimensional and inadequate. Nevertheless, every 
jurisdiction does offer potential solutions and lessons based on experience.  These are valuable 
lessons for South Africa. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
LEGAL, ETHICAL, POLICY AND INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Genetic information privacy is a relatively new concept which arose in response to 
concerns created by the completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003.  The South 
African approach to genetic information is still very much in a state of infancy, hence the 
notable absence of a unified effort to address this issue.  As a result, a discussion of the 
South African approach requires a consideration of relevant legislation, policies, ethical 
guidelines and industry codes.  This chapter identifies those instruments which are or 
could be relevant to genetic information and aims to determine whether, and in what 
respects, they may protect genetic privacy.    
No similar comprehensive study has been undertaken in South Africa.  The closest 
attempt has been a brief study of the legal regulation of genomics research in South 
Africa by Slabbert.
1
   This study assessed relevant constitutional provisions, legislation, 
common law principles, ethical guidelines, and the role of ethics committees/IRBs
2
 in 
regulating genomics research.  Slabbert concluded that there is currently a legal vacuum 
in this area and that a legal framework is required for the regulation of genomics 
research.   
The National Health Research Ethics Council (NHREC) undertook an even more 
focused audit of the laws and guidelines which provide protection for vulnerable research 
participants in South Africa.  In July 2011 a draft report was released for public 
comment.
3
  The audit reviewed primary legislation, subordinate legislation, ethical 
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guidelines, and policies relating to vulnerable research participants.
4
  The audit did 
identify gaps in the legal
5
 and ethical
6
 frameworks.  It did conclude that the ethical 
framework offers more comprehensive protection than the legal framework does.
7
  Of 
interest is its other finding that the law does not contain a definition of vulnerability.
8
  
Unfortunately the audit concentrated solely on vulnerable research participants and in this 
sense, the audit and its findings are limited.   
The following instruments are accordingly discussed in this chapter with the aim of 
providing a more complete assessment of the state of genetic privacy protection in South 
Africa: 
1. National Health Act;9   
2. Regulations relating to stem cell banks;10  
3. Regulations relating to the use of human biological material;11 
4. Employment Equity Act;12   
5. Protection of Personal Information Bill;13  
6. Criminal law (Forensic Procedure) Amendment Bill.14  
7. Human Genetics Policy Guidelines for the Management and Prevention of Genetic 
Disorders, Birth Defects and Disabilities;
15
 
8. National Guidelines for the Care and Prevention of the Most Common Genetic 
Disorders, Birth Defects and Disabilities;
16
  
9. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Conduct of Clinical Trials with Human 
Participants in South Africa;
17
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10. Guidelines on Ethics for Medical Research:  Reproductive Biology and Genetic 
Research;
18
  
11. Code of Ethical Practice for Medical Biotechnology Research in South Africa;
19
  
12. Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Care Professions – Confidentiality: 
Protecting and Providing Information;
20
   
13. Code of Genetic Testing;
21
 and 
14. National Patients‟ Rights Charter.22 
Based on discussions of the abovementioned instruments, conclusions regarding the 
current state of genetic information protection in South Africa are reached at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
 
7.2 LEGISLATION 
(1) National Health Act 61 of 2003  
In terms of s 27(2) of the South African Constitution
23
 the State must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realisation of the right of the people of South Africa to have access to health care 
services.  The National Health Act
24
 may be regarded as the most important piece of 
legislation in the health sector since it gives effect to this section of the Constitution.  It 
establishes a framework for a structured uniform health system.  The framework is 
intended to be supplemented by regulations issued by the Minister of Health as and when 
required. 
 The objective of the National Health Act is to regulate national health and to provide 
uniformity in the provision of health services.
25 
  One of the means of achieving this 
objective is by protecting, respecting, promoting and fulfilling the rights of vulnerable 
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groups.  The Act specifically seeks to protect the rights of vulnerable groups such as 
women, children, older persons, and persons with disabilities.
26
  I would argue that the 
express reference to vulnerable groups can facilitate the protection of genetic information 
in two ways.  First, based on the wording of the Act, the list of vulnerable groups is not 
exhaustive.  This means that those research participants who qualify as „vulnerable‟ can 
derive protection from the Act.  The challenge, however, lies in the fact that the law does 
not define vulnerability.
27
  It simply refers to certain groups as being vulnerable.  This 
makes it difficult to argue for the inclusion of new groups in the category of vulnerable 
research participants.  Despite the envisaged difficulty, extensive arguments for such 
inclusion have already been made in chapter three and are therefore not repeated here. 
 The National Health Act
28
 grants specific protection to research participants by 
providing that research or experimentation on a living person may only be conducted in 
the prescribed manner and with the written consent of the person after he or she has been 
informed of the objects of the research or experimentation and any possible positive or 
negative consequences for his or her health.
29
  As discussed in chapter three, the issue of 
vulnerability in research is a complex one.  It is often assumed, as is evident from the 
reading of section 21(1), that informed consent can eliminate vulnerability.  This is not 
entirely correct, especially in the case of genetic research. Participants in genetic research 
are vulnerable due to the risk of genetic discrimination based on their participation in as 
well as the findings of genetic research.  Viewed from this perspective, it appears that 
section 21(1) would not address the concerns of genetic research participants. 
 Secondly, it is possible to include persons who have genetic disorders within the 
category of „persons with disabilities‟.  This is particularly relevant for individuals who 
are diagnosed with genetic disorders but are presymptomatic.  Those who do display 
symptoms can be classified as disabled based on the nature or severity of visible 
symptoms.  A finding of disability can be made by observation or physical examination 
of the individual by a medical practitioner.  When symptoms are present, there would be 
no problem in determining disability.  The matter becomes complicated when faced with 
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an individual who has been diagnosed with a genetic disease but has not yet started to 
display external symptoms.  The time of onset of the disease may not be predictable.  As 
a precautionary measure such individuals may be excluded from particular types of 
employment because of the potential threat they pose to others.  The typical scenario is 
that of airline pilots and machine operators as discussed in chapter three.  Such 
individuals may be considered to have a disability even though there is no external 
manifestation of disease.  Not every genetic disorder may qualify as a disability but there 
is scope for the inclusion of certain genetic disorders.  Examples would be those that 
render the individual ineligible for certain types of work even though he or she does not 
display symptoms of disease.  I would argue that individuals with such genetic disorders 
should be entitled to protection under the Act on the basis of disability. 
   Section 13 of the National Health Act
30
 requires persons in charge of health 
establishments to ensure that a health record for every user of health services is created 
and maintained at the health establishment.  The person in charge must also implement 
measures to prevent unauthorised access to those records and to the storage facility in 
which, or system by which, records are kept.
31
  Failure to do so amounts to an offence for 
which the penalty is a fine, imprisonment for a period up to one year or both a fine and 
imprisonment.  Section 14 of the National Health Act
32
 protects the right to 
confidentiality.  It provides that no information about a health services user may be 
disclosed unless the user consents to that disclosure in writing; a court order or any law 
requires that disclosure; or non-disclosure of the information represents a serious threat to 
public health.  
 All of the abovementioned sections of the Act are designed to protect users of health 
services.  Vulnerable groups are expressly mentioned.  The right to privacy is given due 
consideration by virtue of the protection of confidentiality
33
  and by prohibition of the 
unauthorised disclosure of health records.
34
 The regulations which are discussed below 
have been issued in terms of the National Health Act 61 of 2003.  
 
                                                 
30
  Supra note 9. 
31
  Ibid s 17. 
32
  Supra note 12. 
33
  Ibid  s 14. 
34
  Ibid s 16. 
  
254 
 
(2) Regulations Relating to Stem Cell Banks
35
 
These regulations were issued in terms of s 68 of the National Health Act.
36
  Section 68 
only came into operation on 17 May 2010.
37
 The regulations deal inter alia with the use, 
processing, storage, and distribution of stem cells. Regulation 9(d) requires a stem cell 
establishment to store data for a period of thirty years after donation or clinical use so as 
to ensure traceability.  Regulation 10 provides that all data, including genetic 
information, collated within the scope of the regulations, shall remain confidential.  The 
penalty for a contravention or failure to comply is a fine, imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment.
38
  It is unfortunate that neither 
the National Health Act
39
 nor these regulations define the term „genetic information‟. 
 
(3)  Regulations Relating to the Use of Human Biological Material
40
 
These regulations were issued in terms of s 68 of the National Health Act.
41
   Section 68 
came into operation on 17 May 2010.
42
  The regulations are intended inter alia to control 
the flow of genetic information.  The following regulation is relevant for this purpose: 
„13.   An authorised institution that keeps or discloses genetic material records and other 
individually identifiable or related health information in any form, whether electronically, 
orally or on paper must ensure that- 
(a) the information is treated confidentially; 
(b) ensure that health care providers or planners give users a clear explanation of how 
the user can use, keep and disclose their information; 
(c) users have access to their records; 
(d)  user's written informed consent is obtained before information is released to health 
insurers, other health care providers or any other relevant person; 
(e) the information is used for the purpose for which it was originally intended; 
(f)  the written informed consent of the user or donor is obtained for long term storage 
of genetic material, stem cells or research findings; 
(g)  the records are destroyed after the purpose for which they were created has been 
served; and 
(h)  the information is treated as anonymous if used for research purposes.‟ 
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Regulation 14 provides that the penalty for contravention of or failure to comply with 
these regulations, is a fine or imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both such fine and 
imprisonment. These regulations do not define genetic information. 
 
(4) Employment Equity Act
43
 
This Act aims to achieve equity in the workplace by promoting equal opportunity and fair 
treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair discrimination.
44
  It does not 
apply to members of the National Defence Force, National Intelligence Agency, South 
African Secret Service, South African National Academy of Intelligence or Comsec.
45
  
The Act prohibits medical testing of employees unless the testing is required or 
permitted by law or there are justifiable reasons for doing so.
46
  Medical testing according 
to the Act „includes any test, question, inquiry or other means designed to ascertain, or 
which has the effect of enabling the employer to ascertain, whether an employee has any 
medical condition.‟47  The protection is extended to job applicants who are also 
considered to be employees for the purposes of this Act.
48
  It is not clear whether 
„medical testing‟ would be interpreted to include genetic testing and screening. 
The Act prohibits unfair discrimination against employees on the basis of race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, 
political opinion, culture, language and birth.
49
  It does not expressly deal with unfair 
discrimination based on results of genetic testing or genetic screening in the employment 
sphere.    The term „disability‟ is not defined in the Act thus making it difficult to 
determine whether a genetic disorder could be regarded as a disability or not.  The 
Oxford Dictionary defines disability as „a physical or mental condition that limits a 
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person‟s movements, senses, or activities.‟   For legislative purposes, „disability‟ could 
possibly be widely interpreted to include predisposition to certain genetic disorders since 
a genetic disorder is a physical condition which may render the affected individual 
ineligible for particular types of employment related activities.  On the other hand, the 
Act provides that it is not unfair discrimination to distinguish, exclude or prefer any 
person on the basis of an inherent requirement of a job.
50
  It is thus possible that persons 
who test or screen positive for certain genetic disorders may legitimately be excluded 
from particular types of employment due to the nature of the work involved.  Their 
exclusion would not amount to the prohibited „unfair discrimination‟ envisaged by the 
Act. 
The Act does not expressly address the issue of genetic discrimination.  Whether or 
not the Act can be utilised to prevent genetic discrimination would depend on how its 
provisions are interpreted.   
 
(5) Protection of Personal Information Bill
51
 
The South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) commenced its investigation into 
privacy and data protection in 2003 and released its report in August 2009.
52
  The report 
includes the Protection of Personal Information Bill.
53
  The bill is intended to give effect 
to the constitutional right to privacy by regulating the processing of personal information. 
It also gives effect to internationally recognised core information protection principles.  
The bill takes the form of a general information protection statute which may be 
supplemented by sector-specific statutes and codes of conduct.  The report acknowledges 
the negative consequences of inadequate information protection in the area of genomic 
research.
54
  The list of consequences includes stigmatisation, insurance discrimination, 
and employment discrimination. 
Section 25(b) of the bill provides special protection to health information by 
prohibiting unauthorised processing of such information.  Processing refers to „any 
                                                 
50
  Ibid. 
51
  Supra note 13. 
52
  South African Law Reform Commission Report (Project 124) Report on Privacy and Data Protection 
(2009). 
53
  Supra note 13. 
54
  Supra note 52 at 110. 
  
257 
 
operation or activity or any set of operations, whether or not by automatic means, 
concerning personal information, including the collection, receipt, recording, 
organisation, collation, storage, updating or modification, retrieval, alteration, 
consultation, use, dissemination by means of transmission, distribution or making 
available in any other form, merging, linking, as well as blocking, degradation, erasure or 
destruction of information.‟55  The protection is not absolute as section 30 provides 
exemptions to the prohibition on the processing of personal information concerning 
health.  Such exemptions apply in specified circumstances to the processing by medical 
professionals, healthcare institutions or facilities, social services, insurance companies, 
medical aid schemes, medical scheme administrators, managed healthcare organisations, 
schools, institutions for probation, child protection or guardianship, the Ministers of 
Justice and Constitutional Development and of Correctional Services, administrative 
bodies, pension funds, employers or institutions working for them.  The relevant 
subsections of s 30 provide as follows: 
„30. (1) The prohibition on processing personal information concerning a data subject's 
health or sexual life, as referred to in section 25, does not apply to the processing by – 
 … 
(b)   insurance companies, medical aid schemes, medical scheme administrators and 
managed healthcare organisations, provided that this is necessary for - 
(i)   assessing the risk to be insured by the insurance company or covered by the 
medical aid scheme and the data subject has not objected to the processing; 
(ii)   the performance of an insurance or medical aid agreement; or 
(iii)  the enforcement of any contractual rights and obligations. 
… 
(f) administrative bodies, pension funds, employers or institutions working for them, if 
this is necessary for – 
(i)  the implementation of the provisions of laws, pension regulations or collective 
agreements which create rights dependent on the health or sexual life of the data 
subject; or 
(ii)  the reintegration of or support for workers or persons entitled to benefit in 
connection with sickness or work incapacity. 
 … 
(5)  Personal information concerning inherited characteristics may not be processed in 
respect of a data subject from whom the information concerned has been obtained, 
unless - 
(a)  a serious medical interest prevails; or 
(b)  the processing is necessary for the purpose of scientific research or statistics.  
(6)  More detailed rules may be prescribed concerning the application of subsection 
(1)(b) and (f).‟ 
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Upon reading s 30(5) it can be said that the Bill attempts to address the processing of 
genetic information, thereby offering some recognition to genetic privacy.  Special 
reference to „personal information concerning inherited characteristics‟ may indicate that 
a distinction is being drawn between genetic information and other health information.  
Such a distinction may prove useful for regulating the processing of genetic information 
in the future since genetic information is different from other health information and may 
require different rules.  Section 30(6) which provides that more detailed rules may be 
prescribed in respect of the processing of health information by insurers and employers is 
particularly relevant for the purpose of protecting genetic privacy. 
The difficulty lies in reconciling ss 30(1) and 30(5).  It is not clear whether section 
30(5) is intended to provide additional exemptions to the prohibition on the processing of 
genetic information or to be treated as the only exemptions applicable to genetic 
information.  If intended to be the only exemptions, it would mean that the exemptions 
provided for in s 30(1) would not apply in respect of genetic information.  The result 
would be that no person or entity, including those referred to in s 30(1), may process 
genetic information in any circumstance except those specified in s 30(5).  The 
consequences of such a restrictive approach, especially in respect of the insurance 
industry, have been discussed comprehensively in chapter 3.   
 
(6) Criminal Law (Forensic Procedure) Amendment Bill
56
 
The Bill was drafted as part of the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development‟s review of the criminal justice system.  It seeks to amend the Criminal 
Procedure Act,
57
 South African Police Service Act,
58
 Firearms Control Act,
59
 and 
Explosives Act
60
 in an attempt to address certain shortcomings in the South African 
criminal justice system.  The shortcomings identified related to the absence of legislation 
to provide for the establishment and administration of a DNA database as a criminal 
intelligence tool and the lack of legislative provision for the collection of DNA evidence.  
The Bill therefore provides inter alia for the creation of a DNA database to assist in 
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addressing crime in South Africa.  It also facilitates the linking of governmental 
fingerprint databases; namely the Department of Transport‟s e-NATIS system61 and the 
Department of Home Affairs‟ HANIS system.62  This is intended to be achieved by the 
insertion of Chapters 5A and 5B into the South African Police Service Act.
63
  The DNA 
database, referred to as the National DNA Database of South Africa (NDDSA), will be 
established by the insertion of chapter 5B into the South African Police Service Act. 
Chapter 5B clearly states that its purpose is to establish and maintain a national DNA 
database.  The NDDSA will contain biological samples as well as DNA profiles derived 
from such samples.  
Clause 9 of the Bill seeks to insert chapter 5B into the South African Police Service 
Act.
64
 Section 15E of the proposed chapter 5B states as follows: 
„The purpose of this chapter is to establish and maintain a national DNA database which 
may only be used for purposes related to the identification of missing persons, the 
identification of unidentified human remains, the prevention or detection of crime, the 
investigation of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution and not for any unauthorised 
purpose in order to, among others – 
(a) serve as a criminal intelligence tool in the fight against crime; 
(b) identify persons alleged to have committed offences, including those committed 
before the entry into force of this chapter; 
(c) where applicable, prove the innocence or guilt of accused persons; or 
(d) where applicable, the identification of missing persons or unidentified human 
remains.‟ 
The Bill
65
 provides that the NDDSA shall contain five indexes; namely a crime scene 
index, reference index, convicted offenders index, volunteer index, and personnel, 
contract and supplier elimination index. 
 The aims of the Bill are laudable and necessary but also a source of concern.  These 
concerns are addressed in the light of international experience, relevant literature and 
cases.  The concerns mentioned briefly below and have been addressed in more detail in 
chapter two: 
(i) The Bill is applicable to adults and children.  
(ii) Non-intimate samples may be taken from arrested and convicted persons as well 
as from suspects.  
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(iii) The Bill permits speculative searching of databases.
66
   
(iv)  The proposed permanent retention of samples and profiles as envisaged in the Bill 
is problematic.
67
   
(v)   The provision relating to sharing of NDDSA information with foreign law 
enforcement agencies poses a great threat to privacy of individuals.   
(vi)  Consent given by volunteers cannot be withdrawn.   
The position envisaged in the Bill is untenable.  Many of the provisions violate the right 
to privacy and will not pass constitutional muster.  The Marper case is a good example of 
how competing rights should be balanced.  It is hoped that the provisions in the Bill will 
be tempered as the Bill proceeds through the legislative process.  If not, it risks being 
successfully challenged in court. 
 
 
7.3 POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
(1) Human Genetics Policy Guidelines for the Management and Prevention of 
Genetic Disorders, Birth Defects and Disabilities
68
 
In August 2001 the Department of Health issued policy guidelines for the management 
and prevention of genetic disorders, birth defects, and disabilities.  The foreword to these 
policy guidelines acknowledges that genetic disorders have not received adequate 
attention in South Africa.  The purpose of the policy guidelines is to facilitate the 
integration of genetic services into primary health care in an attempt to prevent the 
recurrence of genetic disorders and to reduce genetic related morbidity.  A 
comprehensive genetic service is envisaged for South Africa. 
The guidelines envisage the creation of a Medical Genetic Advisory Board which will 
be responsible for addressing inter alia issues such as the release of genetic information to 
third parties.  Insurers and employers are given as examples of such third parties.  The 
guidelines include general ethical guidelines which provide for confidentiality of genetic 
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information.
69
  The ethical guidelines also provide for the protection of individual privacy 
from institutional third parties such as employers, insurers, schools, commercial entities, 
and government agencies.
70
 
 
(2) National Guidelines for the Care and Prevention of the Most Common Genetic 
Disorders, Birth Defects and Disabilities
71
 
In 2006 the Department of Health launched the National Guidelines for the Care and 
Prevention of the Most Common Genetic Disorders, Birth Defects and Disabilities.  The 
purpose of these guidelines to facilitate the management of the common genetic 
disorders.  Like the policy guidelines discussed above, these guidelines also mention 
ethical considerations such as confidentiality.  It notes that genetic information should be 
protected from third parties except where lack of information may affect the safety of the 
individual.  Informed consent is required before the release of genetic information even to 
family members.  This document is a further reflection of the commitment of the 
Department of Health to improving genetic services in South Africa and an 
acknowledgement of the importance of protecting genetic privacy. 
 
 
7.4  ETHICAL GUIDELINES 
(1) Guidelines for Good Practice in the Conduct of Clinical Trials with Human 
Participants in South Africa
72
 
These guidelines were issued by the Department of Health.  They are intended to promote 
good practice in the conduct of clinical trials involving human participants in South 
Africa.  They provide a basis for the scientific and ethical integrity of research involving 
human participants.  This includes protecting the rights and safety of research 
participants.  It is noted that ethical guidelines for clinical trials are crucial because of the 
„potential to violate the rights of trial participants particularly vulnerable communities‟.73  
The main ethical principles addressed are respect for the dignity of persons, beneficence 
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and non-maleficence, and justice.
74
  Patient privacy is also accorded due consideration in 
the guidelines.  It is clearly stated that „participants‟ right to privacy must be protected at 
all costs.‟75 
 The drafting of these guidelines was guided by the contents of the following 
documents and South African researchers are expected to observe the principles 
contained in these documents:
76
 
(i) ICH Guideline for Good Clinical Practice, ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline; 
(ii) Declaration of Helsinki; 
(iii) International Guidelines for Ethical Review of Epidemiological Studies, Council for 
International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) 1991; 
(iv) World Health Organisation, WHO Technical Report Series, No. 850, Guidelines for 
good clinical practice (GCP) for trials on pharmaceutical products (1995); 
(v) World Health Organisation (2000) Operational Guidelines for Ethics Committees 
That Review Biomedical Research. Geneva. TDR/PRD/Ethics/2000.1; 
(vi) MEDSAFE, New Zealand Regulatory Guidelines for Medicines, Vol. 3: Interim 
Good Clinical Research Practice Guideline (August 1998); 
(vii) Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry Clinical Trial Compensation 
Guidelines, Issued January 1991, Reprinted March 1994; and 
(viii) Institutional Review Board (IRB) Guidebook. Office for the Protection from 
Research Risks – National Institutes of Health, USA (1993).77 
 The guidelines dealing with the protection of study participants identify participants 
whose involvement need special attention.  These include minors, women; people with 
mental disabilities or substance abuse related disorders, persons in dependent 
relationships or comparable situations, prisoners, and persons who are highly dependent 
on medical care.
78
  This list appears to be an extension of the list of vulnerable groups as 
contained in the National Health Act which is discussed above.
79
  There is no reason why 
persons with genetic disorders cannot be included in this list since their involvement in 
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research also requires special attention.  Drug trials are crucial for the advancement of 
pharmacogenomics and such trials require the participation of individuals with genetic 
disorders.  Such individuals may understandably be unwilling to participate in clinical 
trials for fear of discrimination in other spheres of their lives.  They are vulnerable in this 
sense.
80
  For this reason it becomes necessary to impose additional safeguards in research 
involving human genetics.  Such safeguards may be imposed by research ethics 
committees.  The guidelines do provide that the list of special groups is not exhaustive.
81
  
This provision can also facilitate the inclusion of genetic research participants as 
deserving of heightened protection.  
 The guidelines also specify the types of research that need additional attention.  These 
are: 
(i)  Research involving collectivities; 
(ii)  research involving indigenous medical systems; 
(iii) emergency care research; 
(iv) research involving innovative therapy or interventions; 
(v) research involving vulnerable communities; and 
(vi) HIV and AIDS clinical and epidemiological research.
82
 
This list can be interpreted to accommodate ethnic groups or communities within which 
certain genetic disorders may be prevalent.  These groups could qualify as „vulnerable 
communities‟ deserving of additional protection.  It is interesting to note the special 
provision in respect of HIV and AIDS.  A similar provision for individuals with genetic 
disorders would prove useful in attracting research participants as well as protecting 
them. 
  4 
 According to the guidelines a community may be regarded as vulnerable on any one 
of the following grounds: 
(i)  Limited economic development; 
(ii)  inadequate protection of human rights; 
(iii) discrimination on the basis of health status; 
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(iv) limited ability of individuals in the community to provide informed consent; 
(v)  limited availability of health care and treatment options; and 
(vi) inadequate understanding of scientific research.
83
 
Grounds (ii), (iii) and (vi) are pertinent to genetic research.  With regard to ground (ii), 
privacy is a human right and if genetic privacy is not protected it cannot be said that there 
is adequate protection of human rights.  The absence of genetic privacy protection would 
thus render any community involved in genetic research vulnerable.  With regard to 
ground (iii), it can be argued that discrimination on the basis of genetic disorders is a 
foreseeable harm which necessitates the protection of genetic information from 
unauthorised disclosure.  The discussion in chapter three is relevant is this regard.  With 
regard to ground (vi), it is possible to assume that due to the technical and complex 
nature of genetic research, few communities are likely to understand it.
84
  Their lack of 
understanding is what would make them vulnerable. 
 It is intended that the above guidelines will be enforced via regulations issued in 
terms of section 90 of the National Health Act.
85
  Compliance with these guidelines is 
compulsory under the direction of the Director-General of Health.
86
 
 
(2) Guidelines on Ethics for Medical Research: Reproductive Biology and Genetic 
Research
87
 
These guidelines were revised inter alia because of fairly recent developments such as the 
Human Genome Project.  The law and policy relating to genetic screening and genetic 
testing are discussed.  The guidelines try to minimise the negative impacts of genetic 
screening and testing on access to life insurance and employment prospects.
88
  
Confidentiality and the right to privacy are considered in some detail.
89
  Reference is 
made to the constitutional right to privacy as well as the common law principles.  It is 
pointed out that the right to privacy is not absolute. 
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As far as employment is concerned, the guidelines attribute the interest of employers 
in genetic information to health-related costs of employment.
90
  The following paragraph 
is noteworthy: 
„The dangers of permitting employers to embark on their own screening programmes are 
self-evident.  The result would be restrictions on the employment of individuals who are 
at risk of genetic disease, and the creation of class orders based on genetic disposition.  In 
other words, genetic discrimination would ensue…..the cost implications for the State are 
critical.  Whereas the business community currently bears some of the cost of genetic 
disease in the population, by excluding this cost through genetic screening, business 
would effectively shift their share of the cost to the State, with repercussions for social 
welfare and health policy in particular.‟91 
  
In response to the above concerns, the guidelines recommend that genetic screening 
programmes in the employment context should be permitted only where – 
(i) the programme is approved by the appropriate regulatory body; 
(ii) steps have been taken to ensure that individuals are not unfairly treated; 
(iii) procedures are in place to assist the individual to find other employment; 
(iv) there is strong evidence of a clear connection between the working environment and 
the development of the condition for which the screening is conducted; 
(v) the condition is one which seriously endangers the health of the employee, or is one 
in which an affected employee is likely to present a serious danger to third parties; 
and 
(vi) the condition is one that cannot be eliminated or made less hazardous by reasonable 
measures taken by the employer to modify or respond to the environmental risks.
92
 
With regard to insurance, the guidelines note the arguments put forward by insurers 
that using genetic information to predict risk is a mere extension of their current practice 
of requiring family medical history.  The counter-argument is that the results of genetic 
tests do not always predict outcomes and they lack actuarial import.
93
  Based on the 
differences in approach to the significance of genetic test results, the guidelines 
recommend a moratorium on disclosure of genetic information until the issue can be 
settled between the State and the insurance industry.  The recommendation is made 
subject to the following two exceptions: 
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(i) individuals with a known family history of genetic disease that can be established 
by the conventional questions about proposers‟ families may be asked to disclose 
the results of relevant genetic tests; and 
(ii)  the moratorium should apply only to policies of moderate value.
94
   
 
(3) Code of Ethical Practice for Medical Biotechnology Research in South Africa 
This code was adopted by the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) in 
2005.
95
  The following observation in the code is very encouraging as it succinctly 
identifies the concerns relating to genetic information and attempts to address such 
concerns: 
„In addition to the usual ethical concerns that govern research involving humans, 
supplementary ethical issues exist which are unique to genetic research.  These issues 
arise from the nature of genes and genetic information which, although personal to the 
actual participant, are shared with family members and unrelated members of the 
population.  The potential for harm to participants, through the use of genetic information 
discovered during research, includes stigmatization and the potential for discrimination 
by, for example, insurance companies and current or potential employers.  Subsequently 
it is important that care be taken to ensure that participants in genetic research are not at 
risk, due to their participation in genetic research, of being denied the benefits available 
to other members of the community.‟96 
The code also indicates that in genetic research there are additional requirements for 
informed consent.
97
  Twenty one requirements are thus listed.  The code deals inter alia 
with issues of confidentiality in genetic research.  It recognises that‟ the nature of genetic 
research raises additional ethical issues in relation to privacy and confidentiality.‟98  The 
code recommends that genetic research participants be informed of the implications for 
insurance if they are found to have a predisposition to a genetic disorder.  Participants 
must be made aware, during the consent process, that if a predisposition to a genetic 
disorder is discovered in the course of the research, such information must be disclosed to 
the participant‟s insurer.99  It is recommended in the code that insurers continue with their 
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current policy of not requiring genetic testing for insurance applications.
100
  The reason 
for such recommendation is the recognition of the following „dangers‟:  
„(a)  The difficulty of assessing what may be slender evidence on the genetic 
susceptibility of  individuals to develop polygenic and multifactorial diseases (e.g. 
some cancers and some heart diseases); 
 (b)  an awareness that ordinary commercial practice will lead companies to be 
overcautious in their assessment of the risks derived from medical data; and  
 (c) The potential for abuse i.e. discrimination.‟101  
 In respect of genetic screening of employees for occupational risks during genetic 
research, the code provides that participants must be informed that if they are found to 
have genetic disorders which may be potentially harmful to colleagues, such information 
will have to be disclosed to the employer.
102
  The code provides that such genetic 
screening may only be conducted in the following circumstances: 
„(a) Where there is strong evidence of a clear connection between the working 
environment and the development of the condition for which genetic screening can 
be conducted;  
 (b) Where the condition in question is one which seriously endangers the health of the 
employee or is one in which an affected employee is likely to present a serious 
danger to third parties;  
  (c)  Where the condition is one for which the dangers cannot be eliminated or 
significantly reduced by reasonable measures taken by the employer to modify or 
respond to the environmental risks.‟103  
 The code places great emphasis on informed consent as a tool for dealing with the 
unique issues posed by genetic research.  Informed consent may become part of the 
solution to the lack of genetic privacy protection in the research context.  
 
(4) Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Care Professions – Confidentiality: 
Protecting and Providing Information
104
  
These guidelines are issued by the HPCSA and are intended to provide a framework for 
the protection of patients‟ rights as well as to assist health care practitioners to comply 
with their ethical and legal obligations.  They are based on international ethical codes, the 
constitution, and the National Health Act.
105
  Clause 3 deals with patients‟ right to 
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confidentiality.  It refers to rule 13 of the Ethical Rules of the HPCSA which states that 
information about a patient may only be divulged if done in terms of law, upon 
instruction of a court, in the public interest;  with the express consent of the patient;  with 
the written consent of the parent or guardian of a minor under the age of 12; or with the 
written consent of the next of kin or executor of a deceased patient‟s estate.106 
 
 
7.5 INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS 
(1) Code on Genetic Testing
107
  
In 2001 the Life Offices‟ Association (LOA) developed a Code of Genetic Testing as part 
of its Code of Conduct.
108
  The introduction to the Code noted that various consumer 
groups had indicated concern about genetic testing and its impact on the availability of 
insurance.  This concern extended to the potential misuse of genetic information by the 
insurance industry.  The Code provided inter alia that existing genetic test results could 
be used in underwriting policies; it was inappropriate to request applicants to undergo 
genetic testing; the LOA would maintain a register of persons whose applications had 
been adversely treated due to genetic abnormalities; and that all medical information 
should be handled with respect for privacy and confidentiality.  Viewed from the 
perspective of the LOA, the most important issue raised by the new genetic technology is 
the ability of insurers to access results of genetic tests that were conducted prior to an 
application for insurance.
109
  The response of the LOA to this issue was that access to 
information relevant to the risk is a cornerstone of insurance and all relevant information 
that is known to the applicant must therefore be disclosed to the insurer at the time of 
application for insurance.  In keeping with the fact that insurance is a contract of utmost 
good faith, this would include disclosure of results of genetic tests that were performed 
prior to the application.
110
  As discussed in chapter three, such a stance by insurers is also 
aimed at avoiding adverse selection.  The Code acknowledged that changes to the policy 
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may become necessary in time depending on changes in technology and consumer 
attitudes and the code was accordingly subject to periodic review.   
The LOA was disbanded in 2008 and its functions were subsumed by the Association 
for Savings and Investment SA (ASISA), which is a representative body for many 
savings, investment, and insurance organisations, including the LOA.  ASISA is 
mandated by its members to engage with policymakers and regulators on issues of 
common concern.  Part of this includes its development of a code on Genetic Testing.
111
  
The introduction to the code acknowledges the concerns that have arisen due to the 
mapping of the human genome and advances in genetic technology.  Implications for the 
insurance industry are also noted.  The code sets out the rights and obligations of the 
various parties involved in the insurance industry, namely, the insurance applicant, 
insurer, underwriter, intermediaries, and ASISA itself.  It also gives an assurance of 
confidentiality in the handling of genetic information.  
Although ASISA recommends the code to all of its members, compliance with the code 
is merely voluntary.  It is envisaged that in due course the code will become an 
entrenched agreement and will be binding on all ASISA members.
112
  Like the previous 
code issued by the LOA, this code is also subject to periodic review due to anticipated 
changes in technology and consumer attitudes.  It is apparent that the insurance industry 
is monitoring developments in the area of genetics and that their policies will be 
developed accordingly. 
 
(2) National Patients’ Rights Charter113 
The charter sets out patients‟ rights and responsibilities.  It also offers guidance to health 
care workers as to how to deliver health care services to patients in a way that promotes 
the realisation of their constitutional right of access to health care.  It briefly mentions 
patients‟ rights to confidentiality and privacy.  It notes that information concerning health 
and treatment may only be disclosed with informed consent except when required in 
terms of any law or any order of court.  Even though the charter is not legally binding, the 
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Health Professions Council of South Africa requires health care practitioners to adhere to 
the guidelines provided therein.
114
   
 It may be argued that persons who are affected by genetic disorders should be able to 
enjoy equal privacy protection on the basis of the charter.  Such individuals have a 
constitutional right of access to health care which cannot be fully realised due to privacy 
concerns.  They should be able to seek medical care and be involved in clinical research.  
Their right to privacy should be adequately and expressly protected so as to enable them 
to realise their right of access to health care.  This can only be achieved if genetic 
information is accorded due recognition as sensitive medical information requiring 
additional safeguards.  The charter would be a good starting point for such an endeavour. 
 
 
7.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The South African approach to the protection of genetic information is not found solely  
in any particular statute, policy, industry code, or ethical guideline.  A study of the  
current position  reflects a reactionary, piecemeal approach to the protection of genetic 
information.  Protective mechanisms are scattered throughout various instruments.  In 
most cases the application of a particular instrument to genetic information requires 
liberal interpretation of the relevant provisions.  A common thread running through all 
the instruments, however, is that of respect for patient confidentiality and privacy.  This 
is implemented by requiring patients‟ informed consent for participation in research and 
for disclosure of medical information.  There are, however, two problems which cannot 
be solved by informed consent:  inherent vulnerability amongst genetic research 
participants, as discussed in chapter three, and compulsory disclosure of confidential 
medical information in court proceedings, as discussed in chapter five. 
Based on the discussion of the various instruments in this chapter it is concluded that 
only the ASISA Code of Genetic Testing;
115
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Research;
116
 and Code of Ethical Practice for Medical Biotechnology Research in South 
Africa
117
 directly address the issue of genetic information and genetic privacy.  All other 
instruments require liberal interpretation in order to be made applicable to genetic 
privacy.  Even the Protection of Personal Information Bill
118
 does not expressly deal with 
genetic privacy.  The Bill is too restrictive in its approach to information relating to 
„hereditary characteristics‟.  It accordingly hampers, rather than facilitates the 
development of sector-specific genetic privacy protection.  The Criminal Law (Forensic 
Procedure) Amendment Bill provides for the establishment of a forensic DNA database 
but the approach that it adopts is unlikely to pass constitutional muster.  The Bill contains 
controversial provisions which have already been found to be unconstitutional by the 
European Court of Human Rights.
119
  
 There is scope for the protection of genetic research participants within the 
Guidelines for Good Practice in the Conduct of Clinical Trials with Human Participants 
in South Africa.
120
  It will be difficult, though, to classify genetic research participants as 
a vulnerable group worthy of additional protection.  On the face of it, the Employment 
Equity Act
121
 does not offer protection to employees who may be affected by genetic 
disorders.   
 Confidential medical information is not protected from disclosure in judicial 
proceedings.  This poses a problem in respect of genetic information which is sensitive 
due to the risk of genetic discrimination posed by disclosure to third parties.  The 
introduction of a genetic information privilege would be consistent with the constitutional 
right to privacy. 
 The South African position in respect of genetic information is clearly unsatisfactory.  
This is not due solely to flaws in the regulatory framework but more to gaps since the 
legal, ethical, and policy positions are not yet fully developed.  What is required is a 
unified position, which can clearly be attained through a single statute.  A statute would 
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eliminate confusion and be enforceable, thus creating an enabling environment in which 
genetic science can flourish for the benefit of all South Africans. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
„Once a civilization has made a distinction between the „outer‟ and „inner‟ man, between 
the life of the soul and the life of the body, between the spiritual and the material, 
between the sacred and the profane, between the realms of God and the realms of Caesar, 
between church and state, between rights inherent and inalienable and rights that are the 
power of government to give and take away, between public and private, between society 
and solitude, it becomes impossible to avoid the idea of privacy by whatever name it may 
be called.‟1  
 
 The realisation of the potential for diagnosis and prediction of genetic conditions 
began with the initiation of the Human Genome Project in 1990.   The completion of the 
human DNA sequence in 2003 coincided with the 50th anniversary of Watson and 
Crick's discovery of the fundamental structure of DNA (the double helix).  This has been 
hailed as a giant step in genetic science.  The deciphering of the human genome ushered 
in a new era of genetics which poses its own challenges to traditional legal concepts and 
regulatory frameworks.  It renewed the debates surrounding the issue of personal privacy 
and fears of discrimination as a consequential harm resulting from inadequate privacy 
protection.  This is therefore a topic which has to be addressed, especially in a country 
like South Africa which has a constitutionally entrenched right to privacy. 
 This thesis anticipates the challenges that South Africa is going to face.  It 
accordingly set out to identify issues and concerns relating to genetic privacy, together 
with the relevant developments in selected jurisdictions, with the aim of demonstrating 
that South Africa requires comprehensive genetic privacy legislation.  This necessitated a 
literature review of the legal and ethical debates; a cross-jurisdictional review of legal, 
ethical, and policy developments; and an assessment of the South African regulatory 
framework.  This undertaking resulted in the overall conclusions which are discussed 
below. 
                                                 
1
  Herbert Marcuse One-Dimensional Man (1964) 10 quoted in MR Konvitz, „Privacy and the law: A 
philosophical prelude‟ (1966) 31 Law & Contemporary Problems 272 at 273. 
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8.2  OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
 
(a) Genetic Databases 
The benefits of forensic and non-forensic DNA databases are substantial and undeniable.  
Notwithstanding the benefits of DNA databases, they do pose enormous legal and ethical 
challenges.   
(i) Forensic DNA databases 
Forensic DNA databases have far-reaching constitutional implications.  It is imperative 
that a balance be attained between the individual‟s right to privacy and society‟s need for 
crime reduction.
2
  The legislative framework must not, however, have an inhibitory effect 
on crime detection and prosecution.  Legal parameters need to be set for the operation of 
forensic DNA databases.  This can be adequately achieved through a genetic privacy 
statute. 
(ii) Genetic research databases 
There is a general lack of regulation of genetic research databases.  This could hamper 
efforts to recruit participants for genetic research.  Due to the importance of genetic 
research, it is crucial that genetic research databases be adequately regulated.  Legal 
regulation is preferable due to enforceability of the law.  It is also important to ensure that 
research databases are not utilised for forensic purposes.  Cross-border sharing of data 
should be encouraged only where the receiving country has a similar level of privacy 
protection.  All of these issues have serious consequences and can only be adequately 
addressed through legislation. 
 
(b) Insurance 
Insurers have an interest in genetic information for underwriting purposes.  Genetic 
discrimination in insurance has not yet become a major problem anywhere in the world 
but many governments have foreseen the potential for discrimination and are proactively 
taking steps to prevent genetic discrimination.  Concern about the disclosure of genetic 
information could result in reluctance to participate in genetic research as well as 
                                                 
2
  S and Marper v The United Kingdom 30562/04 [2008] ECHR 1581 (4 December 2008). 
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reluctance to utilise genetic health services.  Preventing harm in the context of insurance 
is most suitably addressed by the implementation of genetic information privacy 
protection as opposed to the creation of anti-discriminatory measures.  This is simply 
because the flow of information is easier to monitor and enforce as opposed to the use of 
information once it is in the hands of an insurer or employer.
3
   
Three approaches to the problem have been identified: legislative prohibition, 
moratoria and the status quo.  Concerns have been raised about the enforceability of 
moratoria.
4
  The status quo approach cannot be encouraged because it ignores the 
gravity of public concern about genetic discrimination.
5
  In an area as sensitive and as 
far-reaching as human genetics, it is safer to rely on legislation as a protective 
mechanism due to its status and enforceability.  The legislative approach offers the 
most certainty and greatest level of protection.  
 
(c) Employment 
There are documented cases of genetic discrimination by employers in the United States 
of America 
6
 and in Germany.
7
  The economic impact of permitting access to employees‟ 
genetic information is an important consideration in the decision to restrict such access. 
Employers should not have an automatic right of access to genetic information of 
employees.
8
  There are situations in which it may be necessary for employers to gain 
access to such information but this should only be done in clearly specified 
circumstances, with the consent of the employee, and with alternative job functions rather 
than dismissal in mind.  Genetic testing at the request of employers may be reasonable 
and necessary if it is based on the inherent requirements of a job but there is no need for 
the disclosure of actual test results to the employer.  There must also be penalties for 
                                                 
3
  Pauline T. Kim „Genetic discrimination, genetic privacy: Rethinking employee protections for a brave 
new workplace‟ (2002) 96:4  Northwestern University Law Review 1497.  
4
  Yann Joly, Bartha M Knoppers
 
 & Béatrice Godard
   „Genetic information and life insurance: a „real‟ 
risk‟ (2003) 11:8 European Journal of Human Genetics 561 at 562.  
5
  Ibid. 
6
  Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratoy 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998);  Echazabal v 
Chevron USA 213 F.3d 1098 (9
th
 Cir.2000);  Bentivegna v United States Dept of Labour 694 F.2d 619 (9
th
 
Cir. 1982). 
7
  Jane Burgermeister „Teacher was refused job because relatives have Huntington‟s Disease‟ (2003) 327 
British Medical Journal 827. 
8
  Kim op cit note 3 at 1543. 
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unauthorised access to employees‟ genetic information.  The required level of protection 
can only truly be achieved through privacy legislation and not through anti-
discrimination legislation.
9
 
 
(d) Genetic Research 
In order for genetic research to continue and for its potential to be fully realised, it is 
necessary to alleviate the fear of genetic discrimination.  Ethical guidelines provide for 
the protection of human research participants but these lack enforceability.  Research 
Ethics Committees are not functioning optimally and are therefore unable to provide the 
required degree of protection.  The requirement of informed consent and the conventional 
concept of vulnerability, which is consent-based, do not provide protection to genetic 
research participants.  None of the relevant national and international instruments regard 
genetic research participants as vulnerable even though they are exposed to an increased 
risk of stigmatisation (social harm) as well as potential discrimination by insurers and 
employers (economic harm).  This non-inclusion of genetic research participants as a 
vulnerable group can be attributed to the foundational basis of the concept of 
vulnerability, which is the capacity to provide full and informed consent.  Since genetic 
research participants cannot be accommodated within the existing consent-based concept 
of vulnerability, the foundational basis of the concept must be extended to include 
increased susceptibility to additional harm due to or resulting from participation in 
research. 
Potential stigmatisation and genetic discrimination arising from genetic research 
involving human participants warrants the introduction of genetic privacy legislation. 
 
(e) Genetic Privacy 
Computer technology and genetic technology demand fresh scrutiny of existing privacy 
regimes.  A combination of both technologies poses a major challenge to privacy in the 
traditional sense.  Even though the right to privacy enjoys constitutional protection, the 
challenges posed by a combination of genetic technology and information technology 
require legislative intervention for three reasons.  First, judicial development of the 
                                                 
9
  Kim op cit note 3 at 1537. 
  
277 
 
common law is unlikely to keep pace with the rapidly advancing science of human 
genetics.  Secondly, the courts have not displayed an eagerness to develop the common 
law.
10
  Thirdly, the current regulatory framework (legal and ethical) is limited insofar as 
the protection of genetic privacy is concerned.  There are four major models of privacy 
protection; namely, comprehensive laws, sectoral laws, self-regulation, and technologies 
of privacy.
11
  All of these models may prove suitable for the protection of genetic 
privacy.  Due to the number of issues that must be addressed, and in order to avoid a 
piecemeal approach to the protection of genetic privacy, a comprehensive statute will be 
most effective. 
 
(f) Genetic information privilege 
Professional privilege is limited to the legal profession in most jurisdictions.  The 
common law recognition of other privileges has been hampered by a conventional test 
which is clearly outdated.  Genetic information privilege can therefore not be protected 
by a medical professional privilege because such a privilege does not exist.   
 The ad hoc development of the law relating to privilege is neither appropriate nor 
advisable for the protection of genetic information due to the sensitivity of genetic 
information and its wide-ranging implications.  Judicial discretion as a tool for the 
protection of genetic information requires progressive thinking by judicial officers.  This 
cannot be guaranteed.  It is therefore necessary to create a statutory genetic information 
privilege.  This call for the introduction of a new privilege is very likely to meet with 
resistance. 
 
(g) Cross-jurisdictional review 
All of the selected jurisdictions recognise the need for protection of genetic information 
but  have adopted different approaches towards it.  The form and extent of protection 
varies in each country.  Countries tend to favour an anti-discrimination approach instead 
of a privacy approach for this purpose.  This is clearly a flawed choice as it cannot 
                                                 
10
  NM  & others v Smith & others (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (5) SA 250 
(CC) at 281A;  Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria & another (Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies & another, Amici Curiae) 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC). 
11
   Electronic Privacy and Information Centre (EPIC) and Privacy International  Privacy and Human 
Rights 2002:  An International Survey of Privacy Law and Developments  (2002) 3 
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adequately protect genetic information.  Complete protection can only be attained 
through a privacy model.  
 There is a general lack of regulation of genetic research databases worldwide, 
especially in the private sector.  No common approach to the protection of genetic 
information in the context of insurance has been found and there appears to be little scope 
for the recognition of a genetic information privilege.  No jurisdiction has yet developed 
optimal protection for genetic information.   
  
(h) South African regulatory framework  
A study of the current position reflects an inadequate, reactionary, piecemeal approach to 
the protection of genetic information.  Protective mechanisms are scattered amongst 
various legal, ethical, and policy instruments.  There is little scope for the common law 
recognition of a genetic information privilege.  Except for the National Health Act,
12
 no 
other legislation seeks to enforce the constitutional rights of research participants.  There 
is no research-specific legislation in South Africa.  This lacuna threatens the future of 
genetic research in South Africa.  This in turn will have negative consequences for the 
health system, the insurance industry, employment relationships, and the utilisation of 
genetic health services.  The problem can be addressed by the introduction of a genetic 
privacy statute. 
 
 
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings of this research, South Africa should develop and implement a 
comprehensive genetic privacy statute.  Such a statute should include provisions aimed at 
controlling the flow of genetic information to third parties, the regulation of genetic 
research, the regulation of DNA databases, and the creation of a genetic information 
privilege.  It should be applicable to the public and private sectors. 
 The preamble to the statute should acknowledge that genetic information is medical 
information which has unique characteristics.  The purpose of the statute should be to 
protect the constitutional right to privacy by regulating the flow of genetic information.  
                                                 
12
  Act 61 of  2003. 
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The statute should contain a clear definition of genetic information.  The following 
definition is accordingly recommended:  
Genetic information is information derived from genetic testing,  information 
about an  individual's request for, or receipt of genetic services;  information 
about participation in or results of genetic research; and information contained in 
forensic and genetic research databases. 
Based on the arguments made in chapter three for the extension of the concept of 
vulnerability, the proposed statute should contain a definition of vulnerability.  The 
following definition is recommended:   
„Vulnerability includes increased susceptibility to social and economic harm due 
to or resulting from participation in genetic research.‟ 
 Specific restrictions on access to genetic information by employers and insurers 
should be included in the Act.  In respect of employers, the Act should clearly  specify 
the circumstances in which access to genetic information of employees will be permitted, 
the extent of such access, as well as penalties for contravention of the relevant provisions.  
In respect of insurers there should be a prohibition on the ability to request applicants to 
undergo genetic testing as part of the process of application for insurance.  The current 
position is untenable for two reasons; namely, insurers have the right to request results of 
prior genetic tests regardless of the amount of insurance cover being applied for, and 
there is no legally enforceable undertaking by insurers not to request genetic testing.  It is 
recommended that government should immediately commence negotiations with the 
insurance industry to attain certainty in this area instead of waiting for a test case. 
 The Act should strictly regulate the creation, operation, and governance of genetic 
research databases.  This should include detailed provisions on access to information 
contained in such databases and a prohibition on the use of data from these databases for 
forensic purposes.  Since the envisaged DNA Bill
13
 will regulate forensic DNA 
databases, the genetic privacy statute should contain provisions which complement those 
in the Bill with added emphasis on privacy protection.   
 It has been shown that, due to the unique characteristics of genetic information, a 
privilege is required and that its creation can be justified.  Despite the general resistance 
                                                 
13
  Criminal law (Forensic Procedure) Amendment Bill B2-2009 (phase 2). 
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to the creation of new privileges, it is recommended that a genetic information privilege 
should be created in the Bill.   
 The statute should provide for a Genetic Information Privacy Commissioner 
(Commissioner) whose duties should include monitoring compliance with the law, 
providing guidance on interpretation and implementation of the proposed Genetic Privacy 
Act, raising public awareness of genetic privacy issues, providing advice to the 
government and to the public,  making recommendations on the Act,  and  performing 
other ad hoc functions  that may be necessary for the protection of the right to genetic 
privacy.  This is important because this is a dynamic and rapidly advancing field.  The 
Commissioner should be suitably qualified to appear as an expert in judicial proceedings 
which involve the protection of genetic privacy.  The Commissioner should also keep 
abreast of international developments and disseminate updates on such developments.  
The statute should be complemented by industry codes of practice which should be 
approved by the Commissioner.   
 If the abovementioned recommendations are to achieve their aim, they need to be 
implemented as a matter of urgency in order to ensure that South Africans do not remain 
exposed to the identified threat of violation of their right to genetic privacy. 
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